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Abstract 
This dissertation engages the question of what role the Chinese Righteous War Tradition 
(CRWT) played in the process of Chinese decision-making regarding the decisions to go to war 
during the period from 1950 to 1979. It asks whether, in their decision-making, the Chinese 
leaders identified “just cause” through a frame of reference provided by the CRWT; it asks 
further under what circumstances the identified “just cause” may have exerted influence upon 
their decision for war. This dissertation presents the first empirical study exploring the 
application and influence of the traditional Chinese concept of righteous war to China’s modern 
history.  
The CRWT is my label for a set of ideas found in the ancient Chinese classics. These ideas 
suggest that two major standards, righteousness-based justifications and competent authority, 
were a frame of reference for the Chinese leaders in their assessment of the legitimacy of a 
decision for war. The justifications of stopping violence, punishing a disobedient state, helping a 
weaker state against a stronger state’s invasion, and self-defense are regularly defined in the 
CRWT as righteous causes for going to war. The identification of competent authority is often 
related to the perception of moral standing, in which a war can be justified by confronting an 
opponent who is morally inferior to oneself.  
This dissertation employs the methods of most similar systems and process tracing to 
explore the role that the CRWT played in successive Chinese leaders’ decision to use force in six 
cases – the Korean War, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Sino-Indian War, the Vietnam War 
between 1964 and 1965, the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, and the Sino-Vietnamese War. This 
dissertation also examines the pattern of the Chinese government’s use of wording, presented in 
the People’s Daily, morally condemning its opponents, which provides supplementary evidence 
to explore China’s presentation of its own righteous legitimacy. 
The findings of this research suggest that when the decision for war has been justified 
within this frame of reference, the Chinese are prone to put that legitimized decision into action. 
The Chinese concept of righteous war may play a more important role in the decision for war 
when Chinese leaders encounter an impasse in which two opposite courses of action are 
suggested by their calculations based on Realpolitik. A sense of the righteous legitimacy of their 
  
decision may encourage Chinese leaders to enter a war even when the likely consequence may 
not appear to favor the Chinese. Furthermore, these findings may well enrich Johnson and 
Tierney’s theory about the shift of actors’ mind-sets in decision-making because the CRWT may 
function as a catalyst for the shift. This research also reveals that the CRWT had limited 
influence when Chinese leaders faced the danger of a possible invasion by a superior opponent 
or that of nuclear attack. When the need for a decision for war was not open to debate, then, they 
were not influenced by the consideration of just cause when making their decision. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Research Question, Purpose, and Definitions 
War is brutal, savage, and horrible. War brings various forms of damage to the life of 
mankind, such as the killing of people, ruin of the environment, retardation of economic 
development, and spread of disease.1  War is probably the most destructive form of human 
behavior,2 and it is only rarely seen as a good in itself. Nevertheless, although war brings 
destruction to human society, the philosophers of war tell us that not all kinds of war are 
prohibited and certain types of war are morally permissible. The principles of just war are 
commonly the yardstick for gauging whether a particular war is permissible.  
The Western tradition of just war (or just war tradition) is the mainstream conception 
nowadays for studying the justice of war and guiding moral assessment of wars. In his recent 
book, David Fisher provides a workable summary to illustrate the Western tradition of just war.3 
Fisher points out that the just war tradition can be traced back to St. Augustine4, who in the fifth 
century AD pondered whether a Christian may engage in war without sin.5 St Augustine’s 
conclusion set the fundamental concept of just war tradition, specifically, that a Christian could 
engage in war, but only if the war was just.6 The concept of just war began to be shaped into 
recognizable modern form by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century, who argued that three 
                                                 
1 Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (West Sussex, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2010), 1. 
2 Ibid. 
3 David Fisher, Morality and War: Can War be Just in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011). 
4 Aristotle was probably the first philosopher who mentioned the ethical stipulation that war must be fought on 
account of (re)establishing peace; but this sort of idea seems to have had no significant effect on pre-Roman Greek 
practice. In the first century, Marcus Tullius Cicero put forward as a condition for a war to be just that “the pursuit 
of peace must be the foremost aim of any war; without the pursuit of peace a war cannot be just.” St. Augustine’s 
thinking about just war was built on the fusion of Cicero’s argument for just war and the dicta from the Hebrew 
Bible and the Christian New Testament. See, Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from 
Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 44-46. 
5 David Fisher, Morality and War, 64. 
6 Ibid.  
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things – “the authority of the prince,” “a just cause,” and “a right intention” – required to justify 
a war.7 In the sixteenth century, a crucial contribution to the just war tradition was made by 
Francisco de Vitoria, who offered an extended and systematic account of just war as a universal 
principle, established by natural law, applicable to anyone, anywhere, and anytime.8 But after the 
sixteenth century the tradition was largely neglected.9 In the second half of the twentieth century, 
the just war tradition was rediscovered and developed further to furnish an ethical framework for 
the debate over the morality of nuclear weapons.10 Today, the just war tradition has been largely 
shaped by contemporary scholars, such as Michael Walzer, who attempt to work out a modern 
framework of just war theory through the exploration of the medieval tradition.11  
The just war tradition has two sets of principles to test if a war is just, which are jus ad 
bellum – the right to fight, which concerns the morality of going to war – and jus in bello, which 
concerns the morality of what is done within war.12 The principle of jus ad bellum includes six 
criteria: just cause, proportionate cause, right intention, right authority, reasonable prospect of 
success, and last resort.13 There are two criteria under the principle of jus in bello, which are 
discrimination and proportionality. 14  Recently, another principle has been suggested and 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 65 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 David Fisher, Morality and War, 65.  
11 See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic 
Books, 2006). 
12 Charles Guthrie and Michael Quinlan, Just War - The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare (New York: 
Walker & Company, 2007), 11 
13 Just cause means that a just war must have a proper reason for going to war. Proportionate cause means that the 
cause must be weighty enough to warrant the massive step of engaging in war, with all its certain or likely evils. 
Right intention means that the aim of war must be to create a better, more just and more lasting subsequent peace 
than there would have been had the actor not gone to war. Right authority means that the decision to go to war must 
be made by someone with proper authority to undertake so grave a step. Reasonable prospect of success means that 
the war must see a reasonable chance of succeeding in the just aim. Last resort means that the war must not be 
waged unless every other way of adequately securing the just aim has been tried and has been ineffective. All of the 
explanations are mentioned in Charles Guthrie and Michael Quinlan, Just War - The Just War Tradition., 12-14.  
14 Discrimination means that in the conduct of the war a combatant must not deliberately attack the innocent. 
Proportionality means that a combatant must not take action in which the incidental harm done is an unreasonably 
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discussed – jus post bellum, the need to ensure justice after war.15 To political scientists, the 
study of just war tradition is not merely a theoretical debate but has the potential to explain a 
state’s behavior in using force. Michael Butler applied “just war” theory to “a set of U.S. military 
intervention decisions to assess conditions in which considerations of justice may have driven 
U.S. decisions to employ military force in international crisis.”16 Butler found that the relevance 
of the principle of jus ad bellum in U.S. decisions to intervene militarily during the Cold War 
era – as well as the specific primacy of the just cause precept of that principle – was statistically 
confirmed.17  
It should be noticed that the above account of just war is a Western-rooted, or even a 
Eurocentric, tradition of understanding the morality of war. This argument begs the question 
whether non-Western civilizations have their own visions of the justice of war, or whether the 
principles of just war are universal. Edmund Ryden has argued that the texts of Chinese and 
Western just war tradition do not prove that there is a Western just war theory or a Chinese one, 
because all come to roughly similar thinking.18 Indeed, the very basic idea of just war might be a 
universal principle that all civilizations would agree upon. However, some scholars have recently 
suggested that a certain degree of diversity has existed in the actual criteria of jus ad bellum, jus 
in bello, and jus post bellum developed by Western and Asian just war thinkers.19 The various 
criteria for the just use of armed force are reflect the very diverse religious, philosophical, 
ideological, and cultural foundations which informed and conditioned the different perspectives 
                                                                                                                                                             
heavy price to incur for the likely military benefit. All of the explanations are mentioned in Charles Guthrie and 
Michael Quinlan, Just War - The Just War Tradition., 14. 
15 David Fisher, Morality and War, 79. 
16 Michael J. Butler, “U.S. Military Intervention in Crisis, 1945-1994: An Empirical Inquiry of Just War Theory,” 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 47, no.2 (2003), 226. 
17 Ibid., 245. 
18 Edmund Ryden SJ, Just War and Pacifism: Chinese and Christian Perspective in Dialogue (Taipei: Taipei Ricci 
Institute, 2001), 123. 
19 Howard M. Hensel ed., The Prism of Just War: Asian and Western Perspectives on the Legitimate Use of Military 
Force (Surrey and Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010), 274; and also see Torkel Brekke ed., The Ethics 
of War in Asian Civilizations: A Comparative Perspective (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). Taking the 
Chinese concept of the justice of war, for example, Chinese thinkers rarely mentioned the principle of reasonable 
hope of success, but often highlighted the necessity of being virtuous when they discussed the criteria for just war. 
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held by Western and Asian just war theorists.20 This argument further suggests that, to fully 
understand the nature of these diverse perspectives and approaches concerning the legitimate use 
of armed force, one must realize and appreciate the importance of the theological, philosophical, 
ideological, and cultural foundations which shape individual and group perspectives regarding 
the just use of armed force.21 Thus, taking Butler’s findings into account, another question can be 
asked: Would a non-Western civilization actually assess whether to go to war by applying 
perspectives coming from a theory of the just use of armed force that had developed from its 
own religious, philosophical, ideological, and cultural foundation. 
China provides a good opportunity to test the connection between a non-Western 
civilization’s decisions to go to war and its principles concerning the just use of armed force. 
Chinese culture can be clearly categorized as a non-Western culture. Even though Chinese 
culture has experienced several periods of cultural integration with other civilizations22, its main 
foundation, including elements such as Confucianism, remains in existence and continues to 
exert influence upon the Chinese people. As a subset of Chinese culture, the Chinese tradition of 
just war has a long history of development. It can be seen as early as in the Spring and Autumn 
period (c. 771 – 476 BCE) when there was discussion about the legitimate use of armed force. 
Those elements of the Chinese notion of just war which stress ideas that are not especially 
prominent in Western tradition are worth noting. Recently scholars have explored the idea of 
punishment, including punishment of moral depravity, which contributes one of the fundamental 
elements in the Chinese tradition of just war.23 The idea of the restoration of proper order is also 
                                                 
20 Howard M. Hensel, The Prism of Just War: Asian and Western Perspectives on the Legitimate Use of Military 
Force, 274. 
21 Ibid. 
22 For example, Buddhism from South Asia and Manchurian culture under the rule of the Qing dynasty (1644-1912). 
23See  Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995); Wang Yuan-Kang, Harmony and War: Confucian culture and 
Chinese Power Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Mark E. Lewis, “The Just War in Early 
China,” in The Ethics of War in Asian Civilizations: A Comparative Perspective, 185-200; Karen Turner, “War, 
Punishment, and The Law of Nature in Early Chinese Concepts of The State,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 53, 
no. 2 (1993): 285-324; and McNeal, Conquer and Govern: Early Chinese Military Texts from the Yizhou Shu 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2012). 
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emphasized by Confucianism to explain the legitimate use of force.24 The ancient Chinese view 
of the world as fundamentally hierarchical, dominated by the Son of Heaven, informs these 
elements.25  
The existence of a Chinese tradition of just war offers Chinese a ready-made framework for 
assessing the justice of war. Moreover, until very recently, most Chinese leaders were locally 
educated and trained. This suggests that the Chinese tradition of just war should have had ample 
opportunity to exert influence on Chinese leaders’ thought about warfare and on their decisions 
to go to war. Those considerations lead to the central questions of this research: Did Chinese 
leaders consider just cause when making decisions for war? If so, did the traditional Chinese 
concept of just war provide a frame of reference for identifying just cause? And under what 
circumstances did the considerations of just cause actually exert influence upon the decision to 
go to war?  
The Chinese tradition of just war originated mostly from a central belief in Confucianism 
about the relationship between the doctrines of benevolence (Ren, 仁) and righteousness (Yi, 義). 
For Confucians, benevolence is not a naïve doctrine to love all people equally or tolerate 
everything; instead it should be coordinated with righteousness. As an old but popular Chinese 
saying puts it, “if this can be endured, who cannot be endured!” (shikeren shubukeren, 是可忍, 
孰不可忍).26 That is, there are limits to what one must tolerate. The Chinese frequently use this 
proverb to describe or legitimate their actions, including violence, in response to what they take 
to be intolerable behavior. In other words, any pattern of behavior which violates or hinders the 
principles of righteousness is intolerable and demands correction. War, a form of violence, 
should not be excluded from this sort of logic. In traditional Chinese thought concerning the just 
use of armed force, war is morally permissible when it serves to fulfill the demands of 
benevolence and righteousness. This sort of military campaign is called righteous war (yizhan, 
義戰), and the forces being used in this war are a righteous army (yibing, 義兵). Hence, it is 
appropriate to rephrase the Chinese tradition of just war as the Chinese tradition of righteous war 
or the Chinese Righteous War Tradition (hereafter, CRWT) to describe Chinese thought about 
                                                 
24 More discussion and evidence will be provided in Chapter 2. 
25 Detailed discussion is provided in Chapter 2. 
26 Anonymous, The Analects of Confucius, trans. Arthur Waley (New York: Random House, 1938), 94. 
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the justice of war. Since this research examines the role of Chinese concept of righteous war in 
Chinese decision-making between 1950 and 1979, the central questions can be rephrased as: 
1. Did Chinese leaders consider just cause when making decisions for war between 1950 
and 1979? 
2. If so, did the traditional Chinese concept of righteous war (or CRWT) provide a frame of 
reference for identifying just cause? 
3. And under what circumstances did the considerations of just cause actually exert 
influence upon the decision to go to war?  
In the CRWT, the justice of war also includes two main principles - the right reasons for 
going to war and right conduct within war – which are equivalent to the principles of jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello in Western tradition of just war.27 This research will focus on the 
discussion of the criteria determining the right to go to war (jus ad bellum), which theoretically 
provide Chinese a basis for moral assessment to gauge their decision for war.  
For defining war, this research mainly adopts Brian Orend’s definition that “war should be 
understood as an actual, intentional, and widespread armed conflict between political 
communities.”28 Mentioning political communities means that both international and civil wars 
are all included. But this research will mainly focus on international wars, since Chinese 
decisions whether or not to go to war when confronting a foreign power in a crisis situation are 
the main object to be examined. Although Orend does not define the armed conflict specifically, 
this research regards it as fighting between armed forces of political communities, which at least 
one of the belligerent political communities has organized and planned.29 This fighting must 
have actually occurred, have an intention, and be widespread, which means that isolated clashes 
and border patrol incidents should not be counted.30 In other words, there is no real war until at 
least one of the belligerents intends to go to war and fight, and not until they do so with a heavy 
                                                 
27 David A. Graff, “The Chinese Concept of Righteous War,” in The Prism of Just War: Asian and Western 
Perspectives on the Legitimate Use of Military Force, 195-216. 
28 Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Toronto, Canada: Broadview Press, 2006), 2. Italics in the original text. 
29 Here I borrow partly from Hedley Bull’s idea defining war as organized violence carried on by political units 
against each other. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002), 178. 
30 Brian Orend, The Morality of War, 2 
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quantum of force.31 Thus, a “Chinese decision to go to war” is defined as the Chinese intention, 
in a foreign crisis, to engage in an actual armed conflict with a heavy quantum of force.  
 
Significance and Argument 
The study of the CRWT is a relatively undeveloped field of Chinese studies, and literature 
regarding it is somewhat scarce. The current literature on the CRWT mainly exists in the works 
of political scientists who study Chinese strategic culture and historians who are expert in 
Chinese history. Certainly those literatures contribute significantly to the understanding of 
Chinese thought regarding just war. However, these bodies of literatures leave several gaps and 
unresolved questions in the study of the Chinese tradition of righteous war. This research has the 
potential to remedy some of these deficiencies.  
One issue emerging from these bodies of literature is that existing works on Chinese 
strategic culture consistently overlook the meanings and implication of the CRWT. Scholars of 
Chinese strategic culture have asked whether Chinese culture influences the decision to use force 
against external threats. One debate examines whether Chinese culture, especially the doctrine of 
Confucianism, constrained China’s propensity to use armed force within a defensive mindset.32 
Those scholars do take notice of ideas from the Chinese tradition of righteous war. But they tend 
to regard the Chinese tradition of righteous war as an unimportant element in the Chinese 
leaders’ decisions for war. As mentioned earlier and as will be discussed in more detail later, 
Confucianism and some other of traditional Chinese thought were certainly not radically pacifist 
and did not oppose to all sorts of violence including the use of force and war. A war would be 
morally permissible when it was recognized as a righteous act, and the test was meeting the 
criteria of the Chinese concept of righteous war. In other words, Chinese elites might be more 
than willing to go to war if the morality of their decision was confirmed by this assessment. This 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 See John K. Fairbank, “Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience,” in Chinese Ways in Warfare. ed. by Frank 
A. Kierman and John King Fairbank (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 1-26; Alastair Iain 
Johnston, Cultural Realism; Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long 
March (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy 
Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2007); Wang Yuan-Kang, 
Harmony and War.  
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theoretical possibility is rarely mentioned by scholars of Chinese strategic culture.33 This study, 
thus, provides an opportunity to examine this theoretical possibility which will enrich, as well as 
correct some misunderstandings in, the study of Chinese strategic culture.  
Although overlooked by political scientists, the discussion about the theoretical basis of the 
Chinese tradition of righteous war has benefited from the work of historians who have traced and 
examined the origins of Chinese thought about the justice of war.34 Their works present students 
of the Chinese tradition of righteous war with an essential discussion of the fundamental 
concepts in Chinese thought regarding the justice of war. However, an empirical study has not 
yet been conducted by any of those historians to test the validity of the theoretical arguments 
they have explored. The lack of empirical study may weaken the value of the assumptions and 
implications that the CRWT may suggest, especially when one questions the actual effect of the 
CRWT upon Chinese decision-making. An empirical study proving an actual application of the 
CRWT will not only strengthen the theoretical arguments but also benefit policy makers who 
attempt to understand China’s use of force.  
Therefore, I argue that a rethinking of the implications and value of the CRWT is needed, 
and it ought to pay attention to the influence of the CRWT on Chinese decisions for war. Since 
ideas in the CRWT provide a theoretical framework for Chinese in their moral assessment of 
decision-making, it should not be neglected when one attempts to understand the pattern of 
China’s use of force. This research will test this argument through the first empirical study to 
examine the actual application and influence of the CRWT. 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Nadine Godehardt is probably the only political scientist who emphasizes the implications of CRWT and its 
applicability to analyze China’s foreign policy. But she only points out the theoretical argument without a rigid 
empirical study. See Nadine Godehardt, “The Chinese Meaning of Just War and its Impact on the Foreign Policy of 
the People’s Republic of China,” GIGA Working Paper no. 88 (September, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287161. 
34 See Mark E. Lewis, “The Just War in Early China,” 185-200; Karen Turner, “War, Punishment, and The Law of 
Nature in Early Chinese Concepts of The State,” 285-324; James A. Stroble, “Justification of War in Ancient 
China,” Asian Philosophy 8, no. 3 (1998): 165-190; Edmund Ryden SJ, Just War and Pacifism: Chinese and 
Christian Perspective in Dialogue ; Graff, “The Chinese Concepts of Righteous War,” 195-216; and Robin McNeal, 
Conquer and Govern, ch. 2.  
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Outline of the Study 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter Two reviews both the 
literature concerning the CRWT and the ancient Chinese classics containing the concepts relating 
to righteous war. It then develops a theory to explain the relationship between the CRWT and 
China’s decisions for war. It also describes the research design and method. Chapters Three to 
Eight discuss the empirical cases that include six major foreign conflicts between 1950 and 1979, 
which are the Korean War, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the Sino-Indian War, the Vietnam 
War between 1964 and 1965, the Sino-Soviet border conflict, and the Sino-Vietnamese War. The 
last chapter provides the conclusion and directions for future work.
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Chapter 2 - Chinese Tradition of Righteous War 
Unlike the Western tradition of just war, the CRWT was not rooted in a religious frame of 
reference, originating instead from the ancient Chinese philosophies of human behavior, 
governance, and warfare. Scholars of the Chinese tradition of righteous war have discerned this 
relationship through their close study of early Chinese classics. This chapter begins with a 
review of the current literature regarding the origins and evolution of the Chinese tradition of 
righteous war, as well as the role that the tradition may have played in Chinese decision-making. 
This review of the literature aims to situate the concept of righteous war within the overall 
philosophical frame of the ancient Chinese classics and present the basic elements of the 
theoretical arguments that have already been made regarding the role of the CRWT. This chapter, 
then, develops a theoretical argument about the relationship between the ideas of the CRWT and 
China’s decision for war through a survey of the Chinese classics. My hypothesis is that the 
Chinese are prone to go to war only when such action is justified by the CRWT. This chapter 
ends with the illustration of research design and methods used to conduct the study. 
 
Review of Literature 
The current literature regarding the Chinese tradition of righteous war can be categorized 
according to three themes. First, the origins of the CRWT are often mentioned by historians. The 
second theme, which always accompanies the first, includes the key elements of the CRWT. The 
last area of discussion addresses the argument for the role of the CRWT in China’s decision to 
use armed force.  
The origins of the CRWT are debatable, and opinions vary according to how scholars 
interpret the relevant Chinese classics in the historical context. Some scholars have noticed that 
the process of the establishment of the Zhou dynasty (11th century BCE), which was described 
by several Chinese historical records in the succeeding periods, displayed early Chinese thought 
about legitimizing the use of armed force.35  But those records are usually recognized as a 
                                                 
35 See Graff, “The Chinese Concepts of Righteous War,” 195-216; and Robin McNeal, Conquer and Govern, ch. 2. 
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supplement to understanding the CRWT rather than taken as proof about the CRWT’s origins, 
because their creation cannot be traced back to the early Zhou dynasty.  
Mark Edward Lewis argues that the doctrine of righteous force (yi bing, 義兵) appeared 
during the Warring States (481-221 BCE) and Qin (221-207 BCE) periods, when a single 
autocratic ruler was emerging at the center of the Chinese states.36 He argues that the doctrine of 
righteous war was connected to the idea that “proper warfare was possible only under the 
command of a semi-divine ruler who brought killing in the world of men into harmony with the 
violence of nature.”37 It is true that a more complete theory of righteous war, as Lewis argued, 
appeared after the Warring States period, but the early ideas of moral permission for war in the 
late Spring and Autumn period (c. the 6th century BCE) should not be ignored, for example 
Confucius’s comments on war in the Analects of Confucius. The early Chinese classics cited by 
scholars who study the Chinese concept of righteous war may help us understand the currently 
recognized origins of the CRWT (see Table 2-1). As the table shows, the earliest classics cited 
and examined by scholars include the Analects of Confucius, Daodejing, and Sunzi Bingfa, which 
can all probably be dated to the late Spring and Autumn and early Warring States periods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Lewis, “The Just War in Early China,” 185. 
37 Ibid. 
12 
 
Table 2.1 The Early Chinese Classics Cited in the Modern Scholarship on the CRWT 
Chinese Classics Cited by Approximate Date for Creation* 
Analects of Confucius 
(論語) 
Graff; Wang; Stroble; and 
Godehardt. 
Late Spring and Autumn Period 
Daodejing (道德經) Graff; Ryden; and Stroble.  Late Spring and Autumn Period 
Sunzi Bingfa (孫子兵法) Graff; Ryden; Lewis; Stroble; and 
Godehardt. 
Late Spring and Autumn Period 
Mencius (孟子) McNeal; Graff; Ryden; Stroble;and 
Godehardt. 
Warring States Period 
Xunzi (荀子) Graff; Wang; Ryden; Stroble; and 
Turner. 
Warring States Period 
Guanzi (管子) McNeal; Graff; Ryden; Lewis; and 
Turner. 
Warring States Period 
Zuo Zhuan (左傳) McNeal; Graff; Lewis; and Turner. Warring States Period 
Guo Yu (國語) Ryden; and Turner. Warring States Period 
Shang Shu (尚書) Lewis.  Warring States Period 
Mozi (墨子) McNeal; Graff; Johnston; and 
Ryden. 
Warring States Period 
The Book of Lord Shang 
(商君書) 
Graff; Lewis; Stroble; and Turner.  Warring States Period 
Hanfeizi (韓非子) Graff; Lewis; Stroble; and Turner. Warring States Period 
Jingfa (經法) Ryden; and Turner. Warring States Period 
Annals of Lü Buwei  
(呂氏春秋) 
McNeal; Graff; Ryden; Lewis; 
Sellmann; and Turner. 
Warring States Period 
Yizhoushu (逸周書) McNeal; and Graff. Warring States Period 
The Rites of Zhou (周禮) Graff; and Johnston.  Warring States Period 
Wuzi (吳子兵法) Graff; Ryden; and Lewis. Warring States Period 
Taigong Liutao (六韜) Graff; Johnston; and Ryden. Warring States Period 
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Table 2-1 (Continued) 
Chinese Classics Cited by Approximate Date for Creation* 
Sima Fa(司馬法) McNeal; Graff; Johnston; Lewis; 
and Godehardt. 
Warring States Period 
Yuliaozi (尉繚子) Graff; Johnston; and Ryden. Warring States Period 
Zhanguoce (戰國策) Graff. Qin Dynasty (221-207 BCE) 
San Lue (三略) Graff; Johnston; and Godehardt. Western Han Dynasty (202 
BCE – 9 AD) 
Da Dai Li Ji (大戴禮記) Ryden. Western Han Dynasty 
Huainanzi (淮南子) McNeal; Graff; Ryden; Lewis; and 
Turner. 
Western Han Dynasty 
Shuoyuan (說苑) McNeal. Western Han Dynasty 
* This column can only indicate the approximate dates, because scholars still cannot precisely pinpoint the actual 
authors and dates for creation for most of these classics. 
Sources: Lewis, “The Just War in Early China”; Graff, “The Chinese Concepts of Righteous War”; McNeal, 
Conquer and Govern; Johnston, Cultural Realism; Wang, Harmony and War; Ryden SJ, Just War and Pacifism; 
Stroble, “Justification of War in Ancient China”; Turner, “War, Punishment, and The Law of Nature in Early 
Chinese Concepts of The State”; and Godehardt, “The Chinese Meaning of Just War and its Impact on the Foreign 
Policy of the People’s Republic of China.” 
 
The Chinese classics cited above were actually the foundational texts of the major schools 
of Chinese thought, such as Confucians, Taoists, Mohists (Mojia, 墨家 ), Militarists, and 
Legalists. However, those multiple origins increase the difficulty in identifying the nature and 
origin of the Chinese tradition of righteous war. Fortunately, after two decades of effort, 
scholars have discovered the basic concepts, as well as providing several different perspectives 
explaining the nature of the Chinese tradition of righteous war. 
In general, early Chinese thinkers regarded war as wrong in principle38, as an unfortunate 
product of human society39, or even as an evil40. But they did not deny that war was an 
                                                 
38 Turner, “War, Punishment, and The Law of Nature in Early Chinese Concepts of The State,” 296. 
39 Stroble, “Justification of War in Ancient China,” 168-169. 
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unavoidable fact of human life. 41  Like their western counterparts, the early Chinese 
philosophers believed that certain types of warfare were morally permissible or justifiable.42 
Those types of war should be waged only for a just cause along with the goal of bringing peace 
and order to the world. 43  Self-defense was not the only just cause that Chinese thinkers 
recognized. Scholars have noticed that the administration of punishment upon a bad actor also 
provided a philosophical pillar for justice in the CRWT.44 In other words, war was regarded, as 
McNeal puts it, as “homologous with punitive measures taken against criminals, differing only 
in scale.”45 Moreover, Chinese ideas about punishment, including justification of the use of 
military force applied externally to enemy states, are believed to have originated from the 
notion of righteousness (yi, 義), which implied that punishment was not only, as McNeal notes, 
“a morally proper way to treat someone or to behave, but a morally proper code of conduct 
defined in terms of one’s position in a complex web of social relations.”46 In some sense, 
righteousness means “controlling or ordering things as they should be.”47 
The linkage between war and the notion of righteousness suggests that the matter of 
morality was a key concept for the Chinese to legitimize their use of force. As Yuan-Kang 
Wang observed, in Chinese thinking about the justice of war, “a use of force is justified when 
the ruler of another state is morally depraved.”48 Scholars have found that this idea appeared 
when the early Chinese thinkers sought paradigms of the proper way to use force through 
exploring the cases of ancient sage kings’ use of punitive expeditions. 49  Those cases 
                                                                                                                                                             
40 Ryden SJ, Just War and Pacifism, 36. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Lewis, “The Just War in Early China,” 185. 
43 Graff, “The Chinese Concepts of Righteous War,” 196; Turner, “War, Punishment, and The Law of Nature in 
Early Chinese Concepts of The State,” 297; and Lewis, “The Just War in Early China,” 185. 
44 Lewis, “The Just War in Early China,” 185; Turner, “War, Punishment, and The Law of Nature in Early Chinese 
Concepts of The State,” 292-293; McNeal, Conquer and Govern, 41; and Johnston, Cultural Realism, 69.  
45 McNeal, Conquer and Govern, 41. 
46 In this regard, righteousness is “both situational and hierarchical.” McNeal, Conquer and Govern, 41. 
47 Johnston, Cultural Realism, 70 
48 Wang, Harmony and War, 18. 
49 For example, McNeal, Conquer and Govern, 52-53; Graff, “The Chinese Concepts of Righteous War,” 195; 
Lewis, “The Just War in Early China,” 190-193. 
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demonstrated that the sage kings were morally bound to go to war against a state in disorder or 
against a state in flagrant violation of accepted standards of political behavior.50  
With regard to the role of the CRWT in decision-making, scholars bring out two sorts of 
arguments. Huiyun Feng argues that the Chinese concept of righteous war has served as the final 
criterion for Chinese leaders to judge whether they should use military force when their 
nonviolent solutions, which were given the first priority, had failed.51 In strong contrast to Feng’s 
argument, others have regarded the Chinese concept of righteous war as a moral cloak which 
covers acts of aggression.52 In fact, these arguments point to the central questions of this research: 
Did the CRWT provide a set of criteria that was actually used by China’s leaders to assess their 
decisions to go to war? 
 
A Theory of Chinese Righteous War 
This section, which is divided into four sub-sections, searches for a theory of Chinese 
righteous war. First, to grasp the fundamental concept underlying Chinese thinking about 
righteous war, I briefly discuss the key ideas of Chinese thinking about morality. In the second 
and third parts I explore the main ideas of the CRWT, righteousness-based justification and 
competent authority, which may offer a framework of criteria that could be used by Chinese for 
decision-making. Although the current literature provides a good clue for tracing the CRWT in 
the Chinese classics, I selected only the ancient texts that had significant influence upon the 
Chinese tradition or are frequently cited by scholars. In addition, I mainly adopted Graff’s 
framework53 to guide my examination tracing and rearranging the scattered Chinese concepts. In 
the fourth part, I discuss my assumption regarding the relationship between the CRWT and 
                                                 
50 McNeal, Conquer and Govern, 43. 
51 Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 26-27. 
52 Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 104; 
and Johnston, Cultural Realism, 252. Graff quoted Waley’s comments on righteous war in his research, but he made 
a moderate argument that the doctrine of righteous war “performed much the same function of reconciling 
philosophical principles with everyday practice, and may have played an even larger role in legitimizing the resort to 
arms in ancient and imperial China.” Graff, “The Chinese Concepts of Righteous War,” 211.  
53 Graff explores the ideas of justification, competent authority, and jus in bello by tracing their appearance in the 
ancient Chinese classics. 
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Chinese decisions to go to war, particularly the function of the CRWT in such decisions, as well 
as provide the central hypothesis and the research method.    
 
The Key Logic behind the CRWT 
As mentioned earlier, the notion of righteousness (yi, 義) is the central logic of the CRWT. 
According to the Doctrine of the Mean (zhongyong, 中庸), a chapter in the Han Record of Rites 
(Liji, 禮記), “righteousness is the principle of setting things right and proper, and the greatest 
application of it is in honoring the worthy.” 54  Although what sorts of acts constitute 
“right/proper” behavior is not clearly defined in Confucianism, certain guidelines and doctrines 
can help us to understand. Confucians often see righteousness, rites, and laws as a trinity to guide 
human behavior.55 This viewpoint about righteousness implies that acts in accordance with rites 
and laws are naturally right, and so they are acts that human beings should perform. However, in 
human society, there are always plenty of gray zones which are not specifically dictated by rites 
and laws. In such situations, what kind of acts can be justified as righteous? More specifically, 
what kind of acts can be justified as righteous in politics? Confucius once gave a short answer by 
replying to a question about government from Duke Jing of Qi: “Let the prince be a prince, the 
minster a minster, the father a father and the son a son.”56 These four suggestions, especially the 
first two, establish the basic order for conducting the “right” acts in politics that everyone 
(including the ruler) needs to perform in order to fulfill their social duties and the responsibilities 
that stern from their positions. For the Chinese, being virtuous is generally considered as one of 
these fundamental duties that apply not only to ordinary people but also to rulers and 
governments.  
                                                 
54 Wing-tsit Chan, trans. and comp., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1973), 104. Irene Bloom has proposed “rightness” as an alternative translation of yi or i (義). See Irene Bloom, 
trans., “The Mean,” in Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, comp., Sources of Chinese Tradition (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), 336. “Righteousness,” however, continues to predominate throughout the 
relevant secondary literature; therefore, it is adopted in this dissertation.  
55 Ching-Piao Kang, “Just War Thought of the Pre-Qin Period,” WHAMPOA - An Interdisciplinary Journal, no. 
51(2006), 130 
56 Anonymous, The Analects of Confucius, trans. Arthur Waley, 166. 
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In Confucianism, virtue can be categorized into two types. The first type is about the ruler’s 
political and diplomatic actions, which is called “benevolent administration/policy” (de zheng, 
德政); the second refers to personal behavior and moral self-improvement, which is called 
“moral conduct” (de xing, 德行).57 Usually a ruler who can bring stability to the people, conduct 
a broad-minded policy, follow the etiquette system of the rites, receive admonitions without 
displeasure, respect ethical principles, and externally implement a generous and peace-first 
policy and not use his power to bully neighboring rulers will be regarded as a ruler having 
benevolent policy.58 As with benevolent policy, there are many virtues and principles regarding 
moral conduct, including being honest and loyal, and having filial piety, righteousness, valor, 
modesty, and wisdom.59 As a result of indistinct and overlapping definitions, some ideas, such as 
benevolence and righteousness, may appear redundant in this context. Nevertheless, those 
concepts indeed show that rites, laws, and virtue are the fundamental elements defining what 
righteousness should be in politics. 
 
Righteousness-based Justifications 
Confucianism is an unavoidable topic when scholars attempt to explore the CRWT. In 
general, Confucians’ attitude toward warfare is to be passive and prudent. This attitude does not 
require Confucians to abandon entirely the resort to force. For Confucians, not all wars need to 
be condemned; only unrighteous wars deserved to be stopped and punished. According to 
Confucianism, an unrighteous war is one driven by greed and self-interest.60 Because this kind of 
war will kill people savagely and put the aggressor state itself in danger, it must be condemned 
and stopped.61  
                                                 
57 Chen Lai, Gudai Sixiang Wenhua de Shijie: Chunqiu Shiqi de Zongjiao Lunli yu Shehui Sixiang (The World of 
Ancient Thought and Culture: Thoughts of Religion, Morality, and Society in the Spring and Autumn Period ) 
(Beijing: Sdx Joint Publishing Company, 2002), 216-254. 
58 Ibid., 216-254. 
59 Ibid., 269. 
60 See Dai De, Dadai Liji (Beijing, China: Zhonghua Book Company, 1985), Chapter 33 Use of Force. 
61 Mencius, The Works of Mencius, trans James Legge (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), 305. 
18 
 
In Confucianism, righteous war can be characterized as a war fought to forbid savage 
behavior or to stop violence.62 In explaining why a humane and benevolent man needs to wage 
war, the influential Confucian philosopher Xunzi (313-238 BCE) said:  
That humanity of which I spoke does indeed involve loving others, but it is just such love for others that 
causes a hatred of whoever does injury to them. That morality of which I spoke does involve acting in accord 
with rational order, but it is precisely according with rational order that causes a hatred of whoever disrupts it. 
The military principles of which I spoke are just the means whereby to prohibit violent and aggressive 
behavior and to prevent harm to others; they are not the means to contention and confiscation.63  
This logic suggests that it is both “right” and necessary to use force to correct wrongdoings that 
violate the principle of benevolence and righteousness, because such wrongdoings threaten the 
central ethics that Confucianism regards as sustaining the operation of human society.  
Another concept of righteous war can be derived from this comment, namely, that a war to 
maintain and restore political order (specifically, the feudal system at that time 64 ) is also 
justifiable. Confucius once asked his own master, the Duke of Lu, to send a punitive expedition 
to restore the political order and punish the misbehavior caused within a neighboring state, Qi, 
where the minster Chen Heng had murdered his ruler.65 Chen Heng’s crime, in Confucius’s view, 
was an intolerable misbehavior which violated not only righteousness, but also the rites and laws.  
Confucius’s idea of a punitive expedition is echoed in the methods of maintaining a political 
system suggested to kings by the Rites of Zhou (Zhou Li, 周禮), a classical Confucian blueprint 
                                                 
62 See Da Dai Li Ji, Chapter 33 Use of Force; Mencius, The Works of Mencius, trans James Legge, 167. 
63 Xunzi, Xunzi, trans. John Knoblock (Hunan, China: Hunan People’s Publishing House, 1999), 479. 
64 This is the Western Zhou feudalism, which was termed  fengjian in Chinese. The system of fengjian means 
literally “to establish by means of making boundaries.” The essence of this system was that “the function of the 
Western Zhou state was carried out by its numerous local agents, who were replicas of the Zhou central government 
and were centered on lineages as branches of the Zhou royal house or as marriage partners of it.” Each local agent 
constituted “an autonomous geographical entity located in a specific area, and was equipped with a small but 
complete government that enjoyed the combined rights of civil administration, legal punishment, and military 
authority.” The regional rulers were not independent of Zhou royal authority, rather their relationships with the Zhou 
king were even closer than those of the “vassals” and “lords” under the “feudo-vassalic” institutions of medieval 
Europe. This close relationship was based on the institution of “Lineage Law,” which served to “regulate inheritance 
of political authority and property through a kinship structure.” Li Feng, Landscape and Power in Early China: The 
Crisis and Fall of the Western Zhou, 1045-771 BC (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 110-112. 
65 Anonymous, The Analects of Confucius, trans. Arthur Waley, 186.  
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for government. According to the Rites of Zhou, a legitimate Zhou king had the right to impose 
sanctions against a vassal state under one or more of nine conditions.66 Of the nine conditions, 
four called for correction or punishment by a punitive expedition, specifically when a vassal state 
killed a virtuous person and imperiled its own people, when a ruler was killed or exiled by his 
courtiers, when a vassal state disobeyed the kings’ orders, and when a ruler transgressed the 
principles of human ethics and behaved like an animal (e.g., to gain power by killing his father).  
The idea that war may be used to stop violence was also recorded in an important canon of 
Confucianism – the Zuo Zhuan, a chronicle of the Spring and Autumn period. The most 
prominent example was King Zhuang of Chu’s comments on war after he defeated Jin’s troops 
in the Battle of Bi in 597 BCE. One of his generals suggested to him that he collect and pile the 
corpses of the Jin soldiers in a mound to announce victory.67 King Zhuang of Chu rejected the 
suggestion, saying:68  
In the written script, the stopping of weapons constitutes the martial69…. Now in the case of the martial, it 
means prohibiting violence, collecting weapons, preserving the great, establishing merit, bringing peace to the 
people, uniting the masses, and making resources abundant. This is what causes our descendants not to forget 
our splendor. Today I have caused the bones of the soldiers of our two states to lay [sic] exposed on the 
battleground; this is violence. I have unsheathed our weapons in order to awe the feudal lords; this is not 
collecting weapons. Being violent and not collecting weapons – how can I hope to preserve the great? And 
                                                 
66 The nine conditions are: 1) to reduce its fief when the stronger states heckle the weaker state; 2) to send a punitive 
expedition when the state kills virtuous persons and imperils its people; 3) to remove the rulers who brutalize their 
people and humiliate their neighbors; 4) to reduce his fief when the ruler does not manage his territories properly 
and leads his people to disperse; 5) to invade the state who does not submit itself to the emperor’s orders and 
authority; 6) to inflict punishment upon those rulers who kill their own family members; 7) to execute the courtier 
who kills or exiles his ruler; 8) to cut off its relations with other states when said states disobey and defy the King’s 
laws; 9) to put the ruler to death when he transgresses the principles of human ethic and behaves like an animal. See 
Anonymous, The Rites of Zhou (Taipei, Taiwan: Taiwan Zhonghua Book Company, 1981), chapter “The Officer of 
Summer: Sima.”  
67 McNeal, Conquer and Govern, 48; and Yu Xian-hao, Zhou Fu-chang and Yao Man-bo, ann., Zuo Zhuan (Taipei: 
San Min Book Co., 2002), 684 and 688-689. 
68 This translation is directly quoted from McNeal’s. See McNeal, Conquer and Govern, 48-49.  
69 In Chinese this sentence is “止戈為武.” Literally, it can be translated into “the graphs for ‘stop’止 and 
‘weapon’[or dagger-axe]戈 make the graph for ‘martial’ 武.” See McNeal, Conquer and Govern, 183: note 12. It 
also can be translated into “to stop the use of weapons and avoid war is truly military” or “real military prowess 
being to ensure peace.” 
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despite our victory, the state of Jin still survives – how can this be called establishing merit? Moreover, I have 
gone against the desires of the people in many ways – how can they find peace in this? Lacking virtue and 
grappling for power with the feudal lords – how can this unite the masses? Deriving benefit by putting others 
in peril, and finding peace by putting others into chaos, and then taking this as one’s own glory – how can this 
make resources abundant? The martial has these seven virtues, yet I haven’t a single one of them. What am I 
to display to my descendants? 
Although the seven martial virtues that King Zhuang of Chu mentioned included certain 
utilitarian perspectives, the ideas of stopping violence and bringing peace to the people still 
occupied a prominent position in legitimizing the use of armed force. In particular, the sentence 
“the stopping of weapons constitutes the martial” (zhigeweiwu,止戈為武) has become a common 
idiomatic phrase used by Chinese to explain the necessity of use of force.  
While Confucianism accepted the idea of punitive expeditions, Taoism70 insisted that only 
the use of force for self-defense could be justified. As the sage Laozi indicated, “sharp weapons,” 
with the extended meaning of military force, are ill-omened instruments.71 When he discussed a 
maxim about using weapons, Laozi said: “I don’t presume to act like the host, and instead play 
the part of the guest; I don’t advance an inch, but rather retreat a foot.”72 The only legitimate 
condition for the use of force, according to Laozi, is self-preservation in its most immediate and 
obvious sense.73  
Mohism74, like Taoism, was a school of thought that strongly opposed offensive war, but it 
advocated defensive preparation.75 Mo Di (c. 468-376 BCE), the founder of Mohism, believed 
                                                 
70 Taoism is traditionally held to have been founded by Laozi (c. 6th century BCE ). It is one of the major schools of 
thought that have influenced and shaped Chinese culture and Chinese ways of thinking. Its central belief advocates 
the spirit of nature and “non-action” (wuwei, 無為). Its political philosophy is to govern by doing nothing 
(wuweierzhi, 無為而治). See Robert G. Henricks, ed. and trans., Lao-Tzu Te-Tao Ching: A new translation based on 
the recently discovered Ma-Wang-Tui text (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989). 
71 Robert G. Henricks, ed.and trans., Lao-Tzu Te-Tao Ching, 83. 
72 Ibid., p. 40. 
73 Graff, “The Chinese Concept of Righteous War,” 198. 
74 Mohism was founded by Mo Di (c. 468-376 BCE). It was one of the important schools of thought in the Warring 
States period. Although its influence has decreased since the Qin dynasty, the central concepts of Mohism, 
“universal love” (jianai, 兼愛) and “no invasion” (feigong, 非攻), were already well-known by Chinese. See Ian 
Johnston, trans. and ann., The Mozi: A Complete Translation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) 
75 Graff, “The Chinese Concept of Righteous War,” 199; and Lewis, “The Just War in Early China,” 190. 
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that armed aggression is no different from the crimes of robbery and murder, because it not only 
has the same logic in harming others to benefit oneself, but also is on a much larger scale.76 He 
said: 
The killing of one person is spoken of as unrighteous and certainly constitutes one capital offence. Reasoning 
on this basis…killing a hundred people is a hundred times as unrighteous, so certainly constitutes a hundred 
capital offences. If this is valid, the gentlemen of the world should all know and condemn it, and call it 
unrighteous. But when it comes to what is a great lack of righteousness, that is, attacking states, then they do 
not know and condemn it.77 
However, he didn’t completely reject the idea that offensive war could be justified. Mo Di 
considered that the ancient sage kings’ uses of force were not acts of “attack” (gong, 攻), but 
rather acts of “punishment” (zhu, 誅), because the war was aimed to punish vicious rulers who 
had offended against the will of Heaven.78 
A military intervention which rescues a weaker state from a stronger state’s invasion can 
also be justified as a righteous use of force according to Mo Di. Refuting the common argument 
among rulers during the Warring States period that rulers had the right to wage war in order to 
establish righteousness in the world and to draw the other feudal lords to virtue, Mo Di argues 
that: 
Now, if there was one who was able to establish himself in the world through righteousness and reputation and 
attract the feudal lords through virtue, the world’s submission would be immediate and expected…Nowadays, 
if there were feudal lords in the world who were able to establish good faith in their dealings and gave primacy 
to benefit, then, when a great state was not righteous, they would join in grieving for it. When a great state 
attacked a small state, they would join in rescuing it. When the inner and outer city walls of a small state were 
incomplete, they would join in repairing them…If we led the people along the right path, established a 
reputation for righteousness, and invariably acted liberally towards our populace as well as training our forces 
with sincerity, and in this way supported the feudal lords, then it would be possible to have no enemies in the 
world….79 
In Mo Di’s opinion, a ruler with virtue has the right to intervene militarily to save a weaker state 
from a stronger state’s aggression. 
                                                 
76 Graff, “The Chinese Concept of Righteous War,” 199 ; and Ian Johnston trans. and ann., The Mozi, 169.  
77 Ian Johnston, trans. and ann., The Mozi, 169. 
78 Graff, “The Chinese Concept of Righteous War,” 200; and Ian Johnston, trans. and ann., The Mozi, 188-193. 
79 Johnston, trans. and ann.,, The Mozi, 195 and 197. 
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The Guanzi80, the Book of Lord Shang81, and the Han Feizi82 are three major classics of 
Chinese Legalism. Their authors’ attitudes toward warfare are quite different from each other. 
The authors of Guanzi believe that war is dangerous to a country’s survival, but it becomes 
necessary if waged for righteous causes. Generally, a righteous war, in Guanzi, refers to an act of 
punishment upon a state that is vicious83 or does not follow the king’s authority84, or a military 
action for saving a state from disorder.85 These ideas are not shared by the authors of the Book of 
Lord Shang and the Han Feizi. These authors considered that an aggressive war, regardless of its 
justification, should be viewed positively if it advanced the state’s interests (li, 利).86 But, in the 
Book of Lord Shang, the author says that “if by war one wishes to abolish war, even war is 
permissible; if by killing one wants to abolish killing, even killing is permissible; if by 
punishments one wishes to abolish punishments, even heavy punishments are permissible.”87 
Although this statement justifies waging war, it is unclear whether the war is for self-defense or 
military intervention. 
Although rarely discussed, the righteous causes of the resort to force did come to the 
attention of ancient Chinese writers on military strategy. In exploring the causes of war, the 
Wuzi88 defines the “righteous army” as one suppressing “the violently perverse” and rescuing 
                                                 
80 The contents of Guanzi date approximately from the Warring States period. Although it is an encyclopedic 
compilation of early Chinese philosophies, its contents show strong affinities with Legalism. 
81 The Book of Lord Shang mainly records the theories and measures of the political and economic reforms in the 
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“the people from chaos.”89 The Yuliaozi90 has similar opinions to those of Wuzi in that “the 
military provides the means to execute the brutal and chaotic and to stop the unrighteous.”91 This 
justification can also be found in the San Lue:92 “The Sage King does not take any pleasure in 
using the army. He mobilizes it to execute the violently perverse and punish the rebellious.”93 
Among the military classics, the strongest voice in favor of waging war to bolster moral order is 
given by the Sima Fa.94 It states that “if one must kill men to give peace to the people, then 
killing is permissible”; “if one must attack a state out of love for their people, the attacking it is 
permissible”; “if one must stop war with war, although it is war it is permissible.”95 Moreover, 
the nine circumstances legitimizing the imposition of sanctions in the Rites of Zhou were also 
directly quoted by the author of Sima Fa as conditions for the use of armed force.96 
Although most Chinese strategists expressed some ideas about righteous war, Sun Tzu, the 
most famous and important Chinese strategic thinker, mentioned almost nothing about it in his 
classic – Sunzi Bingfa. Unlike the works of several other thinkers who believed that moral factors 
would lead to victory, the Sunzi Bingfa concentrates more on the proper means by which to win a 
war. The only moral issue the Sunzi Bingfa mentions is the “Dao” (or “Way”), which means the 
leader must have the support of his people.97 But Sun Tzu did not clearly explain whether the 
contents of “Dao” required the leader to garner popular support from his people by adopting 
benevolent administration, policy or moral conduct. 
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The era between the late Warring States period and the Han dynasty, as Lewis has argued, 
was a significant period for the development of the Chinese righteous war tradition.98 Both the 
Annals of Lü Buwei and the Huainanzi were masterpieces displaying the evolved concepts of the 
CRWT.99 In the Annals of Lü Buwei, the authors strongly advocate that it be considered a 
requirement for any armed force that one might have to be a righteous one. They treat the 
righteous armed force as a vital tool in maintaining order and peace. If the requirement for armed 
force to be righteous were abandoned, the world would become chaotic in that every state would 
fight the other without limits.100  In their opinion, righteous armed force should be used to 
“punish tyrannical lords and relieve suffering peoples.”101 The authors of the Huainanzi likewise 
indicate that the righteous force is a necessary means for maintaining order:  
In antiquity, those who used the military did not value expanding territory or covet the possession of gold and 
jade. They sought to sustain those who [were] perishing, revive those [lineages] that had been cut off, pacify 
the chaos of the world, and eliminate harm to the myriad people.102  
For this purpose, the righteous force is an essential means for maintaining order, so that “the 
violent are curtailed and the disorderly are punished.”103 
      Thus, there are four major righteousness-based justifications that can be identified from these 
Chinese classics to legitimize the decision to go to war. First, the justification of stopping 
violence was regularly mentioned and constituted a central concept of early Chinese thought 
about the legitimate use of force. This idea usually contains three sometimes overlapping subsets, 
which are to restore order, to bring peace to the people, and to punish or stop a ruler’s savage 
behavior. The second justification is to punish disobedient states. The Rites of Zhou and Sima 
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Fa are the two classics that mention this idea as a condition for a king’s use of force. The third 
justification is to help a weaker state against a stronger state’s invasion. This idea was 
especially brought out by the authors of the Mozi and Rites of Zhou. In ancient times, this notion 
referred particularly to the form of the Zhou king helping one of his weaker vassals to resist the 
attack from a stronger vassal. Finally, a war for self-defense is generally recognized as a 
righteous war, although the Chinese classics, except the Daodejing and the Mozi, do not 
explicitly express such an idea. The justification of self-defense has been given an extra meaning 
by modern Chinese strategists to justify an active posture in the use of force, with China 
projecting its armed force into other states’ territory. This meaning was advanced by Chinese 
leaders especially in the second half of the twentieth century. For them, a defensive war is not 
merely a war of static defense. They advocate an “active defense” in response to what they 
perceive as an adversary’s aggressive action.104  
 
Competent Authority 
In the early Chinese thought on righteous war, the right to designate competent authority in 
a war was usually held to be a monopoly of the semi-divine king who received and sustained the 
“Mandate of Heaven” (tianming, 天命). The idea of receiving and keeping the Mandate of 
Heaven was closely related to the fundamental Chinese political and societal thought that 
Heaven, the King or emperor, and the People composed a trinity of the political and religious 
system. 105  The King, who was an intermediary between Heaven and the people, had 
responsibilities to govern the people as an agent of Heaven and to worship Heaven as the 
representative of the people. 106  The ancient Chinese believed that receipt of the Mandate 
depended on virtue. According to this belief, a regime starts when a person, called “the King 
Receiving the Mandate” (shoumingwang, 受命王), receives the Mandate of Heaven because of 
his virtue.107 But his status does not automatically guarantee the Mandate for his descendants, 
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who must therefore keep their ancestral virtue.108 In other words, the survival of the Heaven-
mandated authority is conditional. Since Heaven always unselfishly and impartially loves the 
people109, a King who improperly governs the people deserves to be abandoned by Heaven. 
When the power of the semi-divine king declined, the idea arose that a virtuous leader who did 
not yet hold the title of king could use force legitimately. 
This idea shaped the early Chinese perspective on the interstate relationship110, which was 
recognized as a hierarchical structure dominated by the legitimate King, who was also called the 
“Son of Heaven.” Moreover, the nature of interstate relations was not recognized as chaotic (as 
in so much of Western political theory), but rather was understood as an order governed by the 
Son of Heaven, who had right to impose sanctions on those who violated his commands. As we 
have seen, this sort of idea is especially prominent in the Rites of Zhou, where the authors present 
nine conditions for the use of force. Mencius111 seemed to agree with this idea when he said that 
“a punitive expedition is a war waged by one in authority against his subordinates,” and “it is not 
for peers to punish one another by war.”112 To Mencius, only the Son of Heaven’s use of force 
could be legitimized as punishment, and a feudal lord’s use of force would be regarded as an 
attack.113  
However, by the mid-Warring States period, the entire notion of competent authority had 
been undercut by the declining power of the Zhou kings114 (the recognized Son of Heaven at that 
time) and by the increasingly prevalent notion that they might be replaced by a newly emergent 
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ruler of great benevolence and virtue.115 The matter of virtue, underlying the guarantee of the 
Mandate of Heaven, was central to identifying competent authority. The Zuo Zhuan provides a 
case in which the matter of virtue was seen as the premise to go to war. In 641 BCE, Duke Xiang 
of Song laid siege to Cao on the pretext that Cao was disobedient to his orders. One of Song’s 
ministers, Zi Yu, asked the Duke to end the siege by bringing up the case of King Wen of Zhou’s 
expedition against Chong, a morally depraved state. When King Wen learned that the ruler and 
people of Chong had behaved immorally, he decided to punish them. But his first expedition was 
unsuccessful, when he withdrew his troops after a futile thirty-day siege of Chong. King Wen 
worked on refining his morality and improving his people with virtue after he returned. When 
King Wen sent another expedition against Chong, the people of Chong immediately surrendered 
when the Zhou troops entered the camp that had been built during the first expedition. Zi Yu 
used this example to warn that even a sage King sometimes would have to refine his morality to 
make an expedition successful, let alone his master the Duke of Song, who had no virtuous 
standing comparable to those sage kings. Zi Yu requested that his master lift the siege, refine his 
morality by self-examination, and then use armed force again after all of the deficiency of 
morality had been corrected.116 The historical authenticity of Zi Yu’s warnings and the example 
of King Wen’s expedition should not be exaggerated. However, this case indicates that the 
author of the Zuo Zhuan attempted to speak through Zi Yu to emphasize the important role of 
morality in the decision for war.  
The role of morality also received attention from the authors of the Annals of Lü Buwei, but 
they presented it from a different angle. When these authors discussed which forms of warfare 
could be legitimized, they said:  
Now, there is no greater act of immorality and no greater harm to the peoples of the world than failing to 
distinguish between the moral and the immoral, and rather hurriedly adopting the policy of indiscriminate 
defense by “rescuing” and “protecting.” Thus, it is logically inadmissible either to adopt a policy of aggressive 
warfare or to condemn it, to adopt a policy of defensive warfare or to condemn it. It is only the use of weapons 
in a righteous cause that can be considered proper. If weapons are raised in a righteous cause, then both 
aggressive and defensive warfare are proper. If the cause is not righteous, then neither is proper.117  
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The authors further pointed out seven cases of ancient rulers who either were immoral or ruled 
their people savagely to explain why defensive warfare might not be righteous. Then, the authors 
wrote: 
        These seven rulers surpassed all other men in acting without the Dao and in being immoral. The innocent 
people they slaughtered and murdered were so numerous, they cannot be counted even by the tens of 
thousands. The corpses of the strong and feeble, the old and young, and the miscarried and stillborn filled the 
flat plains and dammed up the deep gorges and great valleys…Were an ascendant ruler or humane knight to 
contemplate this deeply, it surely would pain his heart and cause him grief and sadness. Were he to examine 
what brought this about, he would conclude that it was because of the demise of those who possess the Dao 
and the licentiousness of those who lack the Dao. But those who lack the Dao have been lucky in conducting 
themselves licentiously. Thus, the misfortune of the world does not lie in the defensive strategy of “rescuing” 
and “safeguarding,” but in the unworthy having been lucky. Yet if persuasions advocate defensive warfare, the 
unworthy are all the more fortunate and the worthy all the more hesitant. Thus, the most profound disorder to 
the world depends on the practice of hurriedly embracing the policy of defense without assessing the rightness 
of the cause.118  
Indeed, the purpose behind this argument was to defend the legitimacy of Qin’s offensive 
strategy of attempting to conquer other states in the late Warring States period. But if we take Zi 
Yu’s argument from the Zuo Zhuan into account, we can see that both arguments point in the 
same direction, showing that moral inferiority results in the lack of a righteous cause to go to war. 
While the author of the Zuo Zhuan went in a positive direction stating that flawless morality 
legitimizes the use of force, the authors of the Annals of Lü Buwei emphasize that immorality 
removes the legitimacy of the use of force, even for defensive purposes.  
These new ideas indicate that by the late Warring States period the Zhou kings’ monopoly 
in determining the competent authority among the combatants no longer existed. They also imply 
an idea similar to that of competent authority in the Western tradition of just war, namely that the 
ruler or government of a sovereign state possesses proper authority to go to war.119 But this idea 
did not survive for long after the Warring States period because most of the succeeding dynasties 
were centralized and unified under a ruler with the same title of “Son of Heaven” that the Zhou 
kings had held. This does not mean that the rulers of the succeeding dynasties abandoned the 
notion that morality plays an important role in legitimizing use of armed force, but rather that in 
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reality they might be more inclined to manifest the competent authority of their regime by 
pointing out the immorality of the opponents being punished, just as the authors of Annals of Lü 
Buwei and Zuo Zhuan attempted to advocate. 
What succeeding generations of Chinese leaders may have learned from the origins of 
competent authority could be the practice of assessing the morality of their decisions to go to war. 
Ideally, this idea would encourage Chinese leaders to examine the relative moral standings 
between themselves (including the regime they lead) and the opponents they attempt to fight 
against. When they perceive that they are morally superior, they are certain that the decision for 
war is legitimate. And they are inclined to decide against war if their moral status fails to pass 
the examination. But the reality is that this ideal model was hardly applied to the everyday 
practice of warfare. The Chinese leaders might adopt a lesser standard of moral assessment such 
that only their opponents would be the objects of examination. As Yuan-Kang Wang observed, 
this idea is similar to the modern concept of “humanitarian intervention,” that a punitive 
expedition can be allowed to fight against a state whose ruler is found to be unjust or abusing his 
people.120 This is to say that by adopting this devalued concept of competent authority, the 
Chinese leaders can be confident of success in legitimizing their decisions for war when the 
moral inferiority of their opponents is identified.  
 
Hypothesis  
Before posing the hypothesis of this research, it is necessary to understand that the ideas 
about righteousness-based justification and competent authority in the CRWT may not be 
fundamentally different from those presented in the Western tradition of just war. For example, 
self-defense is also regarded as a justification for war in the Western tradition. But as noted in 
the introduction, Chinese leaders may not be familiar with the Western doctrine of just war, but it 
is possible that Chinese leaders learned what morally permissible warfare should be from their 
own cultural tradition. Moreover, as Graff argued, several elements that are clearly addressed in 
the Western discourse on just war have been found only undeveloped and ambiguous in the 
CRWT.121 The most obvious of these elements are the principles of reasonable prospect of 
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success and proportionality, which cannot be found in the traditional Chinese concept of 
righteous war. The principle of competent authority also appears ambiguous in comparison with 
its place in the Western tradition of just war, although Chinese thinkers pointed to the moral 
character of the ruler as a means of determining competent authority. Furthermore, the idea that 
war is the last resort does not clearly appear as one of the criteria for assessing the legitimacy of 
the use of force in the early Chinese concept of righteous war. Thus, while it is clear that there 
are some points of similarity with Western just war thought, the Chinese tradition merits 
attention in its own right.  
The survey of the current literature and the ancient Chinese classics yields two major 
understandings of the influence of the CRWT upon China’s decision to go to war. The first 
suggests that the CRWT serves as a moral cloak covering the Chinese decision to use force 
aggressively. This understanding is brought out by Waley, and echoed by Johnston and Graff.122 
Arthur Waley points out that, even though the Confucians strongly emphasized the duty of the 
other states to punish any state which was being badly ruled, there was no inter-state court which 
could investigate charges against a government; therefore, “the righteous war principle became 
merely a moral cloak under which to cover acts of aggression.” Waley further argues that the 
righteous war principle “was in fact a mechanism, familiar enough to-day, for bridging the gap 
between the amoralism of those who actually handle the affairs of a state and the inconvenient 
idealism of the masses.”123 In other words, the critique of the “moral cloak,” in Waley’s term, 
sees decisions for war basically as resulting from amoral assessment, and the ideas in the CRWT 
work as a tool for reconciling amoral decisions with the philosophical principles used to educate 
the masses. This critique suggests that the justice of war has no, or very little, influence upon 
Chinese leaders when they are making the decision to go to war.  
The second understanding, which I argue and will test in this research, suggests that the 
CRWT provides a frame of reference within which Chinese leaders conduct moral assessment of 
their decisions to go to war. This frame of reference helps China’s leaders to assess the 
legitimacy of their decisions. When a decision is found to be legitimate, China’s leaders are more 
likely to put the decision into action. This understanding, however, does not deny that amoral 
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factors, such as national interests and capabilities, have played an important role in Chinese 
decision-making, but it does suggest that Chinese leaders would consider the issues of righteous 
causes and morality when making their decisions. 
Furthermore, the CRWT may play a more important role when China’s leaders have 
encountered an impasse in decision-making such as when different pragmatic arguments point 
toward opposite courses of action. One should not confuse this with the “moral cloak” argument. 
Fundamentally, the argument of “moral cloak” assumes that the CRWT helps Chinese to 
reconcile the conflict between an opportunity for amoral or pragmatic advantageous action and 
those of their cultural and philosophical paradigms that argue against such action. But resolving 
real ambivalence is different. In these cases, the CRWT helps Chinese to reinforce one course of 
action, such as a decision for war, when the pragmatic calculations point in two opposite 
directions. This does not mean that the Chinese decision is amoral or irrelevant to the 
considerations of the justice of war. Rather, the Chinese simultaneously engage in both 
pragmatic calculation and moral assessment while making decisions, and they are more willing 
to view the decision for war as legitimate when another path, apart from pragmatic calculation, 
also suggests going to war.  
This argument also implies that the traditional Chinese concept of righteous war may have 
exerted influence when the Chinese leaders attempted to decide upon the use of large-scale force 
for an offensive operation outside Chinese territory or in a disputed area. In other words, the 
CRWT is expected to exert influence when the Chinese leaders are making a decision for war 
with an active deployment of force, where another justification for war cannot be clearly found. 
When the justification for war is obvious, the CRWT may have no visible influence upon 
Chinese decision making. One such circumstance might be a Chinese decision for self-defense 
against an invasion. This limitation results from the common-sense assumption that any 
aggression would automatically provide just cause to the state that is invaded, as well as trigger 
its action for self-defense. Thus, when the Chinese faced the danger of a superior opponent’s 
massive invasion or nuclear attack, they would naturally see no need to invoke the CRWT in an 
effort to legitimize their action in self-defense.  
This argument echoes Johnson and Tierney’s Rubicon theory of war, which explains the 
shift of mind-sets in decision-making. Johnson and Tierney argue that when people believe they 
have crossed a psychological Rubicon, they switch from a “deliberative” to an “implemental” 
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mind-set, which can be a causal factor in the outbreak of war.124 Johnson and Tierney suggest 
that the shift of mind-sets occurs when people perceive war as imminent.125 I argue that the 
CRWT may also help the Chinese to shift mind-sets when they perceive war as imminent. 
Although the ancient Chinese classics do not include any passages specifically bearing on this 
problem, Huiyun Feng suggests that the Chinese concept of righteous war may have served as 
one of the final criteria for Chinese leaders to determine to use force when nonviolent efforts 
toward a solution had failed.126  According to this argument, the CRWT thinking may well 
influence the shift of mind-sets when Chinese perceive that their attempts at nonviolent solutions 
have encountered deadlock. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
The Chinese are prone to go to war only when such action is justified by the CRWT. 
 
Research Design 
A Chinese decision to go to war is the dependent variable. I use the levels of hostility of the 
Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset to locate China’s final decision for dealing with a 
foreign crisis. The MID dataset defines five levels of hostility for states participating in an 
interstate dispute: no militarized action, threats of force, displays of force, uses of force, and 
war.127 The operational definition of the level of war is “when militarized interstate disputes 
evolve, or escalate, to the point where military combat is sufficiently sustained that it will result 
in a minimum of 1,000 total battle deaths.”128  
Chinese assessment of the legitimacy of the decision to go to war is the independent 
variable. Two major ideas of the CRWT may be applied by Chinese leaders to assess this 
legitimacy, which are righteousness-based justification and judgment of morality. Chinese 
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leaders’ identifications of just causes and their opponents’ moral standing are used as measures 
of how much they have applied the CRWT. In addition, reports in the Chinese media addressing 
the leaders’ attitude toward the behavior of their opponents give a supplementary means for 
assessing how they determine morality.  
The statements of key Chinese leaders and the biographies of them edited and released by 
government-controlled presses merit the highest priority for examination. Other high-ranking 
leaders’ memoirs and recollections are also used to fill in those parts of decision-making which 
are not covered by the sources about the key leaders. The material in these types of sources must 
be treated with caution. For various reasons, such as ideological imperatives or the Chinese 
government’s policy concerning publication by persons of especially high rank, the authors of 
these memoirs may exaggerate a story or simply transplant the official formulation into their 
recollection in order to glorify the image of the paramount leaders. For this reason, I have 
adopted only recollections of direct conversations with the key leaders and the records of events 
in which the authors were personally involved; and I will exclude any recollection about the key 
leaders’ considerations coming from a third-person narrative. 
The People’s Daily, the most important official mouthpiece of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), is the media source for retrieving the data showing China’s public expression of 
the assessment of morality on its opponents. These data show how often there was use of words 
representing the kind of wrongdoing that the CRWT sees as especially worthy of punishment — 
the sort of language adopted by the Chinese to describe opponents’ immorality. Those words, 
many of which are used in the ancient Chinese classics, include: violent (cubao,粗暴; hengbao, 
橫暴; canbao, 殘暴), outrageous (manheng, 蠻橫; kuangwang, 狂妄), savage (changkuang,猖
狂), crazy (fengkuang,瘋狂), vicious (e, 惡; edu, 惡毒), unjustified/unreasonable (wuli, 無理), 
impudent (wuchi, 無恥), criminal (zui, 罪), and barbarian (yeman, 野蠻).129 In order to measure 
the Chinese government’s attitude more specifically rather than any broader group’s opinion, not 
every type of material printed in the People’s Daily is counted. Entries counted are limited to the 
editorials, key decision makers’ speeches and statements, diplomatic messages, reports written 
by reporters of the People’s Daily, supplemental information aimed at educating the Chinese 
public, and news commentary directly expressed by the People’s Daily. Other entries were 
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excluded from my data collection – for example, reports originating from foreign news agencies, 
statements distributed by foreign states and reprinted in the People’s Daily, and news about 
domestic protests against the behavior of China’s opponents.130 
It would be unusual for a government involved in a militarized dispute to refrain from 
blaming its enemy for wrongdoings. Nonetheless, words can still be chosen consciously and 
carefully by a contending state to signal its standing and attitude in the dispute. The signal may 
be presented through the frequency of news items blaming the opponent’s wrongdoings.131 Thus, 
the computed frequency presented here offers a traceable pattern, and it can be stated with 
confidence that a judgment of morality had been made by the Chinese. Moreover, if an increased 
frequency of criticisms appears in the traceable pattern, this may be congruent with a decision by 
China to go to war.  
The analysis of China’s use of morality-based language is a test of the argument that the 
CRWT functioned only as a “moral cloak.” If this research finds that China’s leaders did not 
express any concerns about just cause while making their decisions for war, but the frequency of 
morality-based condemnation increased after the critical points in decision making, then China’s 
use of that language was likely to be for public consumption in order to justify the decision to go 
to war. Therefore, if the frequency of language used in the People’s Daily is found to be 
consistent with the presentation of just cause behind the scenes, then the use of that language 
may be more than just a “moral cloak.”   
Two major methods are used to examine the relationship between the CRWT and China’s 
decisions to go to war. First, I use a method similar to Przeworski and Teune’s “most similar 
systems design,” which compares the cases that are as similar as possible on a wide range of 
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explanatory/independent variables but different on the value of the dependent variable.132 The 
basic inferential logic of this design is, as Levy mentions, “to identify patterns of covariation and 
to eliminate independent variables that do not covary with the dependent variable.”133 However, 
Levy further argued that this method may confront the difficulty of identifying cases that are 
truly comparable – “identical or different in all respects but one.”134 This problem can often be 
eased by approaching longitudinal designs involving a single state over time.135 Longitudinal 
design is also helpful to foster what King, Keohane, and Verba called “unit homogeneity,” which 
assumes that if the observations have the same value on the key explanatory variable, then we 
can expect that the dependent variables from each observation are also the same.136   
By adopting the method of “most similar systems” with a longitudinal design, I select six 
cases between 1950 and 1979 where the circumstances seemed ripe for the CRWT to influence 
decisions to go to war. The cases are the Korean War, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis137, the 
Sino-Indian War, the period of 1964-1965 in the Vietnam War138 , the Sino-Soviet Border 
Disputes, and the Sino-Vietnamese War. According to my argument, the CRWT is expected to 
exert influence on China’s decision to go to war under two circumstances: when China’s leaders 
have encountered an impasse in decision-making (such as when different pragmatic arguments 
point toward opposite courses of action), and when they perceive that their attempts at 
nonviolent solutions have encountered deadlock. I thus expect that these circumstances will be 
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present139 during the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnamese War.140 They 
should not be present during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis141, the period of 1964-1965 in the 
Vietnam War142, and the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute.143 
Process-tracing is the second method I employ to test my hypothesis regarding the influence of 
the CRWT. Collier defines this method as “an analytic tool for drawing descriptive and causal 
inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a temporal sequence 
of events or phenomena.”144 George and Bennett point out that the process-tracing method 
attempts to identify the intervening causal process between an independent variable (or variables) 
and the outcome of the dependent variable.145 By investigating evidence of each step and 
providing a detailed narrative, process-tracing can help researchers to explore the chain of events 
and the decision-making process.146 My argument about the application of the CRWT is relevant 
to the reinforcement of confidence in decisions for war and the timing of shifts in the mind-sets 
of Chinese leaders. Thus, this method can allow me to give close attention to tracing when the 
Chinese leaders apply the CRWT and how its ideas influence the outcome of decision making. 
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Chapter 3 - The Korean War 
In the last two decades, many valuable studies of China’s decision to intervene in the 
Korean War have become available. Some argue that the Chinese Communist Party’s 
“revolutionary nationalism, its sense of responsibility toward an Asian-wide or worldwide 
revolution, and its determination to maintain the inner dynamic of the Chinese revolution”147 
influenced its leaders’ decision to intervene in the Korean War. Some argue that the interplay of 
military romanticism and pragmatism shaped CCP attitude, thinking, and behavior regarding the 
use of force in Korea.148 Some believe that Mao’s calculations concerning security led him to 
choose to dispatch troops in Korea.149 These arguments are persuasive, and I have no intention to 
refute them since the motives that drove China’s leaders to intervene in the Korean War by force 
were complex and varied. For the purpose of this study, I trace the statements and remarks made 
by top Chinese leaders (Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Dehuai) regarding the legitimacy of 
intervention to examine whether their considerations were similar to what the CRWT would 
suggest. My application of the concept of righteous war will be focused. As the following 
examination will show, righteous causes for the decision to go to war not only had been 
considered by the key Chinese leaders, but they also persuaded them that going to war was the 
right decision and should be put into action rather than avoiding involvement. In addition, 
analysis of the People’s Daily shows how the Chinese government presented its case for 
righteous cause.  
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Historical Background 
After receiving the green light from Stalin150, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) 
crossed the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, to “reunify” Korea. The NKPA’s invasion caused the 
United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to advise President Truman to intervene in the 
crisis by force and dispatch the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait.151 Truman immediately approved 
Acheson’s suggestion and informed General MacArthur of that decision. At the same time, the 
U.N. approved the U.S.-proposed resolution to intervene in the Korean conflict with military 
force.152 Although the situation in East Asia changed quickly after the NKPA’s invasion, Beijing 
didn’t have a clear response until three days later when Zhou Enlai protested the presence of the 
U.S. 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait.153 The 7th Fleet’s patrol of the Taiwan Strait significantly 
interfered with and altered Beijing’s intention of “liberating” Taiwan. The huge obstruction 
imposed by the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait eventually forced Beijing to postpone its plan to 
“liberate” Taiwan. 
Although the NKPA’s victory seemed imminent with its quick success after crossing the 
38th parallel, Beijing started to worry about the possibility of a U.S. amphibious operation against 
the NKPA’s lines of communication.154 On July 2, Zhou mentioned to the Soviet Ambassador to 
the PRC that, if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel, Beijing could dispatch troops to Korea 
to support the NKPA against the American forces. For this reason, Zhou said, Beijing would 
initially concentrate three corps in northeastern China as a reserve for a rainy day.155 On July 7, 
based on Mao’s instruction, the Central Military Committee (CMC) approved the order to 
organize the Northeast Border Defense Army (NBDA).156 On July 13, Mao formally approved 
                                                 
150 John Lewis Gaddis, Now We Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 71-72. 
151 Allen Reed Millett, The War for Korea, 1950-1951: they came from the north (Lawrence, Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas, 2010), 115. 
152 Ibid., 113-114. 
153 The Institute of Contemporary China Studies, The Annals of the People’s Republic of China (1950) (Beijing, 
China: Contemporary China Publishing House, 2006), 454-456 
154 Lei Yingfu, Zai zuigaotongshuaibu dang canmou: Lei Yingfu jiang ju hui yi lu (General Lei Yingfu’s Memoir) 
(Nanchang, China: Baihuazhou wenyi chubanshe, 1997), 146-150 
155 The Institute of Contemporary China Studies, The Annals of the People’s Republic of China (1950), 479 
156 Ibid., 490 
39 
 
the decision to protect the Northeast border, which confirmed the organization and preparation of 
the NBDA.157 
While the level of the U.S. intervention was increasing, Mao revealed his concern about the 
possibility of a reverse in the strategic situation in Korea in a Politburo meeting of August 4. He 
mentioned that if the Americans won the war, then they would further threaten China; therefore, 
there was a need to help North Korea. Mao believed that China should send a force with the 
name of “volunteer army” at the right time.158 The next day, Mao ordered the NBDA to complete 
all preparation by the end of August. But Mao quickly extended the time for preparation at the 
request of the frontier units.159 Meanwhile, Mao and Zhou Enlai received a report from the 
Central Military Commission (CMC) estimating the possibility and location of the U.S. 
counterstrike. In this report, Inchon was considered the location most likely for the U.S. 
counterstrike.160 Based on this report, Mao and Zhou decided that the NBDA would complete its 
preparations for war and be ready to dispatch by September 30, and they informed the Soviets of 
their decision.161 
In late August, when the Americans launched a strategic bombing campaign along the Yalu 
River, China’s leaders felt more and more uneasy about the U.S. conduct of the Korean War. 
Zhou dispatched several telegrams to the U.N. Secretary General, Trygve Lie, and the U.S. 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, condemning the U.S. strategic bombing on the Yalu River as 
an improper intrusion into Chinese territory.162 On September 5, Mao recognized that the Korean 
War would very likely become a prolonged war because of the U.S. intervention. He was 
concerned that the U.S. could expand its aggression to China if it won the war; thus, China had 
to prepare for dealing with any possible scenario that developed on the Korean battlefield.163 
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Beijing’s worries about a U.S. counterstrike which would reverse the situation in the war finally 
became reality when General MacArthur launched the Inchon landing on September 15, 1950. 
Not until September 18 did Beijing learn that the Americans were landing at Inchon and 
winning the battle. Zhou immediately summoned the Soviet Ambassador to Beijing to discuss 
the next step for dealing with the situation after the Inchon landing. Zhou believed that the North 
Koreans needed to withdraw all their major forces from the front as quickly as possible if they 
did not have enough reserve troops to protect the rear area.164 On September 20, with Mao’s 
approval, Zhou telegraphed Kim that the NKPA should strive to keep the 38th parallel in its 
hands in order to engage in a prolonged war.165 Beijing’s suggestion was too optimistic regarding 
the NKPA’s ability to control the collapsing situation. On September 28, the key leaders of the 
Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) realized that the NKPA could no longer prevent the Americans 
from crossing the 38th parallel and could not even offer an effective resistance against the 
advance of US/UN troops both toward and within North Korea. Because of this situation, the 
North Koreans had no choice but to ask the Soviet Union and the PRC for help.166 The next day, 
after measuring the situation, Mao authorized Zhou to deliver an official speech supporting the 
North Koreans, stating that “the Chinese people enthusiastically love peace, but in order to 
defend peace, they never have been and never will be afraid to oppose aggressive war” and “the 
Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, not [sic] will they supinely 
tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists.”167   
After receiving the WPK’s call for help, Stalin on September 30 asked Beijing to dispatch at 
least five or six divisions under the cover of volunteer troops to the Korean peninsula for helping 
the NKPA to reconstitute its strength. Moscow also informed the WPK about its request to 
Beijing and the Soviet attitude toward the assistance. That night, Kim sent Park Il-woo to Beijing 
to ask the Chinese to provide help.168 On October 2, two days after receiving Stalin’s request, 
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Mao summoned an emergency meeting to discuss China’s response. Although Mao and Zhou 
tended to favor complying with Stalin’s request to send troops into Korea, the majority of 
participants opposed a decision to enter the war. Because of those objections, Mao decided to 
postpone the delivery of his telegram informing Stalin that Beijing was ready to send forces. Due 
to the dissent, those present at the meeting agreed to summon an enlarged Politburo meeting on 
October 4 to discuss thoroughly the decision to use Chinese forces in Korea. After the October 2 
meeting, Beijing dispatched a telegram to Stalin stating that the Chinese would not send troops 
until the time was right.169 Meanwhile, Beijing’s efforts to stop the U.S. from crossing the 38th 
parallel had not ceased. On October 3, Zhou attempted to warn Washington through the Indian 
Ambassador to Beijing that China would intervene in the war if the U.S. crossed the 38th 
parallel.170  
On October 4, the enlarged Politburo meeting171 took place. The majority still expressed 
reservations about the decision to enter the war. After hearing their reasons, Mao commented 
that the Chinese would “feel terrible” if they were standing on the side and watching the North 
Koreans endure a national crisis.172 This remark eventually won support from Peng Dehuai, who 
had entered the convention hall in the middle of the dispute and didn’t express an opinion during 
the meeting, after he thought about it that night.173 In the next day’s meeting, Peng supported 
Mao, who was encouraged enough to stick to his earlier decision to intervene in Korea. Finally, 
at the end of the October 5 meeting, the Politburo approved Mao’s decision to dispatch troops to 
Korea for the purpose of saving North Korea from ruin.174 
While the CCP Politburo was making its decision to enter the war, Stalin was confused by 
Beijing’s earlier telegram that China would temporarily refrain from dispatching troops. Stalin 
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clarified the Soviet standpoint by asking Beijing to dispatch troops to Korea in reply to the 
Chinese telegram of October 2. On October 7, Mao replied to Stalin, explaining that China 
would send nine divisions but not at once. Mao also asked Stalin to receive Mao’s envoy to 
discuss China’s plans and the Soviets’ military aid to the Chinese in the Chinese effort to support 
North Korea.175 The next day, Mao issued the directive creating the Chinese People’s Volunteers 
(CPV) and informed Kim about Beijing’s decision to enter the war.176  
Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, as the envoys sent from Beijing, met Stalin on October 11 to 
discuss the issue of Soviet military aid to China and its volunteers. Although Beijing had already 
resolved to enter the war, Zhou decided to conceal it from Stalin in order to bargain for more 
favorable military assistance. Zhou attempted to persuade Stalin that the Chinese would enter the 
war only if the Soviets could offer the military supplies and equipment the Chinese needed for 
the war and dispatch air forces to cover the Chinese volunteers in Korea. However, contrary to 
Zhou’s expectation that the Soviet Union should do more, Stalin only agreed to offer materiel; 
the Soviet air force, he said, would not be ready for action until two or two and half months 
later.177 
Zhou’s message about Stalin’s decision presented Mao with a serious dilemma – whether to 
delay the CPV’s entry into the war.178 Mao cabled Peng, Gao Gang179, and other generals of the 
CPV to temporarily cease military actions until there had been another thorough discussion in the 
Politburo.180 On October 13, the Politburo held another meeting to discuss the issue of entry into 
the war without Soviet air cover. Mao asked Peng for his assessment of the feasibility of fighting 
against the U.S. without Soviet air cover. Peng said that it could be done with some success. 
Finally, the meeting ended with a conclusion to maintain the original plan for sending the CPV 
into Korea, even without any immediate air cover provided by the Soviets. That evening, Mao 
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telegraphed Zhou the Politburo’s final decision, stating that “the entry of our army into Korea 
continues to be to our advantage.”181 At a Politburo meeting on October 18, after three days of 
detailed discussion and after receiving Zhou’s message from Moscow, Mao made his final 
decision that the CPV’s plan to cross the river would not be changed or postponed. At 19:00, 
October 19, 1950, the CPV secretly began crossing the Yalu River, and the PRC threw itself into 
another war that would last for the next three years. 
     
Analysis of the Leaders 
Mao Zedong 
Mao was the most important person in the decision to dispatch troops to help the North 
Koreans. As mentioned earlier, in mid-July Mao realized that the PRC needed to prepare as early 
as possible for any outcome of the Korean War. When the NKPA offensive was checked in the 
Pusan area in August, Mao started to believe that an enlarged and prolonged war might be 
possible. Under this circumstance, Mao considered the next step for Beijing. On August 4, he 
said: 
If the American imperialists win, [then they] will pride [themselves in this victory], and will threaten us. For 
North Korea we cannot but help, [we] have to help, in the style of volunteer troops, and of course we need to 
choose the right time. We must have preparation.182 
Mao didn’t specify the right time to offer help until September 23, after the Americans 
successfully landed at Inchon. Mao mentioned that “if the American imperialists want to 
intervene [in the conflict] but not to cross the 38th parallel, we will not intervene [in the conflict]; 
if they cross the 38th parallel, we will certainly go over there [Korea] to fight.”183 These two 
comments show that Mao had recognized that China might need to use force to deal with the 
situation. Clearly, from Mao’s words, the Chinese did not want to see the U.S. expand the war 
into North Korean territory. This unwanted development was the Chinese bottom line for 
intervening in Korea. At this stage, however, we cannot determine whether this consideration 
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resulted from the ideas of the CRWT or pragmatic calculation since both have the potential to 
explain Mao’s position. The justification Mao used is compatible with the idea of helping a weak 
state against a strong state’s invasion in the CRWT. It is also compatible with pragmatic 
calculation. Mere compatibility is not enough to validate the influence of the CRWT. Thus, it is 
important to know what justifications Mao used, and how he used them, when he perceived the 
right time to go to war between October 1 and 18, 1950. 
The first critical moment during that period was the emergency meeting of October 2. A day 
before the meeting, Beijing had received an intelligence report indicating that the US/UN 
vanguard units had begun crossing the 38th parallel.184 On the night of October 1, Kim Il-Sung 
delivered an urgent request to China’s ambassador to Pyongyang appealing to Beijing to send 
forces into Korea. This situation made Mao believe that it was time for China to dispatch its 
forces. Mao had even drafted a telegram that was supposed to be sent to Stalin after the October 
2 meeting. But that telegram was postponed and eventually cancelled because of the discordant 
opinions expressed in the meeting of October 2.185 Although the telegram never accomplished its 
purpose of delivering Mao’s explanation of China’s response, it did reflect Mao’s initial motives 
for entering the Korean War. In that telegram, Mao stated:  
1. We have decided to send some of our troops to Korea under the name of [Chinese People’s] Volunteers to 
fight the United States and its lackey Syngman Rhee and to aid our Korean comrades. From the following 
considerations, we think it necessary to do so: if the Americans occupy the whole of Korea, the Korean 
revolutionary force will meet with a fundamental defeat and the American aggressors will [behave even] more 
rampantly. This will be unfavorable to the entire East. 186 
The justifications Mao adopted in this telegram, however, did not reveal a strong moral 
component. Although Mao did worry that the North Koreans would meet a fundamental defeat 
from the Americans’ invasion, he justified Beijing’s use of force as a protection of the 
communists’ revolution in Korea and the entire East rather than as a righteous act to help save 
the weak neighbor from invasion. This lack of righteousness-based justification does not 
necessarily mean that Mao was making his decision without thinking about the issues of 
righteous war. The role of the receiver of that telegram, Stalin, as the leader of the communist 
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bloc, explains that it was wise for Mao to emphasize the justification from an internationalist 
viewpoint rather than from a distinctively Chinese perspective. Mao’s statements during the next 
critical period show that the ideas of the CRWT played an important role in Mao’s justification 
of the use of force, especially when speaking to his follow Politburo members. 
The second critical moment to observe in Mao’s decision making is between October 4 and 
6, 1950, when the Politburo debated his decision. Because the October 2 meeting could not 
achieve any agreement, Mao decided to convene an enlarged Politburo meeting on October 4 and 
5. In the October 4 meeting, Mao let the participants express their own opinions about the use of 
force in Korea before he shared his opinion. After hearing all of the arguments pro and con, 
according to Peng Dehuai’s recollection, Mao said: “All that you said sounds reasonable and 
logical. When we, however, are standing on the side, just watching other people who are 
undergoing a national crisis, we still feel terrible inside no matter what we pretend.”187 This 
wording not only moved Peng to steadfastly support Mao’s decision, but also revealed an idea 
similar to the CRWT. Mao’s expression suggests that he regarded Chinese inaction when a 
neighbor was in peril as improper behavior. As the expression showed, Mao had a frame of 
reference for identifying the right thing for China to do in dealing with the deteriorating situation 
in North Korea. It should be noted that Mao was making this remark in a closed-door meeting 
with high-ranking leaders, who must have been skillful at, or at least knowledgeable about, the 
use of propaganda. Although we cannot exactly know what those participants had in mind, the 
circumstances of the meeting might well have encouraged them to express the option that they 
believed to be the best decision for China in response to the conflict in Korea. Moreover, Mao’s 
expression suggests that the ideas of the CRWT, in Mao’s view, were also a useful tool that 
could bring the dissenters to think again about what would be the morally right thing for China to 
do in response to the developments in Korea. In this regard, the ideas of the CRWT, to Mao, 
were certainly not naïve thinking, and might have been a sort of common sense for those Chinese 
leaders assessing the decision for war; otherwise, Mao would hardly have wasted time 
persuading his comrades by emphasizing just cause. 
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Mao’s voice highlighting the righteousness of helping North Korea against the U.S. 
invasion reached its peak on the night of October 6, when he heard the reasons that Lin Biao had 
given for opposing the decision to go to war at a CMC meeting earlier that day. According to Lei 
Yingfu’s memoir188, during that CMC meeting in which Mao did not participate, Lin Biao 
continued to question the decision to dispatch troops. Right after the meeting, Lei Yingfu and 
Zhou Enlai ran into Mao at Zhongnanhai. Mao inquired about what had transpired. Zhou 
reported to Mao that Lin Biao was still reluctant to support the decision to enter the war. 
Apparently annoyed with Lin Biao’s formulations, Mao replied:  
He [Lin Biao] has one thousand reasons, ten thousand reasons, [but he] cannot confute only one reason of ours, 
that is both we and North Korea are friendly socialist neighbors under the leadership of Communism. The 
teeth are cold when the lips are lost.189 No matter from the viewpoint of internationalism, or patriotism, we 
cannot see someone in mortal danger without lifting a finger to save him. The Chinese people have a glorious 
tradition and [doctrine of] virtue for thousands of years, that is, never to hesitate to do what is righteous (見義
勇為), and to sacrifice ourselves to save others (捨己救人); we ought to carry them forward.190 
In this comment, Mao clearly pointed out the principles he believed to be the guidelines for 
Chinese behavior when a neighbor was in danger.191 He used two traditional Chinese idioms, 
“never to hesitate to do what is righteous” and “to sacrifice ourselves to save others,” to justify 
his decision. The use of these two idioms suggests that the calculation of China’s interests was 
not the consideration dominating Mao’s assessment of the decision for going to war. A concern 
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for righteousness also appeared. To Mao, China’s decision for war to help the North Koreans 
was not only legitimized, but also a virtuous act that should be glorified.  
Moreover, Mao’s invocation of righteousness between October 4 and 6 to defend his 
decisions implies that the concept of righteous war not only helped him to legitimize his decision 
for war; it also reinforced his determination when dissent arose. This also suggests that the 
concept of righteous war played a role in the shift of Mao’s mind-set during early October of 
1950. The suspension of delivery of the telegram dated October 2 indicates that Mao had not 
been fully ready to decide on entering the war; otherwise he might have resolutely persuaded his 
comrades, as he did later on October 4 and 6, and informed Stalin about China’s decision. 
Between October 4 and 6, Mao’s comments reveal that he had basically made up his mind to go 
to war. Mao’s defense of his decision meanwhile indicates that his conviction about the right 
thing for China to do not only appeared precisely when the shift occurred, but persisted when it 
was challenged by the dissent.  
    Regarding the concept of righteous war as the key element in the shift of Mao’s mind-sets also 
explains the variation in Mao’s remarks after October 6. Johnson and Tierney argue that actors in 
an “implement mind-set” will focus intensely on getting the task done and resist reconsidering 
decisions they have already made or contemplating other courses of action.192 This inference is 
suggested by Mao’s statements after October 6, which focused more on the task itself, rather 
than highlighting the identification of righteous causes. For example, on October 8, Mao did not 
refer to the righteousness-based justifications for the Chinese to enter the war in his directive 
“Creating the Chinese People’s Volunteers” in which the invocation of righteousness and 
legitimacy might have helped to invigorate the Chinese troops’ morale. He wrote:  
In order to support the Korean people’s war of liberation and to resist the attacks of the American imperialists 
and their running dogs, [and] for safeguarding the interest of the people of Korea, China, and all the other 
countries in the East, I herewith order the Northeast Frontier Force [to] change [its name] to the Chinese 
People’s Volunteers, and order the Chinese People’s Volunteers to march speedily to Korea and join in the 
Korean comrades’ fight against the aggressors [for] winning a glorious victory.193 
Although Mao mentioned the purpose of helping North Korea to resist the attacks of the U.S. and 
its allies in this directive, his tone in the whole text was very similar to the earlier statement 
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addressed to Stalin. On the same day, Mao’s telegraph to Kim Il-sung informing him of Beijing’s 
decision was also flatly worded, especially when he referred to the reason for entering the war: 
“according to the current situation, we have decided to dispatch the Volunteers to Korea to help 
you to fight against aggressors.”194  
Similarly, on October 13, when Mao telegraphed Zhou to explain Beijing’s final decision 
after acknowledging the Soviets’ reluctance to offer immediate air support, he adopted a more 
pragmatic turn of expression. He wrote: 
1. After a discussion with the comrades on the Politburo, we have reached a consensus that [to] keep our army 
entering into Korea [will] still [be to] our advantage…2. The adoption of our active policy mentioned above is 
extremely favorable to China, Korea, the East, and the world. If we do not send troops [to Korea], the 
reactionaries at home and abroad will be swollen with arrogance, when the enemy troops move forward to the 
bank of the Yalu River. Consequently, [this situation will bring] disadvantages to all [areas of our] side. The 
first [area will be] Northeast China [which will receive] more disadvantages, [because] the entire Northeast 
Frontier Force will be tied down and the electric power in South Manchuria will be constrained. In short, we 
believe that we should enter the war. We must enter the war. Entering the war is greatly to our advantage; it is 
greatly to our disadvantage if we do not enter the war.195 
This telegram indicates that the consideration of national security, especially the security of 
Northeast China, was a major motivation leading Mao to decide to continue the earlier decision 
after learning of the unfavorable response from the Soviets.  
Therefore, by taking the Rubicon Theory of War into account, the lack of Mao’s 
identification of righteous causes after October 6 should not refute my assumption of the 
influence of the CRWT. Instead, Mao’s activities between October 2 and October 13 suggest that 
the identification of righteous cause may have played an important role in legitimating the 
decision and helping to shift his mind-set from the “deliberative” mode to the “implemental.”   
With regard to the identification of U.S. moral standing, however, Mao did not express a 
strong position, such as by judging the U.S. to be an immoral regime needing to be punished. 
According to Shen Zhi-hua, a Chinese expert on PRC foreign policy in the Cold War, Mao’s 
perception of the U.S. suffered a significant impact when Truman announced his new policy 
toward Taiwan and sent the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. To Mao, these responses of the U.S. 
after the outbreak of Korean War not only manifested that the U.S. regarded the P.R.C. rather 
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than North Korea as its major opponent in the conflict, but also meant that the U.S. had broken 
its commitment not to intervene in the internal affairs of China.196 Mao was very dissatisfied 
with the Americans’ new policy toward the Strait. On June 28, Mao expressed his resentment:  
The Chinese people have long ago declared that the affairs of all countries of the entire world should be 
managed by their own people and not by the United States. The U.S. invasion of Asia can only touch off a 
broad and resolute opposition of Asian people. On January 5, Truman announced that the United States would 
not intervene in Taiwan. Now his conduct proves that what he said was false, and at the same time, he 
shredded all international agreements related to the American commitment not to intervene in China’s internal 
affairs. The United States thus reveals its true color [of being] imperialist…The U.S. intervention in the 
internal affairs of Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam is totally unreasonable.  The sympathies of the Chinese 
people and the people of the world belong to the countries which have been invaded, and [those sympathies] 
will never belong to the side of American imperialists…197 
As Shen Zhi-hua has argued, in Mao’s view, Truman’s statement of June 27 not only obstructed 
Beijing’s plan to recover Taiwan by force but also deprived Beijing of the legitimacy to be 
gained from unifying Taiwan with the mainland both politically and legally.198 This speech 
reveals an attempt to strike back at the Americans’ new policy toward Taiwan by denouncing the 
aggressive nature of the U.S., but it falls far short of a full-blown moral denunciation.  
After his speech of June 28, Mao showed no more resentment in any of his assessments and 
comments on the U.S. between July and September. At the Politburo meeting of September 5, 
when he assessed the advantages and disadvantages the U.S. possessed, Mao said: 
The American imperialists have many difficulties today, which are internal disagreement and discord with 
other states. They only have an advantage in military affairs…but with three additional weaknesses….The 
three weaknesses are: first, the front line is too long…second, the line of communication is too far…third, the 
fighting power is too feeble….The enemy [the U.S.] is not dreadful, its posturing and aggressive stance is 
bluff. But the American imperialists may act recklessly today, it is capable of all sorts of things. If it acts in 
such a way, we will have a hard time [if] without preparation, [but] we will cope with it easily with 
preparation. What I call “act such a way” is nothing but to fight World War III, and fight with nuclear bombs, 
for a long period….199 
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Although Mao’s evaluation of the U.S. weaknesses was founded partly on his own wishful 
thinking, the ground of it is pragmatic and based on the objectives he recognized. These 
statements indicate that Mao had not clearly identified the moral status of the U.S. before the 
critical period of decision-making, even though he was still dissatisfied with the U.S. policy 
toward Taiwan. 
Mao’s use of negative terms, especially the words “aggressor” and “aggressive,” in 
condemning the U.S. behavior in Korea, reappeared when the NKPA was collapsing after the 
Inchon landing. On September 30, Mao instructed Zhou to publicize his report to the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which warned the U.S. not to cross the 38th 
parallel. Zhou’s announcement stated that “the Chinese people will absolutely not tolerate any 
foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being invaded savagely 
by the imperialists.”200 In his draft telegram of October 2 to Stalin, Mao mentioned: “If the 
Americans occupy the whole of Korea, the Korean revolutionary force will meet with a 
fundamental defeat and the American aggressors will [behave even] more rampantly.”  The use 
of “aggressor” when describing the U.S. also appeared in Mao’s directive creating the CPV on 
October 8, as well as in the telegram informing Kim Il-sung of Beijing’s decision to enter the 
war, but it faded out after that.201  
Although Mao did not use morality-based condemnation to describe the moral standing of 
the U.S., the timing of his description of the U.S. as “aggressor” and “aggressive” is congruent 
with his highlighting of righteous causes. Uses of the words “aggressor” and “aggressive” were 
concentrated between September 30 and October 8, while the identification of righteous causes 
appeared especially between October 4 and 6, 1950. This congruence suggests that the moral 
inferiority of the U.S., which Mao branded as the “aggressor,” was used to strengthen the 
righteous legitimacy of his decision to help the North Koreans fight against the U.S. invasion, 
especially when he had to persuade his wavering comrades to go along with him. 
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Zhou Enlai 
Zhou Enlai, the Premier of the PRC, is another key leader to be examined. As early as the 
beginning of August, Zhou had begun to consider the option of providing military assistance to 
North Korea. On August 4, Zhou made a speech in a Politburo meeting that brought up his 
assessment of possible developments in the Korean War. He mentioned:  
If the American imperialists suppress North Korea, then [this result] will bring disadvantages to the peace and 
[the American imperialists] will swell with arrogance. In order to strive for victory, it must add China as a 
factor. After adding the factor of China, it may cause a change internationally. We have to have such a broad 
and long-range plan.202 
Obviously, Zhou was clear about the power of the U.S. and its effect upon the ongoing Korean 
War. Zhou was not entirely pessimistic. His speech shows his confidence in the power of the 
PRC, which might offer considerable help to North Korea if the conflict took a turn for the worse. 
Although Zhou had implied the possibility of Beijing’s intervention, his intention to 
dispatch troops to Korea did not become clear until August 26 when he participated in a meeting 
discussing the preparations of the NBDA. At the meeting, Zhou indicated:  
For our attitude toward the Korean [problem], we shall not only treat it as an issue of brotherhood, not only 
treat it as an issue linking with the vital interest of our northeast, but also need to regard it as an important 
issue of international struggle….If North Korea may achieve victory, our problem in [the issue of] Taiwan will 
be easily solved. Thus, what we adopt to [deal with] the Korean problem is an active attitude, that we will 
organize the Northeast Border Defense Army. 203 
In the same meeting, Zhou mentioned that, “according to the organization ordered by the CMC, a 
corps has more than 35,000 personnel, which [organization] is suitable for the operations in 
Korea.”204 This formulation witnesses that at least by late August of 1950, Zhou had regarded the 
use of force in Korea as an applicable option for dealing with the worst-case scenario occurring 
on the Korean battlefield. 
Zhou didn’t publicize that thought until the U.S./U.N. troops were about to cross the 38th 
parallel on September 30. In this announcement, Zhou warned the U.S.: 
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The Chinese people have been closely following the situation in Korea since she was invaded by the U.S.A. 
The Korean people and their People’s Army are resolute and valorous. Led by Premier Kim Il Sung, they have 
scored remarkable achievements in resisting the American invaders and have won the sympathy and support 
of people throughout the world…The Chinese people are peace-loving people….The Chinese people 
enthusiastically love peace, but in order to defend peace, they never have been and never will be afraid to 
oppose aggressive war. The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they 
supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists.205 
This announcement clearly defined Zhou’s justification of Beijing’s use of force in Korea, which 
was aimed to help its neighbor fight against foreign aggression.  
After receiving indefinite intelligence reporting that American and South Korean troops 
were crossing the 38th parallel on October 3, Zhou delivered another warning with a much 
clearer message through K. M. Panikkar, India’s Ambassador to Beijing. Zhou stated: 
U.S. troops are going to cross the 38th parallel in an attempt to extend the war. If the U.S. troops really do so, 
we cannot sit by idly and remain indifferent. We will intervene.206 
To resolve the conflict in Korea, Zhou said, Beijing favored peaceful negotiation and the 
localization of the Korean War, which meant a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. 
Panikkar knew that Beijing’s proposal, which localized the Korean War by requesting the 
U.S./U.N. troops to withdraw, would be difficult for Washington to accept. Panikkar then 
inquired if there was any alternative proposal acceptable to Beijing, but Zhou replied by 
repeating his assertion that Beijing would intervene in the Korean War if the U.S. crossed the 
38th parallel, noting that China favored the withdrawal of all “aggressor troops” from Korea and 
a peaceful negotiation. Although Zhou’s formulations of conditions for Chinese intervention in 
the Korean conflict present ideas similar to what the CRWT would suggest, this evidence is still 
too weak to state that the concept of righteous war led Zhou to this point. 
The most prominent evidence demonstrating Zhou’s consideration of the righteous causes 
leading to China’s decision for war comes from the enlarged CMC meeting of October 6. As 
mentioned in the section dealing with Mao, Lin Biao expressed his concerns about sending 
forces to Korea in this meeting. Lin mentioned that it was not worthwhile to save North Korea – 
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a small country with a population of several million – in exchange for damaging China, which 
had a population of five hundred million. In Lin’s words, China might suffer from U.S. nuclear 
retaliation, if China pushed the U.S. too far in Korea. Lin suggested that if the Chinese insisted 
on sending forces, the best way to do so was to keep the forces in the northern part of North 
Korea and watch the development of the situation, and then decide what to do.207 According to 
Lei Yingfu’s recollection, after hearing Lin Biao’s objection Zhou delivered harsh criticism: 
Now it is not the issue whether we shall fight or not, but it is the U.S. who compels us to fight. Our self-
defense is just (正義的), and a just war will certainly win victory at the end. Especially for the current North 
Korean government, Premier Kim Il-sung has again and again requested us to send our forces to help [North 
Korea], how can we see someone in mortal danger without lifting a finger to save him? 208 
Although Zhou did not specifically describe helping North Korea as a “just” reason for China to 
go to war, he did not exclude that reason from the justification. As we can see, Zhou’s logic is 
similar to what Mao presented in criticizing Lin’s suggestion, namely, that saving North Korea 
from ruin was the right thing for China to do. Also, the location and timing of Zhou’s 
presentation of this remark are worth noting. The remark occurred in another closed-door 
meeting on October 6. As I mentioned earlier, the circumstances of the meeting might have 
encouraged the participants to express their real concerns about the Chinese response to the 
conflict in Korea. In this regard, Zhou’s response might reflect a concern that China had a moral 
obligation to save North Korea from ruin. Zhou’s tone is also worth mentioning. The just cause 
was brought up by Zhou to criticize Lin Biao’s proposal advocating inaction. His wording 
suggests that to Zhou pragmatic calculation should not be the only language spoken in the 
assessment of China’s decision for war. Rather, the issue of righteous causes should also be 
considered. Just as Mao did, when he sought to legitimize his decision, Zhou chose the 
“righteous” argument for war over pragmatic calculation that pointed in the opposite direction.  
Zhou’s identified righteous causes again at an executive meeting of the CPPCC on October 
24, after the CPV had crossed the Yalu River. At the meeting, Zhou pointed out the reasons for 
Beijing to enter the war: 
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North Korea has a relatively small [territory], and what it can rely on is a population of nine million. 
Depending on such [weak] strength to resist such a strong enemy with determination for a protracted 
resistance, it is rare and commendable and we shall esteem [this behavior]….If North Korea wants victory, it 
must receive international support. Especially in their difficult time, they need more international supporters. 
We shall exalt the morality and justice (道義) of revolution. Only when North Korea wins victory, will the 
[frontline of the] camp of peace not be ripped…If the eastern frontline is wide open, and the enemy is 
approaching our gate, how can we develop [our country]? China and North Korea are states depending on 
each other as the lips and teeth. If the lips are gone, the teeth will be cold. If North Korea is slapped down by 
the American imperialism, the northeast of our country will be unable to stabilize…209 
In addition to the ideology of communism and the idea of preventive defense, the context of 
Zhou’s justification is very similar to the CRWT idea of helping a weak state to fight against a 
stronger state’s invasion. At the beginning, he appraises North Korea’s behavior as a small 
power that has no hesitancy to prepare a long-term resistance fighting against a much stronger 
enemy’s invasion. Then Zhou mentions that, in order for North Korea, as a small state in such a 
difficult time, to win victory, it would have to receive international support with China 
shouldering the most responsibility. After addressing considerations of righteousness, Zhou then 
indicated the critical relationship between China’s national security and the possible results of 
the Korean War.   
The comparison between Zhou’s formulations of October 6 and October 24 provides an 
important clue to trace the influence of the CRWT upon his decision-making. Zhou’s comments 
on October 6 indicate that the justification for helping North Korea against the U.S. invasion 
provided him a frame of reference to locate the right decision China should make. A similar 
expression appeared again when he explained Beijing’s decision on a more public occasion on 
October 24. This consistency between his remarks at private and public occasions suggests that 
Zhou did believe that the consideration of righteous causes should be applied in the assessment 
of the decision to go to war.  
The next question is whether Zhou made any judgment of U.S. morality when he was 
making the decision for entering the Korean War. As mentioned in the section on Mao, 
Washington’s Taiwan policy after the outbreak of the Korean War, which committed the U.S. to 
defend Taiwan, provoked the leaders of PRC. Zhou was of course one of those dissatisfied 
leaders. On June 28, in his public condemnation, Zhou used the phrase “violent act of predation” 
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to describe the U.S. deployment of the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait.210 Between July and 
August, the major negative terms adopted in Zhou’s announcements to describe the U.S. moves 
in Korea were the words “aggressive” or “aggression.”211  The moral condemnation of U.S 
morality peaked during Zhou's protests of the American aerial bombings along the Yalu River. 
For example, on August 27, Zhou protested: 
…with regard to these aggressive and violent (殘暴) behavior invading China’s territorial air space made by 
the American troops invading Korea, it is a serious crime (罪行) to infringe China’s sovereignty, kill the 
Chinese people savagely, and attempt to expand the war and break peace.212 
While the North Korean troops in South Korea were collapsing after the Inchon landing, 
Zhou integrated the condemnations of the U.S. intervention in Korea and aerial bombings along 
the Yalu River into a statement denouncing the immorality of the U.S. On September 30, in his 
first warning to the U.S. about its move crossing the 38th parallel, Zhou stated:  
The United States deliberately concocted the assault of the Syngman Rhee gang against the Korean 
Democratic People’s Republic in order to expand its aggression in the East and then, on the pretext of the 
situation in Korea, dispatched its naval and air forces to invade the Taiwan Province of China; [and] 
announced that the so-called problem of Taiwan’s status should be solved by the American-controlled United 
Nations.  Moreover, time after time, it sent its air force, which is invading Korea, to intrude into the air over 
the Liaodong Province of China, strafing and bombing; and sent its naval forces, which are invading Korea, to 
bombard Chinese merchant ships on the high seas. By these frenzied (瘋狂) and violent(殘暴) acts of 
imperialist aggression, the U.S. government had displayed itself as the most dangerous foe to the PRC.213 
This statement indicates a clear train of thought showing Zhou’s assessment of the moral 
standing of the U.S. The first part of the last sentence concludes that the nature of the U.S., as 
exposed by its intervention in the Korean conflict, its interference in Taiwan issue, and its 
military actions along China’s borders and territorial air space and waters, is frenzied and violent. 
At the end, that frenzied and violent nature leads Zhou to state that the U.S. government is the 
most dangerous foe of the PRC. In other words, Zhou’s public warning assigned a morally 
depraved status to the U.S. because of its behavior in Korea. 
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On October 3, a similar judgment also appeared in Zhou’s conversation with Ambassador 
Panikkar. When Panikkar mentioned that the Indian government was attempting to put pressure 
on the U.N. to achieve a peaceful resolution, Zhou replied: 
We have exchanged points of view on the Korean incident. We favor a peaceful solution and the localization 
of the Korean incident. That is still our stand…We want peace and want construction in peacetime. During the 
past year, we made maximum efforts in this respect. The U.S. government is unreliable. Although an 
agreement reached at the meeting of the three foreign ministers [of France, Great Britain, and the United 
States in early September] stipulates that the 38th parallel cannot be crossed without the approval of the United 
Nations, there is some question whether the agreement is binding on the U.S. government.214 
One of the flaws in the moral character of the U.S., according to Zhou, was its unreliability. In 
Zhou’s statement, the responsibility for breaking peace is by no means assumed by Beijing, 
which had made its maximum efforts to maintain peace, but should be laid on the U.S., which 
had no sincerity to keep commitments upholding peace. Zhou’s perception of the gap between 
Washington’s sincerity to uphold peace and Beijing’s implies that, compared to how the U.S. 
behaved, China stood blameless for intervening in the Korean conflict.  
The evidence showing Zhou’s characterization of U.S. morality is clearer than that for Mao. 
Zhou not only specifically used the words “aggressive,” “violent,” and “frenzied” to describe 
U.S. acts, but also presented a more complete argument explaining what caused the U.S. 
transgressions. To Zhou, China occupied perfect moral ground for using force in Korea, and the 
U.S. was in the opposite position. 
         
Other Leaders 
It is still difficult to trace precisely the other high-ranking leaders’ perceptions toward the 
use of force because of the insufficiency of sources. What we know, according to the currently 
available sources, is that most of the high-ranking leaders, and especially Lin Biao, did not 
support Mao’s decision at the outset of decision-making. But those objections were eventually 
overcome by Mao’s persuasion. In fact, Peng Dehuai, whom Mao asked to be the commander of 
the CPV and a general with an illustrious career, was a critical factor helping Mao to obtain 
consensus from the Politburo. Peng’s steady support not only reassured Mao about his decision, 
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but also alleviated the anxiety among the other comrades. Hence, this section mainly examines 
the motives and perceptions underlying Peng’s decision to support the use of force in Korea. 
The first time Peng divulged his tendency to favor intervention in the Korean War by force 
was in a conversation with Yang Dezhi, the commander of the 19th Army, three days before the 
Politburo meeting of October 4. According to Yang’s recollection, when he reported to Peng that 
the troops under their command were asking to aid North Korea, Peng replied: “the Americans 
are going to reach the bank of the Yalu River in the north, and have occupied our Taiwan in the 
southeast; they are out of their mind.  Under such a situation, [we] shall in no case give way.”215  
This opinion was further reinforced after Mao formally summoned Peng to join the circle of 
decision-making in Beijing. 
According to Peng’s recollection, after attending the Politburo meeting of October 4, he 
thought over and over that night about the decision to enter the war:  
America occupied Korea across the [Yalu] River, threatening Northeast China. It also controlled Taiwan, 
threatening Shanghai and East China. It could launch a war to invade China with any excuse anytime it 
wanted. The tiger always eats people, and the time when it wants to eat depends on its appetite. It is 
impossible to make any concessions to a tiger. Since America came to invade us216, we had to resist its 
invasion…we should send out troops [to Korea] in consideration of the future of our nation’s 
reconstruction…Our forces ought to be dispatched also in order to encourage the peoples of colonial and semi-
colonial countries to carry on their nationalist and democratic revolutions against the imperialists and 
invasions…217 
Peng then ruminated about Mao’s remarks to the participants at the meeting that the Chinese 
would feel terrible if they only watched the North Koreans go through a crisis without offering 
support.218 However, Peng interpreted Mao’s remarks through a different lens than the CRWT. 
In his understanding, that remark was an “instruction combining internationalism with 
patriotism.”219 Peng believed that the objections of those who were reluctant to support the North 
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Koreans in their time of need were being nationalist rather than internationalist. The following 
day, Peng announced his support for the decision to enter the war with his own explanation that: 
Sending the troops to aid Korea is necessary. If we lose, it means nothing more than a couple of years in 
liberating China. If the American military places itself along the Yalu River and in Taiwan, it could find an 
excuse anytime it wants to launch an invasion.220 
As a military officer and a follower of communism, Peng regarded the use of force in Korea 
as a necessary measure to assure China’s national security and uphold internationalism. Unlike 
Mao and Zhou, Peng did not reveal clearly any considerations resembling the ideas of the CRWT. 
Although he employed negative terms such as “invade” and “tiger” to describe U.S. behavior, it 
is still impossible to determine whether the CRWT had any influence on Peng’s decision to 
support the war with the U.S. in Korea. 
 
Analysis of the People’s Daily 
For the analysis of the Chinese government’s use of judgmental language in the People’s 
Daily during the Korean War, this research examines the period between June 27, the first day 
the People’s Daily reported the outbreak of the war, and October 19, 1950, the day the Chinese 
Volunteer Army crossed the Yalu River to enter Korea. There are 115 days of reporting to be 
analyzed. The target of Beijing’s condemnation was the U.S. The total number of words 
condemning the misbehavior and immorality of the U.S. intervention in Korea is 170, which 
yields a daily average of 1.478. Among the five case studies in this dissertation, this average is 
the third highest.  
Here, as in the other cases, the analysis, which uses a watershed date to distinguish between 
daily averages before and after, shows that the Chinese government escalated their moral 
condemnation of their opponent after a key event occurred. The watershed introduced in the case 
of the Korean War is September 18, the day the U.S./U.N troops successfully landed at Inchon. 
As discussed above, because of the success of the Inchon landing the North Korean troops in the 
south collapsed and the U.S./U.N. troops had opportunity to cross the 38th parallel.221 This 
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situation eventually triggered the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Thus, in this method 
of analysis, the Korean War is divided into two periods, from June 27 to September 18 and from 
September 19 to October 19, with the daily averages of the wordings 1.341 and 1.806 
respectively. The increase in frequency suggests that the Chinese government lowered its 
assessment of U.S. moral standing between September 19 and October 19, 1950. This result is 
congruent with my expectation of the variation for the frequency of morality-based 
condemnation, namely that an increased frequency may appear in a case with China’s decision to 
go to war as the outcome. When the necessity of a decision for war is likely, the Chinese 
government may express the legitimacy of its use of force by highlighting the moral inferiority 
of its opponent. 
 
Conclusion     
The evidence from this case does not refute my hypothesis about the influence of the 
CRWT. Rather, it shows that China’s leaders had identified their righteous causes for fighting 
and the moral standing of their major opponent in the decision-making. From the available 
records, Mao and Zhou did make something of a moral assessment of their decision for war, and 
the concept of righteous war seemed to offer them a frame of reference to identify its legitimacy. 
Moreover, both Mao and Zhou emphasized the legitimacy of their decision for war when they 
encountered dissent from other leaders with different calculations of China’s interests. Mao and 
Zhou rejected this view (most clearly enunciated by the cautious Lin Biao) and insisted that the 
right thing for China to do was to give full support to North Korea against the U.S. invasion. 
This result fits my assumption that, when the Chinese leaders have to choose between opposite 
courses of action proposed by their pragmatic calculations, they tend to select the option that is 
most compatible with the concept of righteous war. Mao and Zhou’s formulation defending their 
decision between October 2 and October 6 suggests the validity of this assumption. In addition, 
the records of Mao’s decision making show that the concept of righteous war helped him to 
make up his mind to go to war in Korea. This result supports my assumption that the CRWT may 
play a role in the decision makers’ mind-set shifts. 
The supplementary analysis of the People’s Daily, also results in a supportive finding. 
The Chinese government increased the frequency of its morality-based condemnation of U.S. 
behavior in Korea after the Inchon landing. Meanwhile, key Chinese leaders’ expressions of 
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concern about just cause are also found during their decision making behind closed doors. This 
congruent result supports the interpretation that the Chinese government’s use of morality-based 
condemnation served more than the role of “moral cloak.” It appears to confirm the assumption 
that an increase in frequency should occur in a case resulting in a Chinese decision for war. This 
finding also suggests that the Chinese government attempted to reinforce the legitimacy of its 
decision for war by emphasizing the moral inferiority of the U.S. 
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Chapter 4 - The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis 
At 5:30 P.M., August 30, 1958, the PLA stationed in Fujian province suddenly initiated a 
massive artillery bombardment of the Kuomintang (KMT)-controlled Jinmen island. Because of 
the intensive shelling, a Chinese Communist invasion of Jinmen and Mazu (another KMT-held 
island farther north on the Fujian coast) seemed imminent.222 As soon as it became aware of the 
crisis the U.S. strengthened its 7th Fleet and decided to support Taiwan in protecting the line of 
communication to Jinmen. After more than one month of shelling, the crisis mitigated.223 On 
October 6, Mao released a letter in the name of Peng Dehuai to announce a temporary cease-fire 
over Jinmen. This letter marked the beginning of the end of the Second Taiwanese Strait Crisis. 
Although both the Chinese Communists and the KMT continued shelling until 1979, the danger 
of escalation to a more severe conflict faded away in October, 1958.  
According to one of the PRC’s official records, the artillery bombardment of Jinmen and 
Mazu was insisted to show Beijing’s support for the people of Lebanon and Jordan in the Middle 
East who were against American and British intervention.224 This resembles the idea in the 
CRWT of helping a weak state against a stronger state’s invasion. In addition to claiming to 
support the Arab resistance against American and British intervention in the Middle East, the 
PRC announced that their people in Fujian province had been terrorized by the KMT’s earlier 
raids on the mainland conducted prior to the shelling of the islands by the PRC. This resembles 
the justification of stopping violence in the CRWT. Moreover, the American support for the 
KMT, a group in rebellion by Beijing’s definition, offered the justification that a foreign power 
was illegitimately intervening in China’s domestic affairs. During the crisis, the PRC several 
times accused the U.S. of occupying China’s territory – Taiwan and the Penghu islands. This 
accusation seemed to be offering the justification of defending one’s own territory against a 
foreign state’s invasion. In accordance with the CRWT, these justifications offered perfect 
grounds for legitimizing the decision for war. However, even though the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) had already installed ample air assets and enough capability for amphibious landing 
during the crisis, except for the massive artillery bombardment, the PRC did not attack the KMT-
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controlled territory and the U.S. military forces intervening in the crisis. It seems that the ideas of 
the CRWT may not be sufficient to result in a decision for war. This case, thus, can test that why 
China’s leaders decided not to go to war even though righteous causes were announced.    
 
Historical Background 
According to recent research, the causes of Beijing’s decision to initiate the shelling are 
various and indeterminate. Several inferences about the motives behind Beijing’s decision have 
been offered: this decision was a response to US intervention in Lebanon in 1958, a strategic 
reconnaissance for probing the bottom line of Washington’s policy supporting Taiwan’s defense, 
a countermeasure against the KMT’s raids to the area of Fujian province, an attempt to compel 
the U.S. to resume the ambassador-level meetings with China in Warsaw which had collapsed in 
December 1957, a method to agitate the Great Leap Forward, an attempt to carry out the “noose 
strategy”225 against the U.S., and a continuation of the 1954 military action to seize the KMT-
controlled islands along the coast of mainland China.226 These inferences suggest that the causes 
of the Jinmen shelling of 1958 were complex and multiple, and that certain historical contexts 
since 1953 may help to understand them. 
When the Korean War ended in 1953, the Taiwan issue, which had been given a lower 
priority for three years, received renewed attention from the CCP leaders. In October 1953, Chen 
Yi, then the commander and political commissar of the East China Military Region, proposed a 
plan to seize Jinmen and to establish facilities such as railroads and airfields in Fujian 
province. 227  Mao initially agreed with Chen’s proposal. Mao quickly changed his mind to 
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support the strategy of seizing the offshore islands of Zhejiang province rather than pursuing 
what Chen had proposed, because he believed that before attacking the KMT-controlled islands 
off the Fujian coast, the PLA should liberate and control several islands still occupied by KMT 
troops off the Zhejiang coast.228 
Mao’s strategic target was not merely to seize those islands, but ultimately to “liberate” 
Taiwan. In July, 1954, Mao emphasized the agenda of “liberation of Taiwan.” He believed that it 
had been a political mistake that Beijing had not immediately addressed the mission of 
“liberation of Taiwan” as soon as the Korean War ended.229 Following Mao’s comments, Beijing 
restarted its propaganda about liberating Taiwan in July and August, 1954. In August, the CMC 
announced the “Military Plan and Steps of Implementation about Active Struggle against Chiang 
Bandit Troops in Taiwan.” This instruction confirmed a two-step plan to liberate Taiwan: the 
PLA would seize the KMT-controlled islands and gain air supremacy along the southeastern 
coast in the first stage, and then liberate Taiwan when the time was ripe. As for the strategy of 
seizing the KMT-controlled islands, it set two major directions for operations: take small islands 
first then large islands, and move from north to south.230 The First Taiwan Strait Crisis erupted in 
September, 1954, when the PLA executed the plan by initiating a massive bombardment of 
Jinmen.231 Due to the outbreak of this crisis, Taiwan and the U.S. started and then accelerated the 
negotiation of a mutual defense treaty, which was signed on December 3, 1954. The signing of 
the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty did not halt the PLA from carrying out military 
actions to implement the CMC’s August plan.  
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On January 18, 1955, the PLA launched an amphibious assault on Yijiangshan Island. The 
PLA seized the island the next day. After the fall of Yijiangshan Island, the Eisenhower 
administration appealed to the U.N. to mediate the conflict. Meanwhile, because of the fall of 
Yijiangshan Island, the KMT looked to the U.S. for assistance. In response to the KMT’s call for 
help, on January 29, both houses of the U.S. Congress passed the Formosa Resolution which had 
been proposed by President Eisenhower to grant him the authority to employ American forces to 
defend Taiwan and “related positions and territories” against armed attacks.232 However, after a 
thorough assessment, the KMT decided to withdraw from the Dachen Archipelago, which had 
lost its strategic value and was no longer defensible. In February, 1955, under the U.S. 7th Fleet’s 
protection, the KMT troops and civilians in the Dachen Archipelago successfully withdrew to 
Taiwan. The First Taiwan Strait Crisis ended when the PLA occupied the Dachen Archipelago 
and ceased shelling Jinmen and Mazu. 
Although Beijing had successfully seized the offshore islands in Zhejiang and ensured the 
coastal security north of Fujian province after the 1954-55 Taiwan Strait crisis, the signing of the 
Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan during the crisis tremendously increased 
the difficulties the PRC faced in liberating Taiwan.233 Therefore, a peaceful settlement resolving 
the Taiwan issue through negotiation with the KMT became a more attractive option for Beijing. 
With Mao’s support, at the Second Session of the National People’s Congress Zhou Enlai stated 
his intention to seek a possible peaceful settlement with Taiwan.234 On June 28, 1956, Zhou 
publicly announced in the People’s Daily that Beijing was “willing to discuss with the Taiwan 
authorities about the concrete steps toward, as well as conditions for, a peaceful liberation of 
Taiwan, and hope the Taiwan authorities, when they deem the time is right, will dispatch 
representatives to Beijing, or to another proper location, to begin such discussion.”235   
In addition to prompting consideration of a possible peaceful settlement with Taiwan, the 
First Taiwan Strait Crisis led China’s leaders to recognize that it was impossible to entirely 
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exclude the U.S. from having a voice in the settlement of the Taiwan issue.236 In May 1956, in 
his conversation with the prime minister of Indonesia, Ali Sastroamidjojo, Mao brought up the 
possibility of having negotiations with the U.S. on the settlement of the Taiwan issue. 237 
Eventually, Chinese-American ambassadorial talks began in Warsaw on August 1, 1955, with 
Britain and India helping with coordination and communication. However, both Beijing and 
Washington quickly hit a deadlock when the Americans neither recognized the PRC as the 
legitimate government of China nor promised to support its recovery of Taiwan.238 Finally, the 
talks collapsed on December 12, 1957 – a month after the Chinese had rejected the Soviet policy 
of coexistence with the Americans – when the U.S. downgraded them to the sub-ambassadorial 
level.239 
Immediately after the collapse of the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks, Beijing 
switched from its moderate policy to a militant policy toward Taiwan on December 18, 1957, 
when Mao instructed Peng Dehuai to consider deploying air forces in Fujian. On January 31, 
1958, Peng reported his work to the CMC, which affirmed that the PLA air force could be 
stationed at the newly constructed airfields in Fujian province in July or August, 1958.240 This 
report mentioned that in order to suppress the KMT’s air raids on the Fujian airfields, an artillery 
bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu could be a workable precautionary countermeasure.241 Mao 
approved this plan three days later. Peng’s report is another significant clue for tracing the causes 
of the Second Taiwan Strait crisis. Niu Jun has argued that the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis was 
actually a continuation of the PLA’s military plan of August, 1954, which aimed to seize all the 
offshore islands close to mainland China before liberating Taiwan.242 A successful deployment 
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of the PLAAF to the airfields to gain air supremacy over the coast of Fujian was the key to 
achieving that objective. Peng’s report of 1958, which was concerned about the success and 
failure of the deployment of the PLAAF in Fujian rather than about the seizure of Jinmen and 
Mazu as its ultimate goal, is consistent with such a sequence of ideas. Generally speaking, the 
shift in Beijing’s Taiwan policy at the end of 1957, which restarted the attempt to assert full 
control over the coastline of Fujian province, could be a remote cause of the Second Taiwan 
Strait crisis.  
The trigger for the Second Taiwan Strait crisis was the tension in the Middle East following 
American and British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan in mid July.243 At the same time, the 
KMT stated that Taiwan’s forces were combat ready, prepared to deal with a possible surprise 
attack.244 These two changes of circumstance triggered the decision to shell Jinmen. On July 17, 
Mao asked Peng to convey instructions to the General Staff to frame the plan of action for 
deploying the PLAAF into Fujian and preparing an artillery blockade of Jinmen and its line of 
communication in response to the crisis situation in the Middle East.245 The next night, Mao 
announced his decision to support what he called the Arabs’ struggle against aggression by 
pinning down American imperialism through the shelling of Jinmen and Mazu.246  
The prelude of the crisis began on July 27 when the PLAAF were stationed at the airfields 
of Fujian and engaged with the KMT’s air forces in the following days.247 But Mao called for an 
indefinite postponement of the shelling on the same day that the PLAAF and the artillery units 
were entering Fujian.248 Mao’s decision to postpone the shelling confused the other leaders.249 
On August 13, Peng even instructed the front units in Fujian that they should return to normal 
status if the Americans and the KMT did not initiate “unusual military actions” against the 
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coastal provinces of mainland China in the next few days.250 However, while his commanders 
were wondering about the chairman’s real intention, Mao was actually ready to execute the 
shelling plan.251 The decision had finally been made during an enlarged Politburo conference at 
Beidaihe beginning on August 17, 1958. On the first day of conference, Mao announced his 
decision to shell Jinmen.252 The next day, Mao instructed Peng to terminate a military exercise in 
Shenzhen, Guangdong in order to avoid provoking the British and in order to prepare to conduct 
the shelling.253 During this period, Mao summoned Ye Fei, the political commissar of the Fujian 
Military Region, to Beijing to give him a briefing about the shelling plan. Although Mao had 
asked Ye if he could avoid any American causalities after the shelling commenced and Ye had 
given a negative answer, he announced his decision to execute Ye’s plan on August 22.254 The 
shelling began the following afternoon. On the night of August 23, Mao called a meeting of the 
Politburo Standing Committee to reveal his understanding of the international impact of the 
shelling255 and ordered observation of the American reactions before taking the next step.256  
Right after the shelling began, Washington could not completely comprehend Beijing’s 
actual intention.257 In response to the shelling, President Eisenhower immediately ordered the 
American forces stationed in Asia to be ready for combat, and he transferred two carrier battle 
groups from the Middle East to East Asia.258 Meanwhile, the American strength supporting 
Taiwan’s defense also had been greatly increased.259 After probing Washington’s preliminary 
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response, Mao called another meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee on August 28 to 
discuss the American reaction and Beijing’s next move.260  Mao divulged that the intention 
behind his decision to shell Jinmen was to probe the American determination to defend the 
offshore islands rather than to test the KMT’s defensive capabilities.261 Mao said: “The main 
purpose of our bombardment was not to reconnoiter Jiang’s defenses on these islands, but to 
probe the attitude of the Americans in Washington, testing their determination.”262 As for the 
issue of Jinmen, the chairman expressed the flexible attitude that a landing operation was not the 
only option, but might be carried out if the situation allowed it.263 
The steps in Mao’s strategy to probe America’s determination were interrupted by a small 
incident. On August 27, a radio station in Fujian transmitted an unauthorized broadcast 
announcing that the landing on Jinmen was imminent. Washington immediately recognized this 
broadcast as a signal that the PLA was preparing to land on Jinmen, and then announced that 
Jinmen and Mazu were vital to the defense of Taiwan itself.264 In face of the intense American 
military threat, Mao had no choice but to adjust his strategy. One of the adjustments was to 
announce the adoption of a new limit for China’s territorial waters, which would now be 
extended from 3 nautical miles to 12 nautical miles. After this announcement, Mao ordered a halt 
to the shelling for three days in order to probe the American reactions.265 Washington didn’t keep 
the chairman waiting very long. That same day, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated 
that the U.S. should help Taiwan’s defense as obligated by the defense treaty and deemed that 
the security of Jinmen and Matsu was related to the defense of Taiwan. But Dulles also revealed 
that Washington was willing to resume the ambassadorial meetings to achieve a mutual and 
reciprocal renunciation of force in the Taiwan Strait.266 
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The Americans’ reaction made Beijing understand that, were the crisis to escalate further, 
they would have to directly confront the U.S. forces. Thus, Beijing adopted another strategy – 
“fighting while talking” —  to handle this change. On the one hand, Beijing continued the 
bombardment of Jinmen; on the other, Zhou announced that Beijing was willing to resume the 
ambassadorial meetings with the U.S. on September 6.267 To keep this strategy from getting out 
of control, Mao strictly prohibited the subsequent shelling from targeting any American 
vessel.268 On September 5 and 8, Mao justified these new moves to deal with the Americans as 
part of the “noose strategy.”269 
The eruption of the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis was also a surprise to the Soviet Union, which 
was not informed by the PRC in advance and was confused about the real intention of the 
shelling. The Soviets didn’t hesitate for long before giving their support to the PRC by warning 
the U.S. in Pravda on August 31, but this statement triggered a vague American threat of nuclear 
war on September 4. 270  Worried about Washington’s intention to use nuclear weapons, 
Khrushchev dispatched Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Beijing to probe the PRC’s real 
intention and to deliver Khrushchev’s draft letter to Eisenhower for Mao to review.271 When 
Gromyko arrived in Beijing, he received a copy of a statement from Zhou Enlai which explained 
that the aim of the shelling was not to liberate Taiwan by force, but rather to punish the KMT 
forces and to stop the two-Chinas policy that the U.S. attempting to carry out.272 Although 
Washington didn’t drop its oblique threat to use nuclear weapons, Eisenhower offered an 
opportunity to resume the ambassadorial talks after receiving Khrushchev’s letter.273 
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The suspended Sino-American ambassadorial talks were resumed on September 15, 1958, 
at Warsaw. According to Chen Jian’s argument, Mao originally wanted to probe the bottom line 
of American commitment to Taiwan and then seek an advantageous result by ending the crisis 
through the talks.274 However, the PRC’s representative, Wang Bingnan, was too quick to expose 
Beijing’s hand, which was to force the KMT to withdraw from the offshore islands in exchange 
for a ceasefire, on the first day’s meeting. Wang’s mistake provided the Americans an 
opportunity to gain the diplomatic initiative by stating that a ceasefire would be the first step 
toward the end of the crisis.275 Mao was in a rage after learning of Wang’s performance in the 
talks. Since Wang had mistakenly laid out all of Beijing’s cards, Mao could not help but abandon 
the expectation that the ambassadorial talks would be an opportunity to achieve an acceptable 
resolution with the Americans, and adjust his strategy again.276 Zhou was asked to work out the 
new plan. On September 18, Zhou proposed a new plan consisting of two elements: on the one 
hand, he suggested an expanded activity demanding that the Americans cease their provocation 
and withdraw from Taiwan and the Strait; on the other hand, he believed that a continued 
massive bombardment of the KMT forces on, and their line of communication around, the 
Jinmen islands was still needed.277 But after he submitted the plan, Zhou found that massive 
shelling without a clearly constrained guideline would be inappropriate. On September 22, Zhou 
further clarified his concerns about the guidelines for operations around Jinmen, proposing that 
the PLA continue “shelling but not landing” and “cutting off [the enemy’s line of communication] 
but not letting [the enemy] die.”278  And only the artillery bombardment, instead of a joint 
operation, would be conducted. Mao approved this proposal.  
While they attempted to regain the diplomatic initiative through propaganda and renewed 
military action, Beijing’s leaders had not yet completely abandoned the hope that the crisis 
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would end in their favor. On September 27, Zhou discussed three possible scenarios for the 
development of the crisis with the Soviet chargé d’affaires Antonov. One of the scenarios was 
that if the United States guaranteed the withdrawal of the KMT troops from Jinmen, the PRC 
would agree to suspend fighting for a period to allow the KMT troops to withdraw.279 Although 
Zhou had doubts on the possibility of this scenario, Dulles’s comment on the Taiwan Strait crisis 
on September 30 revealed that Washington was concerned to achieve just such an outcome.280   
In the CCP Politburo Standing Committee meeting held on October 3 and 4, Dulles’s 
comment became the major issue for the discussion of further strategic planning toward the crisis. 
In Zhou’s opinion, Dulles was implying formalization of the reality of “two Chinas” by trading 
Jinmen and Mazu for Taiwan and Penghu.  Also, both Beijing and Washington had acted 
prudently to avoid a direct military confrontation and had probed each other’s real intentions 
during the crisis.281 In other words, Zhou was implying that it was time to end the crisis.282 In 
light of Zhou’s suggestion and seeking to avoid a separation between China and Taiwan, Mao 
proposed the idea of leaving Jinmen and Mazu in Jiang Jieshi’s hands. At the end, those 
attending the meeting agreed with Mao’s suggestion that, in order to avoid the de facto situation 
of two Chinas becoming permanent and official, Beijing would leave Jinmen and Mazu in the 
KMT’s control while it maintained the policy of “shelling but not landing” and “cutting off but 
not letting [the enemy] die.”283   
On October 5, Mao instructed Peng Dehuai, the Minster of National Defense, and Huang 
Kecheng, the Vice Minister of National Defense and PLA Chief of Staff, to suspend shelling for 
two days beginning on October 6 to observe subsequent developments.284 On the same day, Zhou 
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informed Antonov that Beijing had decided not to occupy Jinmen and Mazu.285 The next day, 
Beijing released a “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” announcing a seven-day cease-fire 
and a suggestion for peaceful negotiation between Beijing and Taipei. After seven days, on 
October 13, Peng Dehuai followed orders from the Center to extend the period of ceasefire for 
two weeks.  Although Mao attempted to show that Beijing remained capable of controlling the 
situation by ordering a one-hour barrage of Jinmen on October 20286, the tension had already 
been significantly alleviated. On October 23, the announcement of “Another Message to the 
Compatriots in Taiwan” (again issued by Peng Dehuai but drafted by Mao) marked the final 
curtain of the Second Taiwan Strait crisis. 
 
Analysis of Leaders 
Mao Zedong 
To explore whether Mao had been influenced by ideas from the righteous war tradition in 
making the decision for shelling in 1958, a survey of the application of three justifications is 
useful: the justification of helping the people in the Middle East resisting the American and 
British intervention; then, the justification of stopping the KMT’s acts of violence against 
mainland China; and finally, the justification of resisting the American intervention and support 
for Taiwan. Although these three justifications can be explained in terms of the logic of 
realpolitik, they could also have provided a frame of reference for Mao to assess the moral 
permissibility of a decision for war.  
On July 18, 1958, at a meeting with the generals from the relevant military units involving 
the shelling, Mao proposed to take a practical action to support the Arabs who were struggling 
against the American and British interventions. He mentioned:  
The Jinmen bombardment is aiming to strike the United States. To support the Arabs fighting against 
aggression, [we] shall not only [have] moral (道義上的) [support], but also need to have the support of 
practical action…Jinmen and Mazu are China’s territory. To attack Jinmen and Mazu, [and] to punish the 
KMT troops are Chinese domestic affairs, [in which] the enemy [the U.S.] cannot find excuse [to attack us], 
but [it] will have [an] effect restraining (牽制作用) the American imperialists.287 
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It seems that Mao was attempting to use a military action to divert Washington’s attention from 
the Middle East to East Asia in order to support the Arabs. However, on July 27, when Mao 
postponed the shelling, his letter to Peng Dehuai and Huang Kecheng revealed that this motive 
was not as firm and urgent as Mao had stated on July 18.  He said:  
It seems more appropriate to hold our [plan] to attack Jinmen for several days….When they [the KMT] launch 
a provocative attack, [we will] respond with a counterattack. The solution of the problem in the Middle East 
will take time. Since we have time, why should we be in a big hurry...? To make a plan too quickly usually 
results in thoughtless consideration. I did such things quite often and sometimes could not avoid 
miscalculation….288 
These remarks show that Mao was thinking that his early decision was made in too much of a 
hurry. Niu Jun, a Chinese expert on PRC foreign policy, argues that Mao’s decision to shell 
Jinmen and Mazu continued his policy of seeking to deploy the air force in Fujian province as a 
significant step toward gaining all the offshore islands. Niu mentions that the timing of the 
American and British intervention in the Middle East afforded Mao with a good pretext to 
execute that plan.289  
In fact, the sequence between Mao’s decisions to postpone and reaffirm the shelling plan 
gives a clue for examining Mao’s mindset about the justification for supporting the Arabs. 
Although Mao’s postponement can be explained by the severe weather delaying the 
redeployment in Fujian, current sources reveal that most of the artillery units had been deployed 
by late July.290 This means that military preparations were about ready to execute the shelling on 
July 27. Thus, if Mao had desired to support the Arabs by meaningful action, he could have 
accelerated the shelling rather than postponing it and hesitating to act when the preparations were 
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almost accomplished. However, Mao announced an indefinite postponement at that time, instead. 
The date of the start of the shelling and Mao’s justification about the timing are also supporting 
evidence. Right after the outbreak of the crisis on August 23, Mao explained his thinking about 
the timing of the shelling at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee meeting. He said that 
“the day’s bombardment was perfectly scheduled,” because “three days earlier, the UN General 
Assembly had passed a resolution requesting American and British troops to withdraw from both 
Lebanon and Jordan.” The chairman went on to say that under this circumstance “American 
occupation of Taiwan became even more unjust.” 291  But he neglected to explain why the 
schedule was perfect when the tension in the Middle East was about to be alleviated because of 
the UN resolution. If supporting the Arabs by distracting America was his real intention, Mao 
should have acted when the tension was highest in early August.  
A conversation between Mao and Khrushchev in 1959 indicates this contradiction between 
Mao’s words and actions. During the conversation, Mao said: 
We didn’t expect that firing artillery would cause such a big disturbance… [we] didn’t expect that they [the 
U.S.] would redeploy so many vessels [to the Taiwan Strait].  After you left [Beijing], we decided to attack in 
mid-August… The Americans didn’t immediately dope out our real intention, assumed that we were going to 
attack Taiwan, and then redeployed their troops from the Mediterranean, the Pacific, the West Pacific, Japan, 
and the Philippines [to the Taiwan Strait]… It [the U.S. response] can explain that the American deployment 
was in a hurry and in disorder…292 
Whatever his real purpose in this conversation may have been, Mao’s statement here actually 
contradicted what he had said about the justification of supporting the Arabs. First, Mao’s 
astonishment at the Americans’ impetuous reaction makes the explanation of support for the 
Arabs unsound. Without a considerable American reaction which diverted their attention from 
the Middle East to the Taiwan Strait, it was impossible for China to achieve the purpose of 
supporting the Arabs in their fight against the U.S. Second, Mao’s assessment of the American 
reaction shows that supporting the Arabs was a pretext rather than a real motive. Mao’s 
assessment implies that the shelling of Jinmen and Mazu was effective in manipulating and 
disturbing Washington’s strategic deployment. Mao’s decision to postpone the shelling on July 
27 looks even more contradictory considered against his declaration of July 18. Because the 
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shelling was so effective in manipulating Washington’s moves, it does not make sense that Mao 
would want to postpone the shelling in late July and early August when the tension in the Middle 
East was at its climax, if to support the Arabs had been paramount as Mao declared. This 
inference is similar to Niu Jun’s argument that the crisis in the Middle East provided Mao with 
an impromptu excuse to accelerate the steps already outlined for fulfilling the scheduled plan.293 
Hence, after a thoughtful assessment, Mao quickly postponed his earlier decision. Thus, it can be 
asserted that supporting the Arabs was more likely a pretext rather than a real motive in Mao’s 
considerations. 
Between late 1957 and mid-1958, the KMT executed air reconnaissance and military raids 
on the mainland several times. At the beginning of the “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” 
released on October 6, Mao emphasized that those military raids were one of the causes which 
led Beijing to impose punishment upon the KMT troops by military actions.294 Although this can 
fit within the justification of stopping violence in the CRWT, ultimately it did not result in a 
decision to dispatch troops to land on Jinmen and Mazu. I will now examine whether Mao had 
ever embraced this sincerely.  
At first glance, Mao’s initial decision on July 18 gives the impression that punishing the 
KMT for its military actions against mainland China was a significant motive for Mao to execute 
the shelling. He defined ultimate target of the shelling as the U.S., with an explanation – “Jinmen 
and Mazu are China’s territory, [therefore] to attack the KMT troops on Jinmen and Mazu is 
China’s domestic affair, which will not give excuses to the enemy [to intervene]; but it will have 
a certain effect to pin down American imperialism.”295 But this blurred explanation did not offer 
any specific explanation of the reason for the punishment. Furthermore, when Mao postponed 
the shelling on July 27, he emphasized that “if the other side invades Zhang[zhou], Shan[tou], 
Fuzhou, and Hangzhou, a best scenario [for China to react] would emerge.”296 This indicates that 
Mao was expecting the KMT to initiate air raids or artillery attacks upon the mainland, which 
would provide him with a perfect excuse to launch a counterattack. This expectation not only 
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contradicts the idea of restoring order, which suggests a quick and active move to prevent the 
situation from going to disorder, but also reveals that Mao didn’t judge the KMT’s previous 
military raids as so serious that he had no other choice but to counter them by force. 
On August 25, Mao said: “In fact, our bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu with several 
hundred thousand shells was a probe,” and “we did not say if we were or were not going to 
land.” To Mao, landing on Jinmen might come, or not, “as circumstance dictated, because it was 
‘not a small matter’.”297 Mao’s political justification for the shelling, according to this evidence, 
did not reflect a strong feeling that the KMT’s previous military raids had to be punished or 
stopped. Actually, Mao’s perspective toward the KMT’s military actions cannot be isolated from 
the idea of the continuity of the Chinese Civil War since 1947. After learning of the error made 
by the radio station in Fujian, Mao requested the CMC to draft an instruction to centralize the 
control of the shelling. This draft also indicated the CMC’s understanding of the difficulty of 
recovering Taiwan: “to thoroughly settle all of the problems about Taiwan and the Jiang-
occupied offshore islands is not a matter [which can be resolved] in a short time, rather it is a 
protracted struggle, [for which] we have to have a long term plan.”298 According to this draft, 
Mao clearly presented the decision for shelling as a deliberate act to probe his opponents’ 
capability and intention as part of a long-term plan to “liberate” Taiwan. A quick and decisive 
action to restore order or punish the KMT’s previous military actions seemed not to be part of 
Mao’s thinking.  
Mao’s talk at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council also verifies that neither 
restoring order on the southeastern coastline nor punishing the KMT’s military actions was his 
original motive. On September 5, when he mentioned the issue of landing on Jinmen and Mazu, 
Mao said:  
We do not want to land on what are called Jinmen and Mazu. What do you land on them for? Their defense 
works are considerably firm and solid. [We] just scare them at one swoop. But Jinmen and Mazu are not 
necessarily to be attacked. When the time comes, we will land on them, [therefore, let’s] wait for an 
opportunity to act.299 
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On September 6, when Mao clarified his noose strategy toward the U.S., saying:  
We give Jinmen a hard time, [that means] we are minding our domestic principles. This is our domestic affair. 
Of course, to give Taiwan a hard time is also minding the domestic principles. But since there are your 
American soldiers in that place, we nevertheless temporarily will not go there. You [the U.S.] also expressed a 
lukewarm attitude toward the past negotiations [that caused] a suspension for several months.  Now you want 
to talk, that’s good, [we] can talk.  If you [China] don’t attack, it [the U.S.] will not want to talk.  [We] need to 
grip the noose all at once. [When] it has felt pain, then it says…let’s talk.  If you don’t grip [the noose], it will 
not talk.300 
According to those remarks, Mao intended to use the crisis as a tool to gain an advantageous 
position in the struggle with the KMT and the negotiations with the U.S. Therefore, since there is 
no evidence that Mao wished to punish the KMT’s military actions or bring stability to the 
southeast coast, I exclude these motives as an explanation for Mao’s decision to initiate the 
shelling.   
When viewed in light of the CRWT, the American intervention, which deployed American 
forces in the Taiwan Strait in order to support the KMT’s defense, might have constituted a 
righteous cause, with self-defense legitimizing China’s use of force. According to my 
assumption, this righteous cause might have encouraged the Chinese leaders to make a decision 
for war, especially for an offensive operation. But in this case, the Chinese eventually decided 
not to go to war with either the KMT or the American forces in the Strait. On the contrary, the 
American intervention was a significant factor that prevented the crisis from escalating to a 
severe military conflict. Although Mao had instructed Beijing’s propaganda organs to highlight 
the role of the U.S. as an invader in China’s territory, in reality he rarely used emotional, 
negative, radical, or judgmental language to describe the American intervention in private. In 
fact, in his discussions about the American reactions, Mao often regarded the shelling as a tool of 
communication designed for a strategy of probing and bargaining with Washington.    
As early as June 16, 1958, Mao had thought about the possibility of resuming negotiation 
and communication with the U.S. He mentioned that it was possible for China to be in touch 
with the U.S., but he was not sure that the Americans would actually want the same thing.301 He 
believed China would benefit from a protracted impasse with the U.S. To Mao, the best way to 
get in touch with the U.S. was letting “the U.S. deliver herself to the gate [of China] after 
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dressing up, causing her to be surprised by [the acts of] China.”302 This early thought shows that a 
surprise action adopted by Mao to compel the U.S. to come back to the negotiating table was 
probable. Mao’s decisions on July 17 and August 18, which suggested that the ultimate target of 
the shelling was the U.S., verify that the artillery bombardment was a means of attempting to 
break the impasse with Washington. Thus, the evidence confirms that before the crisis Mao 
didn’t really see the U.S. as the intolerable invader he trumpeted in the propaganda later. 
Mao’s prudent response to the American intervention after the outbreak of the crisis 
evidenced his reluctance to have a direct confrontation with the U.S. as well. Ye Fei’s memoir 
vividly records Mao’s perspectives toward the Americans. On August 21, Mao asked Ye Fei, 
“You use so many shells to attack [Jinmen and Mazu], will [you] kill the Americans or not?” Ye 
said it was possible to hit the Americans, because the U.S. had expanded its help to the KMT’s 
troops by attaching the Military Assistance Advisory Group down to the battalion level. Mao 
further asked, “Can [you] avoid hitting the Americans or not?” Ye replied that “it is 
unavoidable.” Mao didn’t ask any further questions and ended the conversation.303 Although Ye 
Fei’s negative answers didn’t cause Mao to cancel the shelling, this conversation shows that Mao 
was not only reluctant to take the risk of hitting Americans, but also did not regard the U.S. as an 
intolerable invader of China’s territory. On September 7, after learning that the U.S. and KMT 
navies were adopting a coordinated formation to supply Jinmen, Mao instructed Ye Fei that he 
was not allowed to attack the American vessels, and even a counterattack was not permitted if 
the Americans initiated fire. 304  This instruction strengthens the conclusion that the U.S. 
intervention in the crisis did not provide a main motive, namely, defending China’s territory 
from foreign invasion. 
Likewise, Mao’s explanation of the noose strategy held to the same tone in evaluating the 
American intervention. On September 6, Mao clarified his “noose strategy,” which meant 
adopting constrained military action to force the U.S. to take China’s requests seriously.305 Mao’s 
September 6 remarks not only paved the way for conducting the noose strategy, but also 
confirmed the shift in the role of the U.S. from Mao’s perspective. He mentioned: “[for] the 
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affairs with the U.S., in general, [both China and the U.S.] had better settle [their disputes] by 
negotiations, [and] had better [have a] peaceful settlement, [because] we are all peace-loving 
people.”306 Mao clearly understood that it was impossible to resolve any dispute with the U.S., 
including the Taiwan issue, without a peaceful method. In other words, in Mao’s mind the role of 
the U.S. had shifted from an enemy, who could only be dealt with by confrontation, to a rational 
opponent, who could be handled by negotiation and peaceful communication.   
Similarly, Mao’s general directives to Wang Bingnan before Wang left Beijing for the 
ambassadorial meeting display the same perspective toward the Americans. Mao said to Wang: 
In the meeting with the Americans, you should make more use of persuasive means….In the meeting, [you] 
should make more use of your brain, [behave] modestly and prudently, don’t speak excessively provocative 
language, which had been adopted in the negotiations at Panmunjom, to the Americans, [and] don’t hurt the 
Americans’ national feeling. Both China and America are great nations, and should become reconciled [with 
each other].307 
Even when Mao adjusted his strategy in an aggressive direction because of Wang’s error in the 
meeting, a direct military confrontation with the U.S. was still not the option for his new method. 
In his comments on Zhou Enlai’s “About the Conduct of the Jinmen Operation,” Mao approved 
Zhou’s proposal, which abandoned the option of attacking Jinmen through a joint operation in 
order to avoid hitting American vessels and aircraft.308 
Mao’s moderate perspective toward the U.S. and its intervention explains why he could 
switch his stand without difficulty in ending the crisis by letting Taiwan keep Jinmen and Mazu 
and accepting the reality of the continued presence of the U.S. in the Strait. When Mao accepted 
Zhou and other CCP leaders’ assessment of the achievement of strategic goals in successfully 
probing U.S. intentions, it seemed that he was not deeply hostile to the U.S., which was 
ostensibly an intolerable invader responsible for the crisis according to Beijing’s definitions. On 
the contrary, Mao seemed to be treating the Americans’ reactions and behavior as signals 
showing the scope of their commitment to Taiwan. Thus, according to the evidence and my 
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inferences, Mao in this case seemed not to possess a strong sentiment or motive similar to those 
found in the CRWT.   
 
Zhou Enlai 
As with Mao, so with Zhou, three justifications – helping a weaker state to fight against a 
stronger invader, punishing the KMT’s military raids so as to stop the violent, and stopping and 
expelling the U.S. invasion of China’s territory – are the main criteria for judging whether Zhou 
embraced ideas similar to those of the CRWT.  
On several occasions Zhou showed his foreign guests that China saw the British-American 
intervention in the Middle East as an act of invasion that needed to be strongly condemned.309 
The clearest statement about China’s position was released in Zhou’s letter to Abd al-Karim 
Qasim, the Prime Minister of the newly established government of Iraq, on July 27, 1958. Zhou 
wrote that “the Chinese government and Chinese people will do all we can to support your 
government and people’s struggles for maintaining [your] national independence and [for 
helping you to fight] against the invasion of imperialism,” and “the Chinese government and 
Chinese people will set our face against the American and British imperialists’ acts of aggression 
which occupy Lebanon and Jordan by force, threaten the Republic of Iraq and other Arab states, 
and break the peace of the Middle East and the World.”310 Although Zhou’s tone was firm, he 
didn’t say specifically which methods the Chinese government and people would adopt to 
support the Arabs. This ambiguous remark was not unique. Between July 15 and August 23, in 
his conversations with foreign guests, Zhou never said that China would do all in its power to 
support the Arabs, even though he did mention that the American and British intervention should 
be condemned strongly and would be punished by history.311 
In fact, after the shelling, Zhou’s public pronouncements contradicted his words in the letter 
to Abd al-Karim Qasim; “About the Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” on September 7, evidenced 
this contradiction. Although it was a collective work released in the name of Zhou312, this 
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statement is still a valid source for tracing Zhou’s perspective since it must have been reviewed, 
corrected, and approved by Zhou himself before being released. In this statement, Zhou 
mentioned: 
In order to divert the attention of people around the world [from watching] the Americans’ continued invasion 
of the Middle East and delayed action of withdrawal from Lebanon, the U.S. goes so far as to mass 
considerable armed forces in the Taiwan Strait and publicly threaten to expand its range of aggression to 
Jinmen, Mazu, and other offshore islands by taking advantage of this situation. This is a serious act of 
provoking war to six hundred million Chinese and a serious threat to the peace of the Far East and the 
World…. While the U.S. has not yet withdrawn [its] aggressive troops from Lebanon, [it] immediately creates 
a new hazard of war in the area of the Taiwan Strait. This [will] let all the states and people loving peace 
around the world further recognize the arbitrary face of the American aggressor deliberately breaking the 
peace and further recognize that American imperialism is the most ferocious enemy to all the movements of 
national independence and world peace in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.313   
Although the language is very strong, this statement happens to show that the goal of supporting 
the Arabs, if it existed, was minor. If Zhou (or other Chinese leaders) had truly endorsed what he 
had promised to the Arabs as presented in the letter to Abd al-Karim Qasim, he should have 
emphasized that China’s reason for initiating the shelling was to support the Arabs. In fact, that 
was what Zhou did in the Korean War when he highlighted the justifications for the Chinese to 
enter the war on October 24, 1950 after the Chinese troops had crossed into Korea.  
On the contrary, Zhou reversed the relationship by implying that the Americans’ response, 
which diverted world attention from their presence in the Middle East by creating a new crisis in 
the Taiwan Strait, was the major cause of the tension. The strategic concerns behind Zhou’s 
formulation reveal the minor role of the motive of supporting the Arabs. His statement was a 
countermeasure to Dulles’ September 4 speech, which implied the U.S. would expand her 
defensive commitment to Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait.314 Thus, by taking advantage of Dulles’s 
words, Zhou attempted to manipulate China’s image by putting China in the same position as the 
Arabs, with both suffering from American acts of aggression. This propaganda move manifested 
itself after the crisis began, when Zhou (and perhaps all the other leaders in Beijing) had no more 
interest in playing the supporter of the Arabs against aggression, and China could pose as a 
victim of American aggression itself. 
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Moreover, the explanation that Beijing was supporting the Arabs becomes even more 
untenable because Zhou’s statement didn’t say a word in condemnation of the British 
intervention in Jordan. Mao’s instruction to temporarily halt the military exercise on August 18 
verifies this inference. In that instruction, Mao said, “Do not conduct military maneuvers in 
Guangdong and Shenzhen, so that the British will not be scared.”315 Both documents confirm that 
Mao and Zhou did not regard Britain as an opponent of China. The separation of Britain from the 
group of their main opponents suggests that the British intervention in Jordan had no influence 
upon Mao and Zhou’s decision to shell Jinmen. On September 6, at the Supreme State 
Conference, when Zhou commented on Dulles’s statement316 of September 4, he said, “The 
shelling is [to] test him [the U.S.], this time [our] test [has a] result, [which is that] Dulles has 
played this card.”317 This remark explains why Zhou separated the British from the group of 
China’s opponents in the crisis. The shelling, according to Zhou, was a test probing the real 
intention of the U.S. and its reaction to the affair in the Taiwan Strait. For this reason, even 
though the British were doing the same thing as the Americans, an intervention in the Middle 
East, and even though the Chinese claimed that they would take practical action to support the 
Arabs, the Chinese still preferred to exclude the British from their list of opponents. This is to 
say that, for Zhou, either supporting the Arabs was merely an impromptu smokescreen or Britain 
was not recognized as one of the aggressors against the Arabs. The latter assertion, however, is 
clearly wrong. As mentioned earlier in this section, Zhou wrote to Abd al-Karim Qasim on July 
27 that the Chinese people strongly opposed both “the American and British imperialists’ acts of 
aggression which occupy Lebanon and Jordan by force.” Obviously, Zhou regarded both the U.S. 
and British interventions as aggression against the Arabs. Thus, taking the above inferences into 
account, the justification of supporting the Arabs cannot be regarded as one of Zhou’s real 
considerations.  
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Using the available sources, this research cannot determine whether Zhou sincerely 
embraced the motive of punishing the KMT’s military raids by force in coming to his decisions. 
On September 5, when Zhou explained the purposes of shelling to the counselor of the Soviet 
embassy in Beijing, he emphasized that it didn’t aim at liberating Taiwan, but only at punishing 
the KMT troops and preventing the U.S. from executing the “Two Chinas” policy.318 But in this 
conversation he didn’t clarify what the KMT had done that needed to be punished. The specific 
reasons for punishment were announced the next day in Zhou’s public statement – “About the 
Situation in the Taiwan Strait.” Zhou mentioned that “the Jiang Jieshi clan, with U.S. support, for 
a long time has used Jinmen which is close to Xiamen, Mazu which is close to Fuzhou, and other 
offshore islands as the outposts to carry out all sorts of raids and sabotages against mainland 
China.”319 This implied that the KMT’s military raids against mainland China caused Beijing to 
launch the shelling. Zhou’s statement, as a countermeasure to Dulles’s September 4 speech, was 
attempting to exaggerate the illegitimacy of the position of the U.S. by emphasizing that the 
shelling of Jinmen and Mazu was China’s domestic affair. On September 4, Mao said to Hu 
Qiaomu, his political secretary, and Wu Lengxi, the director of Xinhua News Agency, that:  
…at present our media should give wide publicity to a condemnation of America for causing tension in the 
Taiwan Strait…our propaganda should emphasize that Taiwan and the offshore islands are Chinese territory, 
that our bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu was aimed at punishing Jiang’s army and was purely China’s 
internal affair, and no foreign country would be allowed to interfere with what happened there.320  
Taking this consideration into account, Zhou’s formulation in the September 6 statement was a 
propaganda tactic to satisfy Mao’s instruction, and this is not sufficient to verify that Zhou really 
did think that way. 
Zhou’s statements after Wang Bingnan’s error in the ambassadorial meeting also manifest 
the propaganda function of the language referring to the act of punishment. As mentioned earlier, 
Wang’s error left Beijing no choice but to adopt an aggressive stance for recovering the 
diplomatic initiative. In order to counter the U.S. request for a ceasefire as the precondition for 
ending the crisis, Beijing launched a diplomatic offensive, demanding the withdrawal of the 
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American forces from the Taiwan Strait.321 To justify this request, Beijing had to emphasize that 
the bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu, or the possible “liberation” of the offshore islands and 
Taiwan, was China’s domestic affair in which foreign countries would not be allowed to 
interfere. This kind of formulation permeated Zhou’s conversations with his foreign guests 
between September 18 and 21.322 For example, Zhou told Gopalaswami Parthasarathy, Indian 
ambassador in Beijing: “we expect to settle the Taiwan issue with Jiang Jieshi through peaceful 
negotiations. [But] Jiang’s troops frequently raided the coast of mainland China, [and that is] the 
situation we cannot stand.”323   
Indeed, Zhou’s language referring to acts for punishing the KMT owed much to propaganda. 
More precisely locate Zhou’s views, his public statements commenting on the KMT’s military 
raids between December 1957 and August 23, 1958. However, an examination of the reports 
related to the KMT’s military raids in the People’s Daily during that period gives no sign of any 
comment or condemnation issued by Zhou. For example, on December 23, 1957, a KMT aircraft 
was reported to have been shot down in Fujian province; but Zhou (and actually all of the 
Chinese leaders) made no comment on it. The absence of any condemnation by Zhou of the 
KMT’s military raid may be explained by the fact that as one of the highest-ranking leaders, it 
was inappropriate for Zhou to make any comment on tactical-level issues, lest doing so degrade 
his status. If this is the explanation, then Zhou’s subsequent formulation after the crisis occurred 
would have been self-evidently a sophisticated ploy magnifying a minor issue for propaganda 
purposes.  
Zhou’s first public comment related to the U.S. during the crisis appeared in his 
conversation with the counselor of the Soviet embassy in Beijing on September 5, 1958.  He 
mentioned that one of the purposes for initiating the shelling was to prevent the U.S. from 
implementing the “Two Chinas” policy.324 This seemed to imply that the U.S. policy toward the 
Taiwan Strait, which offered support to Taiwan, led Beijing to initiate the bombardment. In his 
September 6 statement, Zhou used the harshest tone in regard to the presence of U.S. in the 
Taiwan Strait. He said that the presence of the U.S. power in the Taiwan Strait was not only an 
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invasion of Chinese territory, but also would provoke the Chinese people.325 As mentioned before, 
for both Zhou and Mao, the September 6 statement had its propaganda purposes, lying behind 
the strategic considerations in countering Dulles’s statement about the U.S. commitment to 
defend Taiwan. And the harsh language used in the propaganda organs was a tactic dictated by 
Mao.326 Thus, although this statement demonstrated a tough tone toward the U.S. reactions, it 
cannot offer valid evidence confirming Zhou’s perspectives toward the U.S.   
A more moderate view of the U.S. was presented in Zhou’s private conversation with Cao 
Juren, a secret envoy between Beijing and Taipei, on September 8. Zhou told Cao three possible 
results the KMT troops stationed on Jinmen and Mazu would face: the first was to live or die 
together with the islands, the second was to voluntarily withdraw back to Taiwan, and the third 
was to withdraw from the islands under U.S. pressure.327 In terms of these three scenarios, it 
seemed that Zhou didn’t recognize the U.S. as an intolerable aggressor invading Chinese 
territory; rather he acknowledged tacitly the undeniable reality that the U.S. was a power present 
in the Taiwan Strait.   
When Beijing launched a new diplomatic offensive after September 16, the language 
branding the American deployments in the Taiwan Strait as an invasion of China and the cause 
of the tension appeared again in Zhou’s talks with his foreign guests.328 Although that language 
condemned the U.S. deployment in the Taiwan Strait as a provocation and threat to the Chinese 
people, Zhou actually had no appetite for a direct military confrontation with the U.S. On 
September 27, Zhou had explained to Antonov three possible scenarios for the development of 
the crisis:  
a) When the time comes, the U.S will prepare to make a concession [and] China and the U.S. will find a 
compromise solution. If the U.S. will guarantee the withdrawal of Jiang’s troops [from Jinmen], we [China] 
agree to hold a period to allow Jiang’s troops to withdraw…b) Both sides keep [this tension] on, [and] 
continue the stalemate…c) the U.S. prepares to put [her] head into the noose….329  
None of the three scenarios suggested a directly military confrontation to expel the U.S. from the 
Taiwan Strait. These assessments tacitly acknowledged that Zhou was not willing to remove 
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Taiwan (perhaps including the Taiwan Strait) from the U.S. sphere of influence by force, even 
though the PRC continued to claim Taiwan as a part of China’s territory. Zhou’s “About the 
Conduct of the Jinmen Operation,”330 which suggested avoiding the risk of hitting American 
vessels and aircraft by canceling a joint-operation attack on Jinmen, also asserts that the U.S. was 
not an intolerable invader that had to be expelled, but an opponent with which direct 
confrontation should be avoided. Zhou’s tacit acknowledgment implies that he did not really 
perceive the presence of the U.S. military force in the Taiwan Strait as an invasion of China’s 
territory.  
In the meetings of the Politburo’s Standing Committee making the decision to end the crisis 
between October 3 and 4, Zhou summed up his perspective toward the U.S. during the crisis. 
Zhou said: 
By now both had some ideas about the other’s bottom line…. Americans knew that we neither intended to 
liberate Taiwan in the near future nor wanted to have a head-to-head clash with America…. Our test by 
artillery fire in August and September was appropriate because the Americans were forced to reconsider what 
they could do in the area. At the same time, we restricted our shelling to Jiang’s ships, not American ships. 
Our naval and air forces all strictly observed the order not to fire on American ships and airplanes. We acted 
with caution and exercised proper restraint… we put up quite a pageant in our propaganda campaign to 
condemn America’s occupation of our Taiwan territory and to protest American ships and aircraft invading 
our territorial waters and air space. Our propaganda had mobilized not only the Chinese masses but also the 
international community to support the Arab peoples and put very heavy pressure on the American 
government.331  
It can be discerned that Zhou’s conclusion was very moderate and pragmatic in assessing the 
interactions between China and the U.S. in the crisis. This moderate formulation once again 
reveals that the motive of expelling the “aggressive” Americans from Chinese territory did not 
influence Zhou’s decision. In Zhou’s view, the shelling was a strategy forcing the U.S. to 
reconsider the role and power of China while dealing with the Taiwan issue. In other words, for 
Zhou the U.S. was not an invader of China by definition, but an opponent whose presence in the 
Taiwan Strait was accepted. 
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Other Leaders 
In 1958, Peng Dehuai was the Minister of National Defense and the Vice Chair of the CMC, 
and also the highest military officer directly involved in planning and conducting the 
bombardment of Jinmen. As a Vice Chair of the CMC, Peng also chaired CMC meetings several 
times when Mao (the Chair of the CMC) was absent during the crisis. Thus, the role Peng played 
in this crisis leads me to select him, in addition to Mao and Zhou, as an object of investigation to 
observe the Chinese leaders’ considerations about the shelling. However, during the crisis, Peng 
did not specifically mention the reasons for the shelling as Mao and Zhou did. For this reason, I 
only trace what can be found in Peng’s assessments and instructions for the operation to see if he 
mentioned any justification similar to what the CRWT would suggest. 
According to the available sources, Peng seems to have had no firm belief that the shelling 
would eventually be carried out while the crisis was fermenting. On July 18, Peng participated in 
the CMC meeting summoned by Mao for communicating the decision to support the Arabs by 
executing the artillery bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu. Then, Peng announced Mao’s 
instruction at another meeting of the presidium of the enlarged CMC. Peng added another 
instruction that the following meetings should not last too long, because all the generals and 
important military officers would be gathering there and it would be difficult to handle the 
situation if fighting began at that time. Shortly thereafter Peng made a personal comment on the 
situation, “I think there will not necessarily be a fight.”332 Peng’s comment seemed to doubt the 
possibility that Mao’s instruction would be immediately put into action. This indirectly suggests 
that Mao’s July 18 instruction was a whim prompted by the Lebanon and Jordan crisis rather 
than a thorough decision.  
Peng’s perspective toward the crisis in the Middle East shows that he did not link the 
shelling or manipulation of the crisis to support of the Arabs. On July 22, Peng stated his opinion 
on the situation in the Middle East at the enlarged CMC meeting.  He said: 
After the revolution occurred in Iraq on July 14, the British and Americans dispatched their forces to Jordan 
and Lebanon… In terms of the development of the situation for the previous eight days, one of the possible 
futures is to develop into a major war, and the other is a stop [of the escalation]. At the present, the possibility 
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of the latter is higher [then the former]. But there is no danger when there is preparedness; we still need to 
have preparedness for combat.333 
On July 24, in another CMC meeting, Peng again offered his assessment of the crisis in the 
Middle East: 
There are three possible [scenarios for the development of the] situation in the Middle East. The first is to 
escalate to a major war, the second is that the British and Americans will not withdraw [their troops], and the 
third is the withdrawal of the British and American troops. Most probably, the possibility of the second 
[scenario] is higher [than the others]. Our war preparedness [can be conducted] based on [the hypothesis of] 
the second possibility, and [should] be ready for [dealing deal with] the first possibility, and [will] strive for 
the situation of the third possibility.334 
None of these formulations displayed an obvious linkage between the Middle East crisis and the 
decision for shelling. Besides, Peng’s benchmark for preparation for war suggested that he 
recognized a severe military conflict or war was not imminent, even after knowing Mao’s July 
17 instruction. Peng’s suggestion that the PLA should attend to preparation for war mainly based 
on the assumption that the British and Americans would not withdraw from the Middle East 
meant that global tension would be in the middle range between the severest and the easiest 
situations. In the same meeting, Peng’s comments on the schedule for building up the 
mechanized divisions and the plan for establishing and training the militia confirm this inference.  
Peng suggested building up 20 mechanized divisions for executing the missions of rapid 
maneuver and anti-airborne operations by 1962. Three regiments of militia could be established 
in each coastal province in advance, and then the organization would be broadened down to the 
military sub-districts after the accomplishment of the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962).335 
These schedules for building up military units disclose a moderate plan of preparation for war, 
which was not intended to handle the situation of an imminent war. This confirms that Peng (and 
perhaps other leaders as well) recognized that a large-scale military action or a war was not on 
the list of means for fulfilling Mao’s instruction.   
It is understandable that Peng adopted a moderate perspective toward the shelling, because 
he might have thought the decision to shell Jinmen and Mazu was merely one of the methods to 
achieve the deployment of the PLAAF into Fujian’s airfields, which had been approved by Mao 
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in March 1958. On January 19, 1958, under Mao’s instruction of December 18, 1957, the Fuzhou 
Military Region submitted to Mao and the CMC a report which discussed the issue of deploying 
the PLAAF in Fujian and proposed the plans and means to suppress the KMT’s possible 
reactions.336 In order to avoid being placed in a disadvantageous and passive position by possible 
KMT air raids, this report put the option of artillery bombardment of Jinmen and Mazu on the 
list of countermeasures. 337  Right after he received this report, Peng led a discussion about 
preparations for the PLAAF entering Fujian in the CMC meeting.338 On March 5, Peng wrote a 
letter to Mao to report the plan for deploying the PLAAF in Fujian. It suggested that the PLAAF 
should enter Fujian between July and August, and the frontline units could execute the shelling 
of Jinmen and Mazu if necessary. Three days later, Mao replied: “about the issues of deploying 
[the air force] in Fujian, [I] agree with your opinion…but [about] the final execution of 
deployment, I will decide when the time comes.”339 In the light of this context, Peng might have 
consistently believed that Mao kept agreeing with his plan to deploy the PLAAF in Fujian.  
Meanwhile, this inference offers a clue to resolve the puzzle of why Peng strained to grasp 
the meaning of Mao’s instruction to halt the shelling on July 27.340 Because the PLAAF had 
started moving its first wave into Fujian on July 27, Peng may have wondered whether Mao’s 
undated suspension of shelling was a signal that the artillery operation would not be a required 
countermeasure to secure the air force’s entry into Fujian. In other words, Peng’s confusion may 
have originated from his purely military viewpoint toward the entire artillery operation, which 
was different from what Mao had discerned through the lens of political and strategic assessment. 
Peng’s viewpoint based on a purely military assessment can be found in his August 6 directive 
aimed at conducting the air operations. Peng proposed three guidelines: 
First, all the Jiang’s and American airplanes intruding into our territorial air space should be brought down 
resolutely, [but we] shall not cross the boundary line of our territorial waters while pursuing them. Second, 
[with regard to] the Jiang’s and American airplanes intruding into our territorial air space to execute bombing 
missions, [we] can pursue them over the boundary line of our territorial waters, but not exceeding 12 
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kilometers. Third, the American and Jiang’s transport planes intruding into our territorial air space shall be 
compelled to land on our airfields, or be shot down if they resist. But as for the airplanes outside of our 
territorial air space, we will do nothing. To the transport planes flying from Taiwan to Jinmen, [we] will 
temporarily not attack, and wait to take action until the enemy has bombed us. 341  
It is clear that in Peng’s viewpoint, the U.S. and the KMT were an indivisible enemy. This 
tendency seems to put Peng in a more confrontational position than Mao and Zhou would occupy 
later, when they thought the struggle with the Americans should be prudently handled and 
prevented from escalating to a direct military confrontation. This instruction reflects the purely 
military consideration that both the American and KMT air power were tactical obstacles to the 
success of the PLAAF’s operations. Without removing these obstacles, the security of the 
PLAAF stationed in Fujian would not be achieved. The restriction on the scope of pursuing 
hostile airplanes also supports this inference. From the military point of view, it would be wise to 
avoid an ambitious adventure, which might incur unwanted troubles by mistakenly entering traps 
in the depth of enemy airspace, when the PLAAF was attempting to establish its power over its 
side of the Strait and was not yet strong enough to compete with its opponents’ air superiority 
over the entire Strait. Therefore, based on this instruction, it is highly probable that to secure the 
PLAAF movement into Fujian was the top priority for Peng’s conduct of military actions before 
Mao decided to shell.   
Peng’s August 13 instruction, which suggested that the frontline units should return to 
normal status if the Americans and KMT did not initiate “unusual military actions” in the next 
few days, testifies to the validity of this assumption as well. Based on Beijing’s assessment, the 
PLAAF had basically come to dominate the air space over the offshore islands after about a half-
month struggle with the KMT’s air force.342 If the achievement of the plan for moving the 
PLAAF into Fujian had been Peng’s first priority, his August 13 instruction may prove this 
conjecture correct. Because of the promising situation in the struggle for air superiority, the 
artillery operation as an auxiliary countermeasure to secure the air force’s operation would have 
seemed less of an imperative than what the previous plan had suggested, when the PLAAF had 
almost gained control of the airspace over the offshore islands on August 13. In this situation, 
Peng may well have believed that the initial stage for moving the PLAAF into Fujian, which 
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should have been the most critical time for the entire operation, had been securely accomplished. 
Hence, to Peng, it was safe to not execute the auxiliary plan – launching the shelling of Jinmen 
and Mazu — since the original objectives had mainly been achieved. 
In sum, my inference suggests that Peng tended to regard the artillery operation as an 
auxiliary plan for achieving the plan of moving the PLAAF into Fujian before the outbreak of the 
crisis. Perhaps because of his position, Peng was very much stuck on the military viewpoint of 
conducting military operations before the shelling began. As my inference has shown, it is highly 
likely that until August 18, when Mao revived the decision to shell, the execution of the artillery 
bombardment against Jinmen and Mazu was not a fixed option in Peng’s mind. Since there is no 
concrete evidence showing that Peng had a strong political opinion to justify the artillery 
operation, I suggest that Peng didn’t possess ideas similar to what the CRWT would suggest in 
regard to the decision to shell Jinmen and Mazu.  
 
Analysis of the People’s Daily 
To conduct the analysis of the People’s Daily in this case, I observe the period between July 
17 and October 28, 1958, for examining the Chinese assessment of the moral standing of their 
opponents in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. July 17, 1958, was the first day the People’s Daily 
reported on the American intervention in Lebanon, and October 26, 1958, was the day that the 
Chinese government released the “Second Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” in the 
People’s Daily, marking the end of the crisis. There are a total of 102 days to be examined. The 
reports about U.S. intervention in the Middle East, Taiwanese military actions over mainland 
China, and U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait are the objects examined to produce the 
number of morality-based condemnations generated by the Chinese government. The total 
number of words condemning those actions is 295, which yields a daily average of 2.892. This 
daily average is higher than in the case of Korean War (and highest among the cases examined in 
this dissertation).  
September 15, when the Sino-American ambassador-level meetings were resumed in 
Warsaw, is the watershed date dividing the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis into two periods. 
Language from the CRWT tends to come into play especially after Chinese leaders recognize 
that their attempts at non-violent resolutions have encountered deadlock. In this case, the 
resumption of Sino-American ambassador-level meetings on September 15 was the obvious 
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event that provided a channel of communication for negotiating a possible resolution. Using this 
date as dividing line, I can examine the variation of morality-based condemnation between the 
period of escalation and the period of de-escalation in this crisis. The days of observation number 
61 (July 17 – September 15) and 41 (September 16 – October 26) in the two periods. In the first, 
the number of words is 71, and the daily average is 2.958. In the second, the number of words is 
116, and the daily average is 2.829.  
The evidence suggests that the Chinese government did not significantly increase or 
decrease the morality-based condemnation after the tension had begun de-escalating. But neither 
can this result refute my assumption, because an increased frequency of morality-based 
condemnation should not be found in this case unless the outcome was a decision to go to war. 
The computed frequency in this case suggests that when a decision for war is unlikely, the 
Chinese government will not emphasize the legitimacy of its use of force by increasing the 
amount of moral condemnation heaped upon its opponents. 
 
Conclusion 
The case of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis yields mixed finding about the influence of the 
CRWT. Although China’s leaders claimed that their shelling had three justifications, which were 
helping the people in the Middle East resisting the American and British intervention, stopping 
the KMT’s violent acts, and resisting the American intervention in the Taiwan Strait, none of 
these had a significant impact on the Chinese leaders’ decision making. More specifically, these 
justifications did not convince China’s leaders to go to war against the KMT and the U.S. troops 
deployed in the Taiwan Strait.  
The initial intention of China’s leaders for the shelling in 1958 may explain why the 
concept of righteous war had such negligible influence on the Chinese decision-making in 1958. 
To the Chinese leaders, the purposes for initiating the shelling were multiple, including the 
attempts to probe the bottom line of Washington’s support for Taiwan’s defense, to compel the 
U.S. to resume the ambassadorial meetings, and to cover the PLA deployment of air forces to the 
Fujian airfields as a prerequisite for seizing the KMT-controlled islands along the coast of 
mainland China. Those intentions did not recommend a decision for war to the Chinese when the 
shelling started. Also, during the crisis, neither Mao nor Zhou was interested in escalating the 
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conflict; instead, both of them preferred to limit the level as well as control the development of 
the conflict.  
These facts suggest that the two circumstances under which the CRWT is most likely to 
influence decision-making – when China’s leaders have encountered an impasse in decision-
making (such as when different pragmatic arguments point toward opposite courses of action), 
and when they perceive that their attempts at nonviolent solutions have encountered deadlock –
did not occur during the entire crisis in 1958. In other words, in this case China’s leaders never 
encountered the best time to apply the ideas of the CRWT because they never really entered in 
the process of making the decision for or against war. This case also shows another circumstance 
limiting the influence of the CRWT, namely, that when the Chinese leaders were making a 
decision for the use of low-intensity force (not full-scale war), they would be less influenced by 
the consideration of just causes. Moreover, the Chinese leaders’ uses of language, in this case, 
suggest that the presentation of righteous legitimacy may have been a smoke screen covering the 
real intentions of Chinese leaders to initiate a low-intensity conflict.  
The findings from the analysis of the People’s Daily are also mixed. No significant 
variation is found in the frequency of Beijing’s morality-based condemnation of its opponents. 
Between the escalating and de-escalating stages of this crisis, the Chinese government seems not 
to have significantly shifted its judgment of its opponents’ moral standing. However, this result 
is entirely consistent with my finding that there is no visible influence of the CRWT on China’s 
leaders in this case. This congruent result seems to agree with my assumption about the 
application of morality-based condemnation, because no increase in the frequency of morality-
based condemnation is found in this crisis in which the Chinese did not make the decision for 
war. 
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Chapter 5 - The Sino-Indian War 
The Sino-Indian War of 1962 is the second major foreign war of Mao’s era. Before the 
1990s, the reasons that caused the Chinese to decide on a war with India were little known. From 
looking at the open sources, some scholars believed that India’s hard-line policy in the 
negotiations and India’s implementation of its “Forward Policy” paved the way for Beijing’s 
decision to use force.343 Since the 1990s, with new publications in Chinese and the release of 
authoritative materials, scholars have argued that Beijing’s decision was not only prompted by 
India’s uncompromising attitude, but also can be traced back to Chinese perceptions of India’s 
policy toward Tibet.344 In other words, from the late 1950s, Beijing increasingly suspected that 
New Delhi wanted to seize Tibet from China, and India’s Forward Policy enhanced this 
suspicion.345 Thus, punishing India and terminating both India’s effort to seize Tibet and its 
aggressive moves along the Sino-Indian border were identified as factors in Beijing’s decision to 
go to war in 1962.346 These recent discoveries make the Sino-Indian War one of the most likely 
candidates for testing the role that the CRWT plays in the Chinese leaders’ decision making. 
 
Historical Background 
The controversial Sino-Indian boundary, divided by Nepal and Bhutan into the eastern and 
western sectors, which had been left behind by British imperialism dating from the 19th century, 
was the biggest factor contributing to the root cause of the outbreak of the Sino-Indian war. In 
the eastern sector, it was all about the disputable boundary line – the McMahon Line. This line 
was agreed by the British and Tibet in the Simla Accord of 1914, which Chinese governments 
have never accepted. In the western sector, the dispute was about the ownership of Aksai Chin, 
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where the British Empire never had a clearly defined boundary line. After its independence, 
India inherited the British Empire’s perspectives toward those controversial boundaries.347 For 
the eastern sector, the Indian government recognized that the McMahon Line was the 
uncontested boundary line between China and India. For the western sector, India adopted a 
more aggressive definition that the line should be drawn along the northern edge of Aksai 
Chin.348  This meant that almost the entire Aksai Chin plateau was claimed by India. Of course, 
those Indian-claimed boundary lines have never been accepted by any Chinese government. In 
the 1950s, a line of actual control came into existence, although both sides had never reached an 
official agreement on its location. In the eastern sector, the McMahon line became the line of 
actual control, even though the Chinese had never approved its legitimacy. In the western sector, 
the Chinese effectively controlled the Aksai Chin plateau.  
Until 1958 a satisfactory settlement for resolving the boundary dispute seemed highly 
probable because of the friendly relationship between China and India.349 China’s completion of 
the Xinjiang-Tibet road and India’s negative reaction to it dimmed the chance of a settlement in 
1958. When both sides argued about the authority for building the Xinjiang-Tibet road in their 
diplomatic communications between 1958 and 1959, the boundary dispute was formally brought 
into the open. Although these diplomatic communications resolved nothing and each side stuck 
to its own vision, the Sino-Indian boundary remained calm until the first half of 1959 when the 
Tibetan uprising erupted. In order to suppress the revolt and to control the deteriorating situation, 
the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the PRC approved an armed suppression operation 
in Tibet, which achieved its purpose at the end of March 1959.350 The end of the Tibetan 
rebellion, however, ignited the first Sino-Indian boundary conflict.  
Indian public opinion quickly took note of the behavior and presence of the Chinese in 
Tibet and put considerable pressure upon Nehru by urging the Indian government to take certain 
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actions to help the Tibetans.351 Under this pressure, Nehru expressed to Beijing his sympathy for 
the Tibetans and concerns about China’s acts in Tibet.352 The Chinese did not appreciate New 
Delhi’s policy attempting to thrust a hand into the Tibet issue, and replied with open criticism.353 
Although that criticism was firm, the Chinese, particularly Mao, had no desire to entirely break 
the friendship with India.354 Mao even instructed Pan Zili, the Chinese ambassador to India, to 
express China’s friendship to the Indian government after that criticism was released.355  
Mao’s hope to maintain a close friendship with India became more and more unrealistic as 
the numbers of troops on the both sides of the border increased. For the Chinese, implementing 
the armed suppression meant that more troops would be deployed in Tibet to control the situation, 
and they would also be deployed along the McMahon Line to cut the Tibetan refugees’ lines of 
escape.356  The increased number of the Chinese troops along the border made the Indians 
anxious about Beijing’s real intention. In response to China’s deployment, New Delhi increased 
its armed forces in that area to enhance its control of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in 
order to offer help and receive the refugees from Tibet.357 Nevertheless, the Indians did not 
restrict their scope of action. Some Indian troops entered the areas north of the McMahon Line, 
such as Khinzemane, Tamaden, and Longju.358 These military actions eventually led to the first 
military clash between China and India at Longju on August 25, 1959.359 About two months later, 
on October 21, another military clash occurred at the Kongka Pass in the western sector.360 
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These incidents in 1959 did not alter the Chinese attitude toward maintaining friendship 
with India. On November 3, 1959, Mao brought up the idea of both sides imposing a 
demilitarized zone along the boundary to create a favorable climate for negotiation.361 In addition, 
the Chinese government expressed that it was ready to have a premier-level meeting with India, 
if the Indian government agreed.362 On November 7, Zhou Enlai conveyed to Nehru China’s 
suggestion of imposing a coordinated demilitarized zone upon the actual line of control by both 
sides as the prelude for diplomatic discussion.363 Yet the Indians refused to accept this proposal 
unless the Chinese government accepted the boundary line defined by New Delhi. New Delhi’s 
insistence meant that Beijing would not only have to recognize the McMahon Line, but would 
also have to unilaterally surrender to India around 20,000 square kilometers in the western 
sector. 364  Even though New Delhi’s response was disappointing, the Chinese government 
insisted on implementing a self-imposed demilitarized zone within Chinese-controlled areas in 
accordance with Mao’s instruction.  Meanwhile, Zhou continued to inform India of China’s wish 
to have a premier-level meeting.365 On February 5, 1960, Beijing finally received a positive 
response from Nehru that a summit meeting devoid of negotiations was welcomed by the Indian 
government. 
For the Chinese, the outcome of Zhou’s trip to India was another disappointing 
development. Originally, Zhou’s objective was to achieve a general agreement with India in 
order to alleviate the tension and to create a precondition for future negotiations.366 His basic 
strategy for the talks was to express that China would continue endorsing the five principles of 
coexistence, maintain the status quo on the border, avoid conflict over the boundary, and remain 
open to peaceful negotiation.367 Zhou believed that Beijing’s goodwill could significantly relieve 
the tension and reconcile certain differences between China and India. Due to the very 
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fundamental contradiction between China and India on the border issues, Zhou’s efforts were 
destined to fail to achieve substantial agreement with India. After meeting with Nehru seven 
times, Zhou received nothing but two lukewarm agreements from the Indian government that 
both governments should draft a report on the border issue based on historical and other sources, 
and this report should be submitted to both governments by the end of September, 1960; 
meanwhile, both sides should do everything to avoid any friction and conflict along the 
boundary.368 To Zhou, the final joint statement was unsatisfactory because it did not reflect 
China’s position and positive attitude on resolving the disputes. He then held an impromptu press 
conference to express Beijing’s standpoint and to make public the original statement drafted by 
the Chinese government.369 
If the unsuccessful premier-level talks of 1960 were a turning point shifting the Chinese 
from a conciliatory attitude to a tough position in dealing with India’s acts on the border, India’s 
implementation of the Forward Policy, particularly its expanded activity in the eastern sector, 
was the last straw for the Chinese in making up their mind to resolve the wrangle over the border 
by force. For the Indians, the period between 1961 and 1962 was a good time to execute their 
Forward Policy. Unfavorable international and domestic developments, such as disclosure of the 
Sino-Soviet dispute, a degenerating economic situation caused by the Great Leap Forward, and 
unmitigated confrontation with the U.S., would not allow Beijing to freely devote its attention 
and resources to the Tibet-Xinjiang area, which had a low priority among China’s strategic 
concerns. Moreover, China’s previous concessions, such as the restrained reactions in the two 
incidents of 1959 and the self-imposed demilitarized zone, strengthened New Delhi’s 
misconception that the Chinese would react to nothing no matter how aggressively the Indians 
acted within the Chinese-claimed territory. India’s victory in regaining Goa from Portugal in 
December 1961 helped make triumphalism pervasive among the Indians. 370  Under these 
circumstances, the Forward Policy was formally put into action at the end of 1961.  
Until February 1962, the Chinese had had no clear idea about the new Indian moves on the 
borders. After learning of India’s new moves, the CMC decided to resume armed patrols and re-
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establish the line of posts, which had been abandoned since 1959.371 But the Chinese reactions 
were still restrained. The CMC limited the frontline units’ freedom of action by imposing strict 
rules of engagement and a prohibition against abandoning any posts without orders from higher 
headquarters. 372  This directive was designed to preserve room for diplomatic maneuver in 
persuading the Indians to go back to the negotiating table. Beijing’s attempt failed, however, 
because the Indians were unmovable in their Forward Policy. This made Beijing’s language 
become stronger and more threatening. On February 26, Beijing warned New Delhi in a note that 
its acts along the border were dangerous and might cause “serious consequences” (嚴重後果).373  
Regardless of China’s enhanced diplomatic efforts, there was no sign of a change in India’s 
new border policy; moreover, the Indian military activities significantly increased in the western 
sector in April. In response to this situation, on April 19 the CMC ordered the frontline units in 
the western sector to establish posts at strategic positions.374 The diplomatic channel between 
Beijing and New Delhi was also flooded with China’s protests about Indian actions on the border 
in the following days. On April 30, Beijing delivered to New Delhi a significant protest with two 
warning signals. First, “if the Indian government refuses to withdraw all posts [which have 
invaded China’s territory] and continues to provoke the Chinese posts, the Chinese border forces 
will have no choice but to execute self-defense, and then India will have to take full 
responsibility for all the consequences caused by such choices.” Then, the second warning 
announced that the Chinese troops would resume their patrols in the western sector and China 
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would consider expanding this decision to the eastern sector if the situation didn’t take a 
favorable turn.375  
To the Indians, Beijing’s warnings looked more like a bluff 376  rather than a threat, 
especially after two events occurred in the western sector in May and July. At the beginning of 
May, Chinese and Indian troops endured a tense confrontation in the area of the Chip Chap River. 
Another tense confrontation occurred in the area of the Galwan Valley on July 5. In both events, 
the Chinese chose to withdraw voluntarily from the confrontation in order to avoid serious 
clashes. These results convinced New Delhi not only that Nehru’s assessment of Beijing’s 
attitude, which was that the Chinese would do nothing except bluff in response to India’s moves, 
was right, but also that steadfast execution of the Forward Policy was the right means for the 
Indians to ensure their borders.377  
Although the Chinese media employed strong language to condemn the Indian acts in these 
incidents378, the Chinese withdrawals seem to have been an attempt to leave room for a peaceful 
resolution with the Indians. In fact, the Chinese were not yet ready to break their relationship 
with India when the rest of world had not yet grasped the crux of the dispute. In a meeting of the 
Secretariat of the CCP’s Central Committee, Mao brought up considerations such as these.379 In 
this meeting, Zhou and Liu Shaoqi, the President of the PRC, proposed two solutions for the 
border dispute to the Secretariat: either to expel the Indian posts by force or to do so by any 
possible measures but force.380 After hearing the report, Mao said: 
[Because] the Indians established posts in our territory, we have a flawless reason to fight against them. But 
[we] still need to restrain ourselves, and cannot be in a hurry to fight. Why? First, we need to let Nehru further 
expose his true face. Now Nehru is getting dizzy with success and believes that his rascally tactic is very 
resourceful… Second, [we shall] win the international community over to recognize the correct understanding 
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of truth and falsehood in the Sino-Indian border disputes, win the majority over to sympathize with and 
support us, especially winning over the nations who are in the middle of the road; some nations in 
international community do not observe the problem of the Sino-Indian border clearly, [they] cannot figure out 
who is right and who is wrong. Meanwhile, our struggle with India is a complicated international issue; [it is] 
not merely having a problem with India, [but also with] American imperialism and the Soviet Union etc. 
[which] are supporting India. They want to take advantage of us [when we are] temporarily in difficulties [by] 
pushing us to go into battle, and [thereby] give us a hard time. But we will not fall into this trap; we now shall 
insist on not firing the first shot. Our guiding principle consists of eight characters: jue bu tui rang, bi mian liu 
xie; 決不退讓, 避免流血 [never yield, avoid bloodshed].381 
Therefore, for limiting India’s moves on the border without the outbreak of armed conflict, Mao 
proposed the policy of “military coexistence” (wu zhuang gong chu, 武裝共處). On July 20, the 
PLA General Staff Department embodied Mao’s directives in a “twenty-character directive” that 
the border force should “absolutely not give ground, strive resolutely to avoid bloodshed, 
interlock [with Indian forces] in a zigzag pattern, and undertake a long period of armed 
coexistence (jue bu tui rang, lizheng bimian liu xie, quan ya jiao cuo, chang qi wuzhuang 
gongchu; 絕不退讓, 力爭避免流血, 犬牙交錯, 長期武裝共處).”382  
Nevertheless, China’s strategy failed to persuade the Indians to alter their Forward Policy. 
Worst of all, the Indians took China’s response as a signal of weakness and were encouraged to 
expand the Forward Policy to the eastern sector.383 On June 4, New Delhi ordered a small Indian 
unit to establish a post in the area of Che Dong, located on the southern slope of Thag La Ridge 
but north of the McMahon Line. As Maxwell has argued, that decision marked the point of no 
return.384 From now on, the Indian government would regard such acts and achievements along 
the McMahon Line as a part of their strategy for successfully implementing the Forward Policy 
and an aid to their advance in the western sector.385  
Beijing did not know of India’s actions in the area of Che Dong until September 8 when a 
Chinese armed patrol entered that area. Without an order from above, the Chinese troops had no 
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choice but to settle into nearby positions and monitor the Indian post.386 This reaction worsened 
New Delhi’s delusion that the Chinese would do nothing even if under Indian attack.387 This 
misconception eventually resulted in the appearance of Operation Leghorn on September 9: the 
Indian 7th Brigade was ordered to move to Che Dong and to be ready for battle; it was also 
expected to encircle the Chinese troops if possible. 388  While the Indians were preparing 
Operation Leghorn, their troops had started to expel the Chinese from the area of Che Dong by 
force. Between September 21 and 24, several serious clashes, which resulted in some Chinese 
soldiers killed and wounded, occurred under the Indians’ initiative in the eastern sector.   
The September clashes led the Chinese to elevate the level of warning.  On September 22, 
the People’s Daily printed an editorial titled “If this can be tolerated, then what cannot be 
tolerated?” (shi ke ren, shu bu ke ren). This editorial suggested that the Chinese people could 
never tolerate their territory being freely invaded by India, and could never be indifferent to 
seeing their border soldiers “brutally” killed. It warned that the “Chinese government, Chinese 
people, and Chinese border forces do not possess unlimited patience.”389 The Chinese warnings 
failed again. Between September 24 and 26, the Indians initiated another two clashes at Che 
Dong, causing seven more Chinese causalities.390  
At the beginning of October, Beijing started to accept that China’s previous acts and 
warnings could not stop the Indians from continuing their course of action in the eastern sector. 
On October 5, the PLA General Staff Department reported to Zhou about the movement of the 
Indian troops in the eastern sector. This report concluded that the Indian government “had made 
up its mind to drive the Chinese back.” Zhou immediately instructed that “if the Indian troops get 
to work in the eastern sector, we shall not only bash them back, but also can annihilate some of 
their posts in the western sector at the same time,” and he ordered Luo Ruiqing, the Chief of the 
General Staff, to accelerate the preparation and deployment on the border.391  
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The Chinese made their last attempt to persuade India to halt its Forward Policy by 
diplomatic means on October 3, with a warning stating that, “whenever India attacks, China is 
sure to strike back.”392 Although the signal was tough, this note also indicated that Beijing still 
wished to have unconditional negotiations with India.393 New Delhi didn’t appreciate Beijing’s 
suggestion, and India set a precondition for negotiations: that the Chinese relinquish Indian-
claimed territory in the western sector and stop invading India’s NEFA (including the area of 
Che Dong).394 On October 6, the day India rejected China’s October 3 suggestion for negotiation, 
the Chinese delivered another note asserting their sovereignty over the area of Che Dong with a 
warning that the Indians would eventually “perish by the flame [they] played with.”395 
India’s rejection of the Chinese suggestion on October 6 is a crucial event in tracing the 
ultimate decision of China’s leaders to act. As Xu Yan has argued, the CMC did not resolve to 
execute a counterstrike until New Delhi rejected Beijing’s suggestion for holding unconditional 
negotiations. 396  On the same day, the CMC and Mao decided to conduct a constrained 
counterstrike against the Indian action. The situation in the eastern section entered an explosive 
stage after the CMC and Mao’s instruction and after the Indian government put Operation 
Leghorn into action. On October 10, the Chinese launched their first counterstrike against the 
Indians since 1959. This constrained counterstrike successfully expelled the targeted Indians 
from their positions at Tseng Jong.397 To the Chinese, this action was a demonstration showing 
their teeth and expressing to the Indians that the Chinese would do what they said by translating 
their tough language into action.398 Beijing’s attempt to stop New Delhi’s advance failed again. 
The Indians were not shocked by their defeat at Tseng Jong. Instead, they only felt unsatisfied 
with the result and insisted on keeping their troops in their positions. On October 12, at the 
airport at New Delhi before his trip to Sri Lanka, Nehru made a statement announcing that war 
was likely and calling for preparations. This statement confirmed that “the armed forces had 
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been ordered to throw the Chinese aggressors out of the NEFA.”399 It was the final assertion that 
the Indian government would not be interested in negotiation with the Chinese government until 
the Chinese had completely evacuated the Thag La Ridge. Not only India but also other states, 
including China, saw Nehru’s statement as a declaration of war. For the Chinese, all they could 
do in response to that statement was concede or go to war. The Chinese had no choice but to 
accept the latter option and publicized this decision as the last warning on October 14. Two days 
later, Lei Yingfu, the Deputy Chief of Operations of the General Staff, reported to Mao about the 
reasons for India’s de facto declaration of war against China. According to Lei’s memoir, this 
report cleared up Mao’s doubt that a decision for war with the Indians would be needed.400  
China’s leaders officially achieved a consensus at an enlarged politburo conference on 
October 18.401 It began with a discussion of international sentiment, the situation on the fronts, 
the General Staff’s plan for counterstrike, intelligence, the latest Indian troop movements, and 
the PLA’s deployments.402 Zhou then drew the conclusion that China had no choice but to 
execute a self-defensive counterstrike. Mao approved this conclusion. At the end, the participants 
selected October 20 as the date of the counterstrike.403 Two days later the Chinese launched their 
first large assault in the area of the Namka Chu River. 
 
Analysis of Leaders 
Mao Zedong  
Two sorts of righteousness-based justification can be traced to explore the influence of the 
CRWT in Mao’s decision-making. First, self-defense is the most obvious justification. The 
second justification, which could be seen as a derivative of the first, is stopping the violent 
behavior of the Indians.  
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To Mao, India’s unyielding Forward Policy not only made no sense for a resolution of the 
border issue, but also caused India to invade Chinese territory. When the border dispute was 
brought into the open in 1959, Mao’s thinking was simply that the Chinese would do everything 
within reason to avoid bloodshed or conflict with the Indians. In Mao’s plan, the keynote of 
China’s India policy was maintaining friendship.404 Mao’s decision for a demilitarized zone on 
the border suggested as much. He envisioned India embracing the same idea of avoiding conflict, 
as can be seen in his amendment to Zhou’s letter to Nehru saying that, “if both governments 
cannot produce a very well-arranged resolution [to the border issues], I am afraid that border 
conflict, which both governments will be reluctant to face, will occur from now on.”405 Also, 
Mao’s remarks portrayed China as a socialist state advocating peace and opposing wars; 
therefore, China would not seize even an inch of territory from other states, but at the same time 
it would never allow others to take any Chinese territory by force.406 
As Mao portrayed it, China was a peace-loving country but with the proviso that China’s 
territory was not to be invaded by any foreign state. This proviso was challenged when India 
carried out its Forward Policy. Mao was still hoping to maintain the status quo on the borders 
when the Indians established posts in the western sector. His directives for adopting a low-
intensity defensive posture against India’s expansion and the flow of Chinese diplomatic notes 
and protests to India support this assumption. The Chinese discovery of India’s action at Che 
Dong on September 6 fundamentally broke Mao’s attempt to maintain the status quo. The 
presence of an Indian military force at Che Dong meant that an actual invasion of China’s 
territory had taken place. 
But why didn’t this obvious justification yield an immediate decision by Mao to use force? 
The obvious answer is that a peaceful resolution was still possible, according to the Chinese 
responses. When India rejected China’s last proposal for unconditional negotiations on October 6, 
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Mao’s attitude toward the Indian military actions seemed to start fundamentally shifting. With a 
tough tone, Mao instructed the border troops: 
If Indian troops attack us, then [we] will ruthlessly strike them back. In addition be well prepared in the eastern 
sector of Tibet, [our troops in] the western sector also need to operate in coordination. If they attack, [we] will 
not only repel them, but also will ruthlessly bash them and make them feel pain (打狠打痛).407 
This shows that the former policy of restraint had been replaced by a more positive, but still 
defensive, guideline in the face of India’s aggressive moves. This directive also indicates that of 
the two sectors, the eastern sector was the more sensitive area and Mao’s main concern. Also, the 
disclosure of Operation Leghorn convinced Mao that a massive Indian attack to seize Chinese 
territory was unavoidable and unalterable. 
However, Mao’s decision for a war against the Indians seems not to have been made until 
October 12 when Nehru made his statement calling for war. When Lei Yingfu reported to Mao 
an assessment of Nehru’s call for war on October 16, Mao responded that he was ready for a 
decision for war in response to the Indian military actions on the borders. In this conversation, 
Mao initially asked, “Why does Nehru have to fight against us?” When Lei hesitated to reply to 
the question, Mao pressed again: “Tell me [your thought], why after all does Nehru want to meet 
us on the battlefield?” Then, Lei laid out five key reasons that had been identified by a research 
group of the General Staff. After hearing the first four reasons408, Mao stopped Lei’s report and 
asked, “It is not enough to explain why Nehru is so truculent and savage because of these four 
reasons; under the circumstance that we forgave, forbore, and conciliated them again and again, 
why do they still want a war with us?” Finally, Lei pointed out the fifth reason, which satisfied 
Mao’s concerns: Nehru’s savagery was because he believed that the Chinese would never strike 
back no matter how far the Indians pushed. Lei reported that the strategic envelopment created 
by the Soviet Union, India, and the U.S., China’s lessened capability since it had not recovered 
from natural disasters, and the situation of China’s strategic deployment with only a few non-
                                                 
407 Zhong yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zuozhanshi, http://info.cndsi.com/html/20051126/1760143501.html. 
408 Those four reasons are “a desire to turn Tibet into ‘a colony or a protectorate’ of India --- the core Chinese belief 
discussed earlier; a desire to gain increased U.S. and Soviet military assistance by becoming a part of their anti-
China campaign; a desire to "achieve hegemony in Asia" by using anti-China activities to increase India's status with 
poor and small countries of the Third World; a desire to divert class and national contradictions with India,” quoted 
in Garver, “China’s Decision for War with India in 1962,” 120. 
107 
 
elite forces stationed in the southwestern region had all led Nehru to believe that China could 
“only bark but not bite.”409 Mao was satisfied with this assessment and encouraged Lei to give a 
more detailed analysis. Lei further reported that since 1950 the Chinese government had again 
and again tolerated and conciliated India’s policy of expansion; the Chinese didn’t strike back 
when the Indians occupied China’s territory in the middle410 and eastern sector, even when they 
killed and wounded Chinese personnel while establishing their posts. China’s policy of 
forbearance had led Nehru to assert that the Chinese were weak and easy to bully. Hence, he 
became more and more defiant and crazier and crazier to gain the cost-free benefits he imagined 
on the Sino-Indian border by attacking and pressing the Chinese.411 Then, Mao nodded with 
satisfaction and said:  
It seems like it is indeed that sort of a situation. In this case, we cannot but fight a war. Well, since Nehru says 
we only “bark but don't bite,” we absolutely must fight. We have no other choice. We might as well 
accompany him [in fighting a war].412 
This conversation indicates that in addition to Nehru’s statement calling for war, the violent 
behavior of the Indians also seemed to convince Mao that China’s policy of forbearance could no 
longer solve the dispute. Moreover, as Lei pointed out, China’s forbearance fed Indian ambitions 
and even encouraged the Indians to act violently on the borders. Needless to say, Mao agreed 
completely with Lei’s analysis that India’s escalating violence, including shooting at, killing, and 
wounding Chinese soldiers, would not stop as China’s non-violent response prompted Indian 
misperception and miscalculation. The increasing violence may have helped Mao to identify a 
decision for war as the right decision to make in order to prevent the situation from deteriorating 
further.  
Meanwhile, this conversation reveals that an assessment on the moral standing of the Indian 
government was made by Mao. In Mao’s opinion, the Sino-Indian border disputes could be 
solved peacefully. His policy and guidelines were consistent with this orientation. In other words, 
in Mao’s eyes China had always acted decently and even flawlessly in dealing with the border 
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disputes. When the Indian government rejected Beijing’s suggestions for peaceful negotiations 
again and again, and further attempted to solve the dispute by force, Mao naturally would see 
that, compared to China’s conciliatory, even appeasing position, the Indians’ acts exposed their 
expansionism and were wrong and unrighteous. This inference can be supported by Mao’ use of 
the terms “truculent” (xiong, 兇 ) and “savage” (changkuang, 猖狂 ) in describing Nehru’s 
behavior. These negative terms reveal a metaphor criticizing unwarranted behavior that far 
oversteps the bounds of propriety. 
Mao’s appreciation of Lei’s analysis of the roots of India’s aggressive advances tells us 
more about the ideas applied to judge the moral standing of the Indians. Mao agreed with Lei’s 
report that India’s aggressive advance was premised on the belief that international and domestic 
circumstances prevented China from making a tough and substantial response. This 
presupposition led the Indian leaders to believe that China could only “bark but not bite,” as Lei 
and Mao put it. In other words, Mao would agree that India was profiting at China’s expense, 
especially when China was in a difficult situation. There is an ancient Chinese proverb saying, 
“It is not benevolence to take advantage of someone’s difficulties (趁人之危，非仁也).”413 It is 
safe to say that when Mao agreed that the Indians were engaging in such behavior, at the same 
time he was implying that they were engaging in improper behavior against China. This 
perception brought Mao to the next judgment that India was seeking its own aggrandizement by 
bullying a weak neighbor. Mao agreed that China’s restrained response together with the 
Indians’ assumptions had led them to believe that China was weak-kneed and vulnerable to 
bullying. Based on this recognition, India’s bullying would likely be increasingly unrestrained 
and would not stop spontaneously, because, as Mao and Lei speculated, it was a very “profitable 
business” to stay tough against a China that would not fight back anyway. Thus, for China, a 
decision for war would be the right thing to punish the bullying. The same sort of idea can also 
be found in the ancient classic the Rites of Zhou, which suggests that punishment of a bullying 
neighbor and exploiter of the weak is permissible. 
The justifications of self-defense and stopping violence in particular were stressed by Mao 
to legitimate his decision, when the Politburo discussed the final decision on October 18. That 
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was an enlarged Politburo conference, where Mao was the last person who made comments and 
concluded what the course of action should be. Mao said: 
For many years we have adopted many methods to seek a peaceful solution on the Sino-Indian border issue, 
but India didn’t accept [our efforts]. India intentionally provoked armed conflicts, which are getting stronger 
and stronger. [They] have pushed [us] too far (欺人太甚). Since Nehru wants such a fight, what we can do is 
to stay at the party until the end. “It is impolite not to reciprocate (來而不往非禮也).” As a proverb goes, no 
discord, no concord; maybe our counterstrike on one occasion could stabilize the border and promise to 
achieve a peaceful solution of the border issues. But our counterstrike will be merely a warning and 
punishment in nature that only informs Nehru and the Indian government that it is not allowed to settle the 
border issue by military measures.414 
After his conclusion, Mao asked Zhang Guohua, the commander of the Tibet Military Region, to 
assess the probability of winning the war. Zhang gave a positive answer. Then, Mao made an 
additional remark: 
Maybe we cannot win [the war]. [If so, then] we will have nothing to say. When we cannot defeat [our 
opponent], we shouldn’t blame everyone and everything except ourselves, all we can blame is our inability [to 
win the war]. The worst result will be nothing but to allow India to occupy our Tibet. But Tibet is China’s 
sacred territory…that will never be changed. Someday, we will take it back.415 
Mao again showed the train of thought that it was not China’s responsibility but the behavior of 
India, which kept rejecting China’s efforts at peaceful resolution and redoubling its efforts to 
seize Chinese territories, that forced China to choose war. China, in Mao’s words, had made 
every effort to seek a peaceful resolution, but all of its efforts had encountered deadlock because 
of the Indian government’s hard-line policy. The purpose of the war, as Mao reasoned, was to 
stabilize the border and to create favorable conditions for negotiation. But Mao immediately 
entangled these just causes with the logic of punishment by saying that the war should be a 
warning and a punishment. This entanglement indicates that for Mao the decision for war was 
not only a pragmatic response to India’s military action, but also an act of judgment with China 
possessing a superior moral status to impose punishment upon India.  
In addition to the function of legitimizing the decision, the concept of righteous war may 
have helped Mao to shift his mind-set from the deliberative to the implemental according to the 
records of his moves in October, 1950. His instruction of October 6 marks the start of the shift. It 
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appears that the shift was completed when Mao heard Lei’s report on October 16, because he 
accepted the decision for war. As the conversation indicates, Mao applied ideas similar to the 
concept of righteous war to determine the legitimacy of the decision for war. Mao’s mind-set 
shift occurred simultaneously with his legitimizing the decision for war. Moreover, by agreeing 
with Lei’s analysis, Mao revealed that India’s ceaseless violence, resulting from the 
misperception that China would not strike back in any case, was the most important cause 
leading him to his decision. This suggests that the consideration of stopping the Indian violence 
may have been the catalytic agent in the shifting Mao’s mind-sets. 
 
Zhou Enlai 
During the period of Sino-Indian conflict, Zhou was acting as a significant bridge between 
China and its foreign counterparts. Because of the characteristics of that role, Zhou’s tone tended 
to be prudent, cooperative, and flexible in seeking a peaceful resolution with India. Although 
Zhou remained friendly and flexible to some extent in his communication with the Indians, this 
is not to say that Zhou opposed the decision for war against India; rather Zhou was playing a 
secondary role. In the final stage of decision-making, his endorsement of the use of offensive 
force had a catalytic effect upon other leaders. According to his accounts after the outbreak of 
the Sino-Indian war, Zhou had treated the conflict as a war of self-defense against India’s 
invasion. And compared to Mao, it seems that Zhou tended more to regard it as a war for 
stopping the Indian violence.  
Like Mao, Zhou initially believed that the Sino-Indian border dispute could be solved by 
peaceful means. Zhou thought that the patterns of China’s negotiation with other South and 
Southeast Asian states, especially Burma, could contribute a workable model for resolving the 
Sino-Indian disputes. In his talks with U Nu, Myanmar’s Premier, Zhou said: “We can tell you 
frankly that we can absolutely resolve the Sino-Indian border problems based on the principles 
resolving the Sino-Burmese border issues.”416 For Zhou, the unresolved problem was not any 
lack of Chinese sincerity in negotiating no sound principle but “the Indian government’s dissent 
on those principles.”417 The result of the meetings between Zhou and Nehru in 1960 testified to 
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this view. During the talks, Zhou implicitly proposed a mutual compromise involving a 
“reciprocal acceptance of present realities in both sectors.”418 But the proposal was rejected by 
the Indians. Zhou was very disappointed by the Indian government’s response to his proposal, 
otherwise he would not have held an impromptu press conference to state Beijing’s position just 
before leaving New Delhi. 
Generally speaking, Zhou retained a relatively moderate and flexible tone in dealing with 
the clashes that occurred on the border due to India’s Forward Policy. But even Zhou had his 
bottom line. In July 1962, Zhou seemed to recognize that the Indians would not stop advancing 
voluntarily and that the use of force might be a major option on China’s list. Liu Shaoqi and 
Zhou’s report to Mao offered this same opinion. They reported two options – to expel the Indian 
troops by force or to expel them with any method but force – and Mao chose the latter. By 
October 5, 1962, Zhou had started to favor the option of use of force when he received the report 
indicating that a massive Indian assault would be launched on the McMahon Line, which meant 
the end of the last hope for a peaceful resolution.  
Like Mao’s, Zhou’s attitude toward the Indian actions along the borders became tougher 
and tougher after October 6 when the Indians rejected Beijing’s final proposal for unconditional 
negotiations. On October 8, Zhou notified the Soviet ambassador to China that the Indian 
government might launch a large-scale attack in the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border. 
Zhou stated that the Chinese had always taken a forbearing attitude toward India’s moves; except 
for self-defense, the Chinese never launched an attack or assault and had never fired the first shot 
when the Indians invaded China’s territory and killed and wounded Chinese soldiers. In Zhou’s 
words, China persisted in forbearance even when the Indians pushed too far (bi dao tou shang, 
逼到頭上). Those forbearing attitudes, according to Zhou, led the Indians to believe that they 
could “insult” the Chinese and get away with it. Zhou informed the Soviet ambassador that now 
the Indian government was preparing to attack the Chinese with two brigades; therefore, once the 
Indians launched their attack, the Chinese would resolutely defend themselves.419 Zhou asserted 
that “Nehru will not give up the thought of a Great Indian Empire and the position to invade 
[China].” With regard to China’s response, Zhou said: “Only [when we launch] a counterstrike 
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for self-defense and progressively isolate him can [we] let him withdraw after learning of 
difficulties, or temporarily mitigate [his ambition].”420 Thus, in order to stabilize the situation on 
the border and stop the possible conflict resulting from Nehru’s ambitions, Zhou believed that 
China had to strike against India “in a big fashion”; otherwise “it would not make a significant 
change.”421 In other words, Zhou’s notification suggested that the Chinese had decided to stop 
violence with violence, if the Indians would not stop their violence against the Chinese. 
Zhou’s suggestion at the enlarged politburo conference of October 18 provides another clue 
to explore the application of the CRWT in Zhou’s consideration of the decision for war. Zhou 
first gave an analysis of the situation on the Sino-Indian border. Then, he emphasized that the 
reason why the Chinese troops had not crossed the McMahon Line in the past was that China 
wanted to negotiate with India; but since India had broken the tacit understanding regarding the 
McMahon Line as the actual line of control between China and India, China had no reason to 
constrain itself to observe that understanding. Zhou suggested that all things considered, China 
had no choice but to launch a self-defensive counterstrike.422 
The above records show only that the ideas of the CRWT may have helped Zhou legitimize 
China’s decision to go to war against India. This finding is mainly due to the lack of sources 
providing detailed records of Zhou’s activities before the Sino-Indian War. Yet, Zhou’s remarks 
do show that the identification of just cause occurred when Zhou was making the determination 
for war after India rejected China’s final proposal for negotiation of October 6. But this finding 
is not sufficient to prove the influence of the CRWT on the shift of Zhou’s mind-set. 
 
Other leaders 
During the period of Sino-Indian border disputes, Liu Bocheng, a PLA marshal and one of 
China’s top military leaders, was leading a team analyzing and planning strategy under the CMC. 
His remarks can be taken to represent the viewpoint of this team as well as the CMC. Although 
Liu’s team was in charge of broad work on strategic studies for the nation, it contributed several 
important plans and suggestions about preparation and deployment before the war. Liu’s team 
offered important information and suggestions to Mao for assessing the situation and 
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recommending conduct for dealing with the dispute. Perhaps because of the nature of his mission, 
Liu didn’t express any thought other than pragmatic calculation. However, it can be asserted that 
Liu became aware in May 1962 that war between China and India was a real possibility, and he 
especially instructed the Tibet Military Region to make good preparations. Also, Liu’s 
instruction to the border forces tells us a little about his perspective toward the war with India. 
As he said, “This business is a great matter, directly related to national and military prestige; we 
have to fight well.”423 
The works of Luo Ruiqing can also be taken to represent opinions from the General Staff. 
After learning of the Indian moves in the western sector, Luo ordered Lei Yingfu to investigate 
the situation:  
You go to have a look, [to see] if the Indian nibbling operation will stop or not. If it will not stop, [then] what 
shall we do? When the necessary time for fighting comes, [we] have to fight…the department of operations is 
not the department of concessions, we have to prepare well. But before Chairman Mao makes his decision, 
[we] will not allow any shot to be fired, without exception. If the Center prepares to launch a counterstrike, 
and we are not ready, then we will all be guilty of [hurting] our nation.424 
After Mao made his decision on October 18, Luo drafted a telegram to the border forces with the 
same tone as Liu Bocheng’s words: “This operation is related to national and military prestige. 
You must win the first battle, you have to fight well, and are not allowed to fight poorly.”425 Like 
Liu, Luo had noticed that the possibility of conflict between China and India had become more 
and more real. Although Luo’s instruction seems hawkish, as a soldier he did not join in the 
decision-making but only acted as a well-prepared executor of orders from above.  
Overall, both generals’ statements illustrate that the ideas of the CRWT played little part in 
influencing the military leaders’ attitude toward the decision to go to war against the Indians. 
This may have resulted from the positions Liu and Luo held at that time, which required them to 
pay more attention to the task itself rather than the political consideration of the decision.  
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Analysis of the People’s Daily 
There are a total of 203 days of reporting to be observed in the case of the Sino-Indian War 
in 1962. The period starts from April 1 and lasts until October 20 when the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) launched its counterstrike against the Indian troops. Selecting April 1, 1962, as the 
starting day of observation is arbitrary. But it is a reasonable option, because it was late in March 
and early in April when the Chinese government came to recognize the Indian government’s 
insistence on implementing its Forward Policy in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. I 
focus on the reports about Indian actions along the Sino-Indian border in the People’s Daily as 
the objects to be observed. There are a total of 69 instances in this period when Chinese officials 
issued moral condemnations of India. The average daily rate is 0.339, which ranks last in the 
frequency of use of moral condemnation among the five cases.  
September 8, 1962, is the date set for the watershed dividing the period of observation in the 
case of the Sino-Indian War. The Chinese government responded to the Indian government’s 
military action in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border with restraint until September 8 
when Beijing learned that the Indian troops had advanced at Che Dong, an area north of the 
McMahon Line – the actual line of control for both sides. To the Chinese, the presence of an 
Indian force at Che Dong meant an invasion of China. In this analysis, the daily averages for the 
two sub-periods are 0.149 and 1.071 respectively.  
The second analysis shows that the Chinese government evidently increased its morality-
based condemnation of India after September 8, 1962. This variation is congruent with my 
assumption that an increased frequency of morality-based condemnation will occur in a case 
with the result of a decision for war. This finding suggests that the Chinese government was 
attempting to showcase the legitimacy of its decision by highlighting the moral inferiority of the 
Indians. 
 
Conclusion 
My assumption about the influence of the CRWT is rather moderately supported by the 
evidence resulting from this case. According to the statements and comments made by the PRC 
leaders, Mao was the most noticeable leader applying the ideas of righteous war to legitimize his 
decision for war against the Indians. Mao not only legitimized his decision by pointing to the 
justifications of self-defense and stopping violence, but also assigned a status of moral inferiority 
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to the Indian behavior. In addition, the CRWT may also have functioned as an intervening factor 
triggering the shift of Mao’s mind-sets. Compared to the records with regard to Mao, those for 
Zhou suggest that the ideas of righteous war functioned mostly as a frame of reference to 
legitimize the decision to go to war. Additionally, the findings from the generals indicate that the 
issue of morality or righteousness was not a part of their thinking about the decision for war. 
While the remarks of the leaders do not provide an especially compelling result, the 
analysis of the People’s Daily supports my assumption about the Chinese government’s use of 
morality-based condemnation. The frequency of Beijing’s morality-based condemnation 
evidently increased after the Chinese learned of the Indian troops advancing at Che Dong. 
China’s leaders also expressed their concerns about righteous causes when they were pondering 
the decision to attack the Indians. This suggests that the use of morality-based condemnation was 
more than a  “moral cloak” in this case. This result agrees with my hypothesis that a Chinese 
decision for war is likely to occur when China attempts to manifest the legitimacy of its use of 
force by highlighting the moral inferiority of its opponents. 
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Chapter 6 - China’s Response to U.S. Escalation in Vietnam, 1964-
1965 
In the Vietnam War, as did in the Korean War, the PRC offered assistance to a neighbor to 
defend against attacks from a foreign state. Considered in light of the CRWT, the Chinese used 
the same righteousness-based justification in both the Vietnam War and the Korean War, namely 
helping a weak state to resist a strong state’s invasion. The Chinese offered a considerable 
quantity of material and a large number of “volunteer” units to their Vietnamese ally, especially 
between 1964 and 1969.426 Chinese engineering units constructed and maintained numerous 
traffic routes and airfields in North Vietnam, and Chinese antiaircraft artillery units shouldered 
the chief responsibility for defending sensitive areas in the northern part of Vietnam.427 However, 
the Chinese did not enter the war, as they did in the Korean War, by sending a large number of 
combat troops to help their Vietnamese comrades fight against the U.S. troops deployed in South 
Vietnam. This case offers a good clue to explore how the Chinese could respond differently 
when the righteous cause for war is the same. The clue lies in the period between late 1964 and 
early 1965 when the United States escalated the war and China’s leaders made the decision to aid 
their Vietnamese ally. 
 
Historical Background, 1964-1965 
The turning point in the escalation during the Vietnam War was between August 1964 and 
early 1965, when President Johnson made a series of decisions to increase the U.S. military 
commitment to South Vietnam. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident between August 2 and 4, 1964, 
President Johnson requested a Congressional resolution that gave him authority to expand 
military measures to support the defense of South Vietnam.428  Meanwhile, President Johnson 
ordered a retaliatory air strike, Operation Pierce Arrow, against North Vietnam on August 5. The 
U.S. Congress passed the resolution Johnson requested, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, on 
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August 7, giving him broad authority to carry out all necessary measures to repel any armed 
attack against American forces and to prevent further aggression in Southeast Asia.429  
The development of the conflict in Vietnam had been a focus of Beijing’s foreign policy 
before the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Between 1954 and 1963 Beijing was closely involved in 
Hanoi’s policy against foreign intervention and offered considerable military and economic aid 
to its Vietnamese comrades.430 According to Qiang Zhai’s research, in 1965 Beijing seems to 
have made an agreement with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) that the Chinese 
government would send combat troops to shoulder the duty of defending North Vietnam if U.S. 
ground troops crossed the 17th parallel.431 During the first half of 1964, Beijing and Hanoi held 
several meetings to discuss and plot strategies to deal with the developing situation. By the end 
of July 1964, Beijing decided to offer to cooperate closely with Hanoi to fight against an even 
greater U.S. intervention.432 
The Gulf of Tonkin incident led the Chinese government to become more actively involved 
in North Vietnamese strategy-making and to prepare for war on the southern borders of China. 
On August 8th, Zhou Enlai and Luo Ruiqing cabled Ho Chi Minh, Pham Van Dong, and Van 
Tien Dung to recommend that they “investigate and clarify the situation, discuss and formulate 
proper strategies and policies, and be ready to take action.”433 That same night, the PLA General 
Staff asked the PLA Air Force and Navy to enter readiness posture and decided to reinforce the 
air defenses in the areas of Guangxi, Yunnan, and Hainan Island.434 When Le Duan secretly 
visited Mao in Beijing on 13 August, Mao expressed his opinion about the probability of 
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escalation. Mao thought that neither Beijing and Hanoi nor Washington wanted to fight a war at 
that time; thus it was unlikely that there would be a war. When Le Duan’s colleagues said that 
the U.S. was making noise about a possible future attack on North Vietnam, Mao guaranteed that 
Beijing would support Hanoi and make it public, if North Vietnam were under U.S. attack.435 
Another secret meeting between Mao and high-ranking North Vietnamese officials was held in 
Beijing on October 5th. At this meeting, Mao advised his Vietnamese comrades that the 
deployment of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam should be carefully planned in order 
to avoid provoking the U.S. to expand the scale of conflict. In case the scenario of the movement 
of U.S. ground troops into North Vietnam happened, Mao suggested that Hanoi should construct 
defensive works along the coast and then preserve their main force by avoiding a direct 
confrontation with the Americans.436        
Early 1965 witnessed a major escalation of the conflict in Vietnam when the U.S. launched 
Operation Flaming Dart and Operation Rolling Thunder to retaliate for North Vietnamese 
military actions crossing the 17th Parallel into South Vietnam. On March 8, the landing of two 
battalions of U.S. Marines at Danang deepened Beijing’s concern about whether the U.S. 
intended to conduct a massive ground invasion into North Vietnam. Liu Shaoqi, the President of 
the PRC, guaranteed the DRV in a meeting on April 8 that the Chinese government would do its 
best to support Hanoi with whatever it needed.437 Although Beijing was willing to offer any kind 
of support to Hanoi, both the Chinese and Vietnamese agreed that China should avoid engaging 
in a direct confrontation with the U.S. at that time.438  
In addition to offering its support, the Chinese government started to deliver a series of 
signals expressing Beijing’s standpoint and attempting to warn the U.S. not to escalate the war in 
North Vietnam. On March 25, Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of the PRC, announced that the 
Chinese people were ready and, if necessary, they would send their “personnel to fight together 
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with the Vietnamese people to annihilate the American aggressors.”439 Zhou Enlai expressed 
similar assurances during his visit to Albania.440 Beijing’s most carefully crafted signal since the 
escalation of the U.S intervention was revealed during Zhou’s trip to Pakistan, where he had a 
private conversation with Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan. Zhou attempted to convey to 
Washington, through Ayub Khan, Beijing’s four principles for handling the Vietnam conflict. 
Ayub Khan was supposed to visit the U.S. later that month.441 However, his trip to the U.S. was 
postponed by President Johnson in mid-April. This postponement led Johnson unwittingly to 
lose the opportunity to receive a firsthand message revealing Beijing’s intentions in Vietnam.442 
Doubtful that the message would be conveyed, and given the signs of the imminent escalation of 
war in Vietnam, Beijing decided to utilize other channels to deliver its message to 
Washington.443 Zhou expressed the same message in his speech of April 20 and in his talks with 
Subandrio, the Indonesian foreign minister, on May 28.444 None of those channels accomplished 
a successful communication with Washington. 
When Beijing recognized that those channels were failing to work effectively, the Chinese 
government decided to use an unusual channel, the British, to convey its message to the U.S. On 
May 31, Donald Hopson, British chargé d'affaires in Beijing, was received by Chen Yi, who 
attempted to deliver Beijing’s four-point message during their meeting. After the conversation, 
the message was reported to London by Hopson and then passed to Washington through the 
British diplomatic system. On June 7, Hopson told the Chinese that Beijing’s message had been 
conveyed to Washington. After learning that their message had reached Washington, China’s 
leaders gradually became more confident that the risk of a direct confrontation between China 
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and the U.S. had been reduced.445  The successful delivery of Beijing’s four principles for 
handling the Vietnam conflict not only led the Americans to discern the Chinese intentions in 
Vietnam, but also helped reassure the Chinese that there was little danger of a direct Sino-
American confrontation in which China might be attacked by the U.S. 
In addition to communication with the U.S., the North Vietnamese plan for using Chinese 
support was another factor that prevented Beijing from engaging in a Korean War-style conflict 
in Vietnam. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the Chinese government guaranteed its 
Vietnamese comrades that China would offer full support, including the dispatch of combat units 
to Vietnam, if it were requested. The agreement concerning Chinese support to North Vietnam, 
after several high-level contacts between Beijing and Hanoi, was achieved in a meeting in early 
June 1965. According to the discussion, the Vietnamese proposed that, “if the war remained in 
its current conditions, the DRV would fight the war by itself and China would provide various 
kinds of support as the North Vietnamese needed”; “if the United States used its navy and air 
force to support a South Vietnamese attack on the north, China would also provide naval and air 
force support to the DRV”; and “if U.S. ground forces were directly used to attack the north, 
China would use its land forces as strategic reserves for the DRV and conduct military 
operations whenever necessary.” 446  With the regard to a possible coordinated plan for the 
deployment of the Chinese land force, Hanoi suggested two options — that the Chinese troops 
either help to strengthen the North Vietnamese defensive position in order to create conditions 
for a counteroffensive, or launch an offensive to disrupt the enemy’s deployment and gain the 
strategic initiative.447 Luo Ruiqing, the Chinese representative at the meeting, concluded that “we 
are already prepared, [the decision] is up to you, whenever you want us to go [there], we will go 
[by your decision]…the power of command is yours, we only dispatch personnel to offer 
support.”448 The Chinese attitude was clear that it was completely up to Hanoi whether the 
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Chinese should engage in a Korean War-style intervention in Vietnam or not. At no point during 
the Vietnam War did Hanoi ever ask Beijing to provide such support for launching an offensive 
against the U.S. troops in Vietnam. Perhaps, this is because the survival of North Vietnam was 
never threatened by a massive U.S. ground invasion.449 Another consideration is that the leaders 
of DRV, who worried about the expansion of Chinese influence in their territory, were reluctant 
to let the Chinese become deeply involved in the conflict.450  
 
Analysis of Leaders 
Mao Zedong 
China was encountering an unfavorable international environment in the mid-1960s. On the 
east side of China, Taiwan and the United States had engaged in a prolonged confrontation with 
Beijing since the outbreak of Korean War; the worsening of the Sino-Soviet split imposed a 
threat from the north; and there was no sign in the south to show the tension between China and 
India was receding, despite the fact that the Sino-Indian war had ended several years before. 
These situations plus the newly emerging situation in Vietnam, where the U.S. intention to 
intervene was becoming clearer and clearer, drove Mao to pay more attention to the issues of 
China’s security and preparation for war.451 The greatest concern for Mao was the possibility of a 
major war and China’s preparedness for it. He said: “Things in this world always turn out this 
way, when you are ill-prepared, the enemy comes; and when you are prepared, on the contrary 
the enemy does not dare to come.”452 The concern about the possibility of a major war didn’t 
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alter Mao’s support for North Vietnam against the U.S. On June 23, 1964, when Mao received a 
group of Chilean journalists, he said:  
China wants peace. Whoever supports peace, we will agree with. We don’t agree with having a war. But those 
wars of oppressed people fighting against imperialists we will support…As for the war of the South 
Vietnamese people fighting against the American imperialists, we will also support it.453 
This remark was not the first time Mao expressed support for his Vietnamese comrades in their 
fight against the U.S. His expressions of this sort can probably be traced back to 1963, when 
Beijing and Hanoi had achieved a preliminary agreement about the conditions for China to 
intervene in the Vietnam conflict. According to research by Chinese scholars, by 1963 the high-
ranking leaders of both parties had reached a consensus that, if the U.S. invaded North Vietnam, 
China would dispatch its forces to execute a coordinated military action with the North 
Vietnamese forces to fight against the invasion.454 Although there is no evidence showing that 
Mao had personally participated in the early discussions, taking the operation of the PRC’s 
power structure into account, he certainly would have known and approved of the consensus 
achieved by both parties.   
Mao expressed his support again right before the Gulf of Tonkin incident, when the signs of 
the U.S. expanding its intervention in Vietnam became more and more obvious. On June 24, 
1964, when Mao received General Van Tien Dung, he said: “If the United States risks taking the 
war to North Vietnam, Chinese troops should cross the border [to enter the war].” Mao further 
suggested that “It is better for our troops to be [called] volunteers.”455 Mao also encouraged his 
Vietnamese comrades not to be afraid of the U.S. intention to expand the scale of its intervention. 
Mao said “The more you fear the Americans, the more they will bully you…You should not fear, 
you should fight…In my opinion, the less you fear [the Americans], the less they will dare to 
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bully you.”456 Mao’s tone was indeed belligerent, but he didn’t forget to reassure the Vietnamese, 
who were uneasy about the escalation of the conflict, by saying: 
Our two parties and two countries must cooperate and fight the enemy together. Your business is my business 
and my business is your business. In other words, our two sides must deal with the enemy together without 
condition.457  
A clearer expression of the conditions for China’s use of force in the coming conflict appeared 
on July 27 when Mao received Tran Tu Bihn, the DRV ambassador to China. During their 
conversation, Mao said:  
Don’t be afraid of the U.S. intervention, it is no more than another “Korean War.” Chinese troops are ready; if 
the U.S. takes a risk to attack North Vietnam, Chinese troops will move over there. Our troops have wanted to 
go to war. The Americans need to think that Chinese are not without legs. The Americans can dispatch their 
troops. Cannot Chinese also dispatch our troops? From our country to your country, we take one step and are 
already there.458 
These records show that before the Gulf of Tonkin incident Mao had assured his support for 
dispatching Chinese troops to Vietnam if they were needed. Especially in his remark of July 27, 
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1964, Mao defined the situation that would trigger a Chinese intervention in the Vietnam conflict 
as a U.S. attack on North Vietnam.   
August 13, 1964, was the first time Mao expressed his thoughts about the U.S. escalation in 
Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. In his talks with Le Duan, Mao asserted:  
It seems that the Americans do not want to fight a war, you do not want to fight a war, and we do not 
necessarily want to fight a war. As none of the three sides wants to fight a war, the war will not happen.459  
When Le Duan said that the U.S. was making “noise” about escalating the war, Mao replied, “if 
the United States attacks the North, they will have to remember that the Chinese also have legs, 
and legs are used for walking.” He further proposed that China would openly redeploy its air and 
land forces to the south of China in order to respond to the U.S. threats.460  
These remarks appear to confirm that Mao’s premise for Chinese intervention was more 
influenced by pragmatic calculation at this stage. His purpose in uttering this expression may 
explain why the element of righteous judgment is lacking, as it served mainly for reassuring the 
North Vietnamese leaders of China’s commitment. Additionally, Mao’s perception of the 
likelihood of a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam, presented in his talks with Le Duan on August 
13, suggests that the need to assess the decision for war was not pressing at that time.  
However, Mao’s public announcements in September of 1964 appeared in a different 
formulation with strong judgmental language condemning the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. In 
his congratulatory telegram on the 19th Anniversary of the Founding of the DRV on September 1, 
1964, Mao wrote:  
Recently, the American imperialists have launched a military action invading the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, which is a premeditated provocation expanding the scale of war in Indochina. Since the American 
imperialists adopted the step to expand the war in Indochina, neither should they expect the DRV to surrender 
its right of action to fight against invasion, nor should they expect all of the peace-loving countries and people 
to abandon their support for the DRV’s right of action to fight against invasion. The American imperialists 
have to answer for the serious crime that they committed in invading the DRV. The debt of blood they owe to 
the Vietnamese people needs to be paid…. Justice (正義) is totally on the side of the DRV. The Vietnamese 
self-defensive military struggle against the U.S. and the sanguinary rule of its running dog will win the final 
victory…China and Vietnam are close neighbors, which have a supportive relationship as between lips and 
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teeth, and stand together in times of need. The Chinese people greatly appreciate the increasing consolidation 
and development of great unity and militant friendship between China and Vietnam (DRV).461 
This public speech was also the first time Mao identified the moral standing of the U.S., whose 
acts were described as a “serious crime.” Although Mao proclaimed that justice was on the side 
of North Vietnam, he did not go on to declare that China also possessed the moral authority to 
intervene in the conflict if necessary. Moreover, Mao’s commitment to intervention was also 
vague in this speech. This may be a result of Mao’s intention to limit the scope of conflict, as he 
divulged in his conversation with Pham Van Dong on October 5.  
In that conversation, Mao began:  
According to Comrade Le Duan, you had the plan to dispatch a division [to the South]. Probably you have not 
dispatched that division yet. When should you dispatch it, the timing is important. Whether or not the United 
States will attack the North, it has not yet made the decision. Now, it [the U.S.] is not even in a position to 
resolve the problem in South Vietnam. If it attacks the North, [it may need to] fight for one hundred years, and 
its legs will be trapped there. Therefore, it needs to consider carefully. The Americans have made all kinds of 
scary statements. They claim that they will run after [you], and will chase into your country, and that they will 
attack our air force. In my opinion, the meaning of these words is that they do not want us to fight a big war, 
and that [they do not want] our air force to attack their warships. If [we] do not attack their warships, they will 
not run after you. Isn’t this what they mean? The Americans have something to hide. 462 
Pham Van Dong agreed, saying: 
This is also our thinking. The United States is facing many difficulties, and it is not easy for it to expand the 
war. Therefore, our consideration is that we should try to restrict the war in South Vietnam to the sphere of 
special war, and should try to defeat the enemy within the sphere of special war. We should try our best not to 
let the U.S. imperialists turn the war in South Vietnam into a limited war, and try our best not to let the war be 
expanded to North Vietnam. We must adopt a very skillful strategy, and should not provoke it [the U.S.]. Our 
Politburo has made a decision on this matter, and today I am reporting it to Chairman Mao. We believe that 
this is workable.463 
Right after learning of the Vietnamese plan and concerns, Mao answered: “Yes.” Then, they 
continued to discuss the scenario of a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam. Mao proposed a strategy 
of protracted war to his Vietnamese comrades for dealing with that situation: 
If the Americans dare to take the risk to bring the war to the North, how should the invasion be dealt with? I 
have discussed this issue with Comrade Le Duan. [First], of course, it is necessary to construct defensive 
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works along the coast. The best way is to construct defensive works like the ones [we had constructed] during 
the Korean War, so that you may prevent the enemy from entering the inner land. Second, however, if the 
Americans are determined to invade the inner land, you may allow them to do so. You should pay attention to 
your strategy. You must not engage your main force in a head-to-head confrontation with them, and must well 
maintain your main force. My opinion is that so long as the green mountain is there, how can you ever lack 
firewood? 464 
This conversation implies three main elements of Mao’s thinking about the Vietnam conflict and 
U.S. intentions at that time. First, Mao regarded the chance of a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam 
as still small, even though it could not entirely be ignored. Second, Mao agreed that the scope of 
war should be limited to South Vietnam by using a skillful strategy without provoking the U.S. 
This thought was not enunciated by Mao himself, but he did express agreement with it. Third, 
Mao seemed to prefer that a Korean War-style Chinese intervention should be the last option to 
be considered. This does not mean that Mao had completely abandoned his commitment to 
support North Vietnam, but rather it shows that Mao preferred to let Hanoi strive for winning the 
war first. Then, if the North Vietnamese efforts failed, the Chinese could offer a Korean War-
style intervention in response to their call for help, especially in the event they encountered a 
massive U.S. invasion of North Vietnam.  
A clearer identification of the legitimacy of China’s decision to go to war was not seen until 
January 9, 1965, when Mao received Edgar Snow, a Kansas City-born American journalist who 
had long enjoyed a good relationship with the Chinese communists. In their conversation, Snow 
broached the issue of China’s attitude toward the Vietnam conflict by mentioning his assumption 
that a Sino-American major war was unlikely to occur. Mao agreed with Snow, and further 
emphasized that China would not cross the line to attack the U.S. Following up, Snow observed 
that the U.S. was often saying that the war in South Vietnam would be expanded to the north; but 
Mao seemed to doubt that it would do so, mentioning that Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary of State, 
had denied that the U.S. had any such intention. Then, Snow mentioned that the U.S. government 
didn’t understand what the Chinese, especially Mao Zedong, thought of the Vietnam War. Mao 
replied:  
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How come [they] don’t understand? We will not go [outside our border] to fight (打出去). Only if the United 
States came and attacked465 (打進來) would we fight. This point can be proved by history. Our country’s 
hands are full for dealing with our own business. It is a crime to go [beyond the border] to fight, why shall we 
go [outside the border] to fight? South Vietnam simply does not need us to go there, they can handle the 
situation by themselves.   
Snow also asked Mao’s opinion about the U.S. proposal that China and North Vietnam give up 
the policy of aggression in Southeast Asia in exchange for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. Mao 
answered:  
We have no such policy of aggression to abandon; we do not engage in an invasion. But China supports 
revolution, cannot help but to [do so]. Wherever revolution occurs, we will announce our statements and 
gather some rallies to support [the revolution]. What the imperialists dislike is that [sort of action]. We like to 
have empty talk, shoot blanks, but will that not dispatch forces. Shooting blanks, is it called aggression? For 
those who dispatch forces, on the contrary, will it not be called aggression?466  
This conversation suggests that the issue of morality seemed to help Mao to identify premises 
legitimizing Chinese intervention in the conflict. Mao clearly indicated that in any case China 
would commit a crime if it sent its troops outside Chinese territory to attack its opponents – 
unless those opponents attacked first. China had no reason to commit such a crime. In other 
words, Mao may have believed that the use of force outside Chinese territory was morally 
prohibited behavior. But, in the case of the conflict in Vietnam, Mao further stated that a U.S. 
attack would give China the legitimacy to intervene in the conflict without it being regarded as a 
crime. This logic suggests that Mao may have applied a frame of reference based on the 
consideration of morality to distinguish what was the right decision for China to make in dealing 
with the conflict in Vietnam. However, Mao’s location of the trigger for Chinese intervention 
was vague since he did not specifically indicate whether China could legitimately use force if 
North Vietnam, China, or both were attacked by the U.S. In other words, both the justification of 
self-defense and that of helping a weak state against a strong state’s invasion could be regarded 
as the righteous causes. In addition, Mao’s complaint about an international environment in 
which U.S. military actions in Vietnam would not be denounced as aggression while China’s 
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possible intervention would be implies that Mao regarded the U.S. moves in Vietnam as 
improper behavior. 
Another clue indicating how Mao could legitimize China’s use of force in Vietnam can be 
found in a draft of the instruction to prepare for war sent to Mao by the Central Committee of the 
CCP on April 10, 1965. It is worth noting that this report was produced after the Johnson 
administration launched Operation Rolling Thunder. This draft reveals a firmer position of the 
Chinese government regarding possible intervention in Vietnam, stating: 
1. The American imperialists are adopting steps to expand the war in Vietnam, which directly violates (侵犯) 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and severely threatens our nation’s security. We have manifested again 
our serious standpoint to the world: We will never put this matter aside, we will prepare to join the 
Vietnamese combat at any time. We also need to prepare for handling [a situation in which] the Americans 
bring the flames of war to our territory….3. The American imperialists are a paper tiger. It [American 
imperialists] is crazily expanding the war in Vietnam, [and this action] is not a display of its strength, but a 
display of its weakness….The American imperialists want to further expand the war, [but] its [American 
imperialists’] fatal defect is, [that] it [American imperialists] is engaging in an unjust (非正義的), reactionary, 
and aggressive war….5. Now, the Vietnamese people bravely shoulder the burden of fighting against the 
American imperialists…we shall also carry forward the spirit blended with patriotism and internationalism, do 
our utmost to Aid Vietnamese and Resist America, resolutely support the South Vietnamese liberation 
movement, resolutely support the Vietnamese just struggle (正義鬥爭) fighting against the American invasion 
and for the unification of [their] motherland. Whatever the Vietnamese need us to support, we will offer 
whatever they need.467 
Mao approved this draft to be circulated among the party committees above county and 
regimental levels on April 13. Mao’s approval suggests that he agreed with the contents of this 
instruction, especially the conditions giving legitimacy to China’s possible intervention. In this 
instruction, the Chinese recognition of the legitimacy of their intervention in Vietnam was 
straightforward. The Chinese explained that they would not ignore any situation in which the U.S. 
expanded the war against North Vietnam or attacked China. Thus, the Chinese should be ready 
to deal with these situations, and especially for the possibility of joining the combat with their 
Vietnamese comrades. Although the situation in Vietnam in 1965 was not as urgent as in Korea 
in 1950, the Chinese still implied that a Korean War-style intervention would be possible if the 
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DRV requested it. To be sure, the Chinese did not specifically state that such an intervention 
would be a just action saving the DRV from ruin, as they had announced with regard to North 
Korea in the Korean War. Nevertheless, their emphasis on the North Vietnamese “struggle” 
against U.S. invasion as “just” implies that a Korean War-style intervention would also be just. 
Moreover, the Chinese straightforwardly defined a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam as an unjust, 
reactionary, and aggressive war. Indeed, this statement reflects the influence of communist 
ideology through use of the word “reactionary.” At the same time, it also shows that the Chinese 
attempted to distinguish the status of North Vietnam and China from that of the U.S., which was 
identified as occupying a position of moral inferiority.  
However, in the second half of 1965, identification of the legitimacy of Chinese 
intervention was again missing from Mao’s comments about the situation in Vietnam. For 
example, in his conversation with Hoang Van Hoan on July 16, 1965, Mao explained his strategy 
for the struggle: 
…At first, our motto was mainly for the political struggle and the military struggle was secondary. Later, the 
political and military struggles became equal. And then the military struggle will be the main [part], the 
political struggle will be supportive to the military one. So, we are also escalating step by step. At first, we 
destroy a platoon, and then a company. Then we annihilate a battalion, and a regiment or two…We should 
escalate and we should know how to escalate step by step.468 
And on October 20, 1965, when Mao received a delegation from the DRV, he said: 
You fought well in your war, you fought well in both North and South [Vietnam]…Actually, what can resolve 
problems is still relying on your fighting, and of course negotiations…what kinds of issues you discussed with 
the Americans I have not noticed yet. I only pay attention to how to fight with the Americans, and how to 
expel the Americans [from Vietnam]. [You] can negotiate when a certain time comes, but [you] cannot always 
lower your tone, must raise the tone higher. Be prepared that the enemy will cheat you.469 
Both conversations indicate that Mao paid more attention to the strategic and tactical issues of 
the North Vietnamese conduct of the war than to the righteousness of Chinese intervention. 
The development of the conflict in June, 1965, may explain why Mao focused more on the 
practical issues of the North Vietnamese struggle with the U.S. As mentioned earlier, Beijing 
successfully sent its message about China’s intention and possible response to Washington 
through the British diplomatic system early that same month. According to Hershberg and Chen, 
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this move not only enabled the Americans to understand Chinese intentions, but also convinced 
the Chinese that the danger of a direct Sino-American confrontation had been reduced.470 
Therefore, this development may have led Mao to focus more on the North Vietnamese strategy 
for the struggle rather than on the assessment of China’s decision to go to war, which was not 
urgent as it had been in the late 1964 and early 1965.  
 
Zhou Enlai 
According to Chinese official records, Zhou participated in at least several discussions 
about the developing situation in Indochina with either the relevant Chinese bureaucrats or the 
DRV leadership in June and July 1964. Among these discussions, only the record of Zhou’s trip 
to Hanoi is partially available. Zhou’s objective was to lead a Chinese delegation to participate in 
a four-day meeting, between July 5 and 8, 1964, to discuss the situation of Vietnam and the 
Pathet Lao with both the DRV and the Pathet Lao leaders in Hanoi.471 In his analysis of the 
situation in Indochina, Zhou considered that the Americans would not cease their invasion of 
Southeast Asia. That, he said, would lead to one of two possible outcomes: either the U.S. would 
reinforce its “special warfare,” or it would expand it to a local war in which the U.S. would send 
troops from South Vietnam and Laos to bomb or invade North Vietnam. No matter which 
scenario the U.S. carried out, the Chinese people would definitely support the Southeast Asian 
people’s struggle. Zhou suggested that the communist parties in Southeast Asia should prepare to 
engage in a prolonged struggle by adopting a two-handed strategy, politically insisting on the 
Geneva Accords in order to expose the U.S. intention to break them and military strengthening 
preparations for engaging in a prolonged war. Regarding the conditions for China’s intervention, 
Zhou said that the guiding principles for the struggle were to do everything possible to contain 
the war within its current scope, while preparing to cope with the second possibility whose 
guiding principle was “the U.S. moves a step, then China moves; the U.S. sends its force, then 
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China sends its force.”472 These analyses and suggestions indicate that before the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident Zhou had been aware of the chance of escalation of the Vietnam conflict, and he 
understood that Chinese intervention would depend on U.S. actions. But Zhou did not clarify 
what sort of force China would send. 
The Gulf of Tonkin incident seemed immediately to trigger Zhou’s identification of 
legitimate grounds for intervening in the conflict. On August 5, 1964, when he received the 
Cambodian ambassador, Zhou said: 
The Department of Defense of the United States has announced [that they will] bomb the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam in order to make reprisals and expand the flames of war on the groundless excuse of so-
called “fact.” It is absolutely unallowable to unscrupulously (肆無忌憚地) carry out such a continued 
provocation (挑釁) upon a sovereign state. For this, we have to answer…to preserve the peace of Southeast 
Asia and Indochina are both our most pressing affairs and tasks.473  
In his talk with Elisabeth Comber, a Chinese-born Eurasian author, on September 10, 1964, Zhou 
mentioned:  
Once the United States invades North Vietnam, we will be forced to recognize that [invasion] as a threat to us. 
We of course will offer the Vietnamese whatever they need to engage in a just war (正義戰爭) fighting for 
liberation. We firmly believe that the Vietnamese people can fully rely on their own power to liberate their 
own land. But we will regard the American troops invading North Vietnam as a hostile act toward China; we 
are also fully prepared for this.474  
On November 24, Zhou dispatched a telegram expressing support for North Vietnam, stating that 
“the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is a brother neighbor closely related to China, and the 
Chinese people have a brotherhood with the people in Indochina as close as flesh and blood, and 
will absolutely not watch our neighbors being invaded.”475 On December 16, when he was 
interviewed by Edgar Snow, Zhou made another claim stating Beijing’s position that if the U.S. 
engaged in lawless activities in the area of Indochina, China could not sit idly by.476 
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These identifications are straightforward. In Zhou’s words, China would not ignore a 
situation in which a neighbor, specifically North Vietnam, was invaded by the U.S. Thus, China 
would certainly offer support to its neighbor if the scenario occurred. However, Zhou’s 
statements do not provide a detailed context for further understanding the logic of his application 
of those ideas in late 1964. Zhou used “just war” to describe the North Vietnamese struggle 
against the Americans, but he also defined that “just war” as a war for liberation. It seems that 
communist ideology had more influence upon his identification of legitimacy than the CRWT. In 
addition, his recognition of a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam as a threat to China, in his talk with 
Elisabeth Comber, indicates that the calculation of China’s security influenced Zhou’s 
perspective on the conflict. These records can only suggest that Zhou had made an assessment of 
the legitimacy of Chinese intervention by late 1964. 
His identification of the legitimacy of Chinese intervention became clearer when Zhou 
carried out the task of signaling Chinese intentions to the U.S. through different diplomatic 
channels in 1965. During his trip to Algeria in March, Zhou first expressed his opinion on the 
escalation of the Vietnam conflict since Operation Rolling Thunder at a mass meeting on March 
29:  
The Chinese people will resolutely echo the recent announcement issued by the National Front for the 
Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF), and will offer the South Vietnamese all necessary substance, including 
weaponry and every material for war. We also are prepared to dispatch our personnel to fight together with 
the South Vietnamese people when the South Vietnamese people need them.477  
The next day, Zhou expressed his opinion on the U.S. escalation of the Vietnam conflict in a 
private conversation with Ahmed Ben Bella, the President of Algeria. Zhou considered that the 
escalation was a bluff aimed at compelling the DRV and China to engage in negotiations. 
“Unconditional cease-fire,” as the U.S.-proposed precondition for proceeding with negotiations, 
was not only unacceptable to the DRV and China, but it also meant that “South Vietnam would 
once again be enslaved” as a puppet regime of the U.S. Thus, any activities leading to 
negotiations were “unfavorable to the liberation of the people in South Vietnam, if viewed 
objectively.”478  
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On April 2, 1965, Zhou highlighted China’s four principles for dealing with the 
development of the conflict when he met the Pakistani president, Ayub Khan, in Karachi: first, 
“China will not take the initiative to provoke a war against the United States”; second, “China 
means what it says, and China will honor whatever international obligations it has undertaken”; 
third, “China is prepared”; and fourth, “if the United States expands the war to China, it will 
really suffer.”479 Zhou also addressed the issue of war expansion:   
Our position is that even if the war is not expanded to China, still China will support Vietnam, so long as the 
DRV requests it, so long as the NLF in South Vietnam request it…The United States wants to play with fire 
and to take the risk. China hopes to extinguish the fire…The expansion of the war is caused by the United 
States, not initiated by us. Although China has adopted an attitude of restraint, if the United States expands the 
war on this battlefield, the war flame will spread.480  
Zhou’s words made it clear that China would certainly enter the war if the U.S. expanded the 
conflict into Chinese territory. With regard to the scenario of a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam, 
Zhou’s signal suggested that China would undertake a Korean War-style intervention only in 
response to North Vietnam’s request. In other words, these signals were telling Washington that 
China was not eager to confront the U.S. unless its territory was attacked or its allies were calling 
for help because of U.S. invasion.  
On April 12, 1965, when China’s leaders were identifying which scenario would bring 
China into the war, Zhou maintained his earlier position that a U.S. invasion of North Vietnam 
should be the one to do so. Zhou said that China should “gain mastery by striking only after the 
enemy has struck” and “leave some leeway” in coping with the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. He 
also suggested that Beijing should employ the slogan “Aid Vietnam, Resist America” later, 
because the Chinese government was only supporting the Vietnamese, who should be given first 
place in making the decision.481 In the end, the Politburo meeting decided upon all of the above 
strategies in response to the U.S. military activities in Vietnam: first, if the United States invaded 
North Vietnam, China would send troops to its defense; second, China would give warnings – 
some clear, others deliberately ambiguous – to the United States, to deter it from extending its 
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military operations into North Vietnam, let alone China; and third, China would avoid as long as 
possible a direct military confrontation with the United States, but not shrink from one.482  
The idea that China would not attack unless the U.S. invaded North Vietnam or China and 
the Vietnamese called the Chinese for help constituted the main message when Zhou explained 
China’s response and intention in the diplomatic arena during the rest of 1965. On April 27, 
Zhou repeated this message when he talked with Ne Win, the Prime Minister of Burma:  
We [Chinese] are going to gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck, we will not actively 
provoke a war. If the U.S. provokes a war, then we will fight back. Regarding the issue of our volunteers 
supporting the Vietnamese, only when the Vietnamese side has need to request us [to offer help], will we then 
dispatch [our volunteer troops], [otherwise] we will not send out [our troops] on our initiative.483  
But on May 16, in a conversation with a delegation of the NLF, Zhou emphasized that a U.S. 
attack on China’s territory would constitute the precondition triggering a Chinese decision for 
war. Zhou said:  
We will go to Vietnam if Vietnam is in need, as we did in Korea…The war will have no limits if the US 
expands it to Chinese territory. The US can fight an air war. Yet, China also can fight a ground war.484 
Zhou said something similar May 28, when he met Subandrio, the foreign minister of Indonesia, 
at Guangzhou. Zhou said:  
If the United States bombs China, that means bringing the war to China. The war has no boundary. This has 
two meanings: First, you cannot say that only air war on your part is allowed, and land war on my part is not 
allowed. Second, not only may you invade our territory, we may also fight a war abroad [sic].485  
These statements indicate that Zhou’s identification of the legitimacy for Chinese intervention 
includes at least two justifications, self-defense and helping North Vietnam resist a U.S. invasion.  
Again on November 30, in his talk with Jean Chauvel, the representative of the French 
foreign minister, Zhou repeated the same perspective on the Vietnam conflict. Zhou mentioned 
that, “Unless [the Vietnamese] fight until the U.S. admits defeat, it will be impossible to have 
negotiations.” Zhou emphasized the Chinese experience in struggling against the U.S. which led 
to the conclusion that “[according to] the Vietnamese and our experiences, all [of them indicate 
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that] unless the U.S. admits defeat, it will not agree to have negotiations;” thus, in Zhou’s words, 
“the current negotiation proposed by the U.S is a swindle, now there is no chance of having 
negotiations with the U.S.” Additionally, Zhou reiterated the principle of China’s use of force, 
that, “if the U.S. determines to expand the war to China, we will resolutely fight back at any 
cost,” but the Chinese government “will not provoke the U.S. to expand the war.” At the end of 
the talk, Zhou concluded that: 
[In the] Vietnam War [it] is the U.S. [that is] escalating [the level of conflict], the responsibility is on the U.S., 
not on anyone else. We [China and the DRV] are socialist states, and neighbors, we absolutely should not 
only offer spiritual, but also material support to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.486  
Yet, these expressions were still straightforward and revealed very little regarding Zhou’s 
identification of the moral standing of the U.S. The only document showing that Zhou might 
make a judgment on the moral standing of the U.S. was his congratulatory message for the 5th 
anniversary of the NLF on December 20, 1965. In this message, Zhou declared: 
The thing is very clear, the Vietnamese people do not invade the U.S., [but it] is the U.S. that invades Vietnam; 
invading Vietnam is all by the U.S. to impose on the Vietnamese people. Thus, in order to achieve the 
liberation of South Vietnam and then the peaceful unification of Vietnam, it can never be in accordance with 
the enemy’s terms…In a word, the aggressor must withdraw from Vietnam, and it is impossible to have other 
options…The only choice of the Vietnamese people is to fight resolutely, fight ruthlessly, until the American 
aggressor get out of Vietnam…Being a brotherhood-neighbor as close as lips to teeth, the Chinese government 
and 650 million Chinese people resolutely support the Vietnamese people’s just struggle against the U.S…The 
Chinese people are prepared for a long time. If American imperialists insist to keep walking on the path of 
expanding war and contesting with the Chinese people again, the Chinese people will resolutely accept the 
challenge, and have the honor to keep the U.S. company until the end.487 
In this statement, Zhou clearly used the word “aggressor” to imply the moral inferiority of the 
U.S. But it offers no other evidence that Zhou had made a judgment of the moral standing of the 
U.S.  
According to Zhou’s statements, it seems that the justifications of self-defense and helping 
North Vietnam resist the U.S. invasion in response to a Vietnamese call for help provided the 
main frame of reference helping him to legitimize China’s possible intervention in the conflict. 
Although those ideas are similar to the elements of the CRWT, Zhou’s remarks do not present 
strong evidence that his justifications were derived from considerations of morality. In addition 
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to the lack of detailed sources, Zhou’s role as the mouthpiece of the PRC may explain why his 
application of those justifications was straightforward. Since Zhou shouldered the task of 
signaling China’s intentions to the rest of the world, the message could not be so complex as to 
confuse the audience. However, we cannot entirely reject the possibility that Zhou’s statements 
reflected his concern that Chinese intervention required the legitimacy resulting from a righteous 
cause. Zhou’s indefatigable effort to justify the possible Chinese intervention suggests that the 
Chinese government cared about the international opinions toward its military actions. Thus, 
ideas of righteous war may well have functioned as the frame of reference helping Zhou to 
legitimize the possible Chinese intervention.  
 
Other Leaders 
This section focuses on Chen Yi’s remarks about the Vietnam conflict. Chen Yi was the 
foreign minister of the PRC at that time, and his remarks on China’s policy toward Vietnam thus 
represented the Chinese government’s attitude. Moreover, the secret conversation between Chen 
Yi and Donald Hopson was one of the most significant attempts the Chinese government made 
to convey its signals to the U.S. and needs to be examined in detail.  
As the foreign minister of the PRC, Chen Yi had several times expressed Beijing’s intention 
to support North Vietnam and the NLF on diplomatic occasions around the period of the Gulf of 
Tonkin incident. On July 6, 1964, in his letter replying to the DRV’s foreign minister, Chen Yi 
wrote:  
[As to] any invasion of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, [it] cannot be expected [that] China will watch 
with folded arms. The American intervention and invasion of South Vietnam must stop; the American troops 
and military personnel must withdraw from South Vietnam. The internal affairs of South Vietnam can only be 
resolved by the South Vietnamese people themselves.488  
After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Chen Yi explicitly declared that the Chinese would stand with 
their Vietnamese comrades to fight against a U.S. invasion. At a reception receiving an 
Indonesian delegation on August 17, Chen warned that the “American imperialists” must be 
punished, and the Chinese people and Southeast Asian people would have to follow through on 
supporting the Vietnamese struggle against invasion.489 On September 2, at a reception hosted by 
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the DRV ambassador, Tran Tu Bihn, Chen condemned the U.S. for making excuses to launch a 
surprise attack upon the DRV as the first step in expanding the Indochina war; thus, the U.S. 
would have to take the consequence for the flagrant crime it was committing.490 Chen Yi made 
another statement supporting the Vietnamese in a telegram dispatched to the foreign minister of 
the DRV on September 7, which stated that the Chinese government and people absolutely 
agreed with and resolutely supported the righteous ground the DRV possessed to fight against 
American imperialism’s evil plot, and if the U.S. dared to launch a new military assault, China 
would resolutely stand with Vietnam to fight the struggle to the end.491 
Chen Yi gave a clearer explanation of which methods China would use in standing with the 
Vietnamese people after the Johnson administration launched Operation Rolling Thunder. 
During his March trip to Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in 1965, Chen addressed a similar 
message to those leaders who were concerned about the escalation of the Vietnam conflict. Chen 
stated that China’s influence upon the development of the Vietnam conflict might be 
overestimated, because it was entirely up to the Vietnamese to decide whether to fight or achieve 
peace. China’s attitude, in Chen’s opinion, was supporting the Vietnamese to fight against the 
U.S. invasion without preconditions.492 Taking Zhou Enlai’s speech in Algeria at the end of 
March 1965 into account, Chen’s unconditional commitment for supporting the DRV may have 
included the option of dispatching forces at North Vietnam’s request.  
With regard to the conditions under which China would enter the war, Chen made a more 
detailed and precise statement in his conversation with Hopson at the end of May 1965. 
According to Hopson’s report, in addition to expressing the official four principles of China’s 
policy toward intervention, Chen Yi made an attempt to explain the role Beijing played in the 
Vietnam conflict and its link with Hanoi. He refuted the assumption that the continuance of the 
Vietnam conflict was because Beijing manipulated Hanoi’s policy from behind the scenes. Chen 
said:  
Americans, British and some others had an erroneous viewpoint in thinking that the war was being fought 
because of Chinese support. They also thought wrongly that if Chinese brought influence to bear there could 
be peace. If the North Vietnamese wanted peace, “we would support it”; if they wanted to fight on, “we would 
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equally support this”. The point was that the Vietnamese would not necessarily listen if the Chinese 
interfered.493 
Hopson went on to record: “He (Chen Yi) agreed that the Chinese could ask their friendly 
contacts to talk, but whether the Vietnamese listened was up to them.” About the question of 
whether China had the ability or willingness to conciliate the conflict, Chen Yi explained,  
The very existence of the country was at stake, and their hopes for reunification. The Chinese therefore had no 
right to place obstacles in Viet Nam’s [Vietnam’s] path to liberation. It was entirely up to Vietnamese to 
decide. “Whether we help or not, they will still fight.” 
Although Chen Yi’s explanation, stressing that Beijing’s influence upon Hanoi had been 
overestimated by the U.S. and Britain, was questionable, his attempt also indicates that Beijing 
was communicating to Washington its unwillingness to have a direct confrontation with the U.S. 
It didn’t mean that Beijing lacked the will to engage in a war with the U.S.; rather, according to 
Chen Yi’s statement, China would enter the Vietnam War without hesitation if its bottom line 
were violated. Later in this conversation, Chen mentioned:  
China supports Viet Nam [Vietnam] unconditionally. An aggression against Viet Nam is an aggression against 
China. If war is expanded to Chinese territory, China will take part…China is not afraid of the United States 
expansion of war. If America wants to “break down limits” of war Chinese will have right to go to any 
lengths…. We are prepared. Let Johnson escalate if he wants. When he escalates to the level of China then 
we’ll take part.494  
The messages Chen Yi conveyed to Hopson revealed the same justification Zhou Enlai 
expressed on many occasions for China to use force in Vietnam. The clearest condition was that 
if the U.S. expanded the war into Chinese territory, China would use force to strike back. 
Regarding the Vietnamese call for help in the face of American invasion, Chen Yi only gave 
vague formulations that “China supports Viet Nam unconditionally”, and “An aggression against 
Viet Nam is an aggression against China.” Taking China’s four principles into account, Chen Yi 
may also have been implying that a Vietnamese call for help would result in China using Korean 
War-style force in Vietnam if necessary. 
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Much like Zhou’s, Chen’s remarks and statements indicate that a justification similar to 
elements of the CRWT was used by the foreign minister to condition the premise of the possible 
Chinese intervention. Yet Chen described the justification straightforwardly, revealing little in 
the logic for applying the concept of righteous war. Thus, the documentary evidence suggests 
that the ideas of righteous war could have been a frame of reference for Chen to identify the 
legitimacy of China’s decision to enter the war if the U.S. expanded the conflict into North 
Vietnam. 
 
Analysis of the People’s Daily 
The period for press observation in this case consists of the dates between August 3, 1964, 
the day on which the People’s Daily started to report the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and December 
31, 1965. The end date is an arbitrary choice. After June 7, 1965, the probability of a direct 
military confrontation between Beijing and Washington in Vietnam had gradually declined. But 
this did not cause Beijing to stop supporting Hanoi. Hence, I selected December 31, 1965 as the 
end date in order to present a more complete picture of Chinese media pronouncements during 
1964 and 1965. The data collected in this case comes from published condemnations of U.S. 
activities in Vietnam. According to the data, a total of 848 instances of moral condemnation 
appeared in the 516 days observed, yielding an average daily rate of 1.643, which is the second 
highest rate among the five cases assessed in this study.  
I take June 7, 1965 as the watershed date for dividing the period of observation. As 
mentioned in the section of historical background, after Operation Rolling Thunder was launched, 
the Chinese government kept warning the American government that if it continued to escalate 
its military involvement, China would do everything necessary, even at the risk of a Korean 
War-type confrontation, to assist North Vietnam in resisting America. Beijing’s signals were not 
be delivered until the Chinese government sought to convey the messages to Washington 
through the British diplomatic channel between late May and early June, 1965. On June 7, the 
British confirmed to the Chinese that the signals had been delivered to Washington. After 
China’s leaders were certain the signals had arrived at Washington, they gradually became more 
confident that the risk of a direct military confrontation between China and the U.S. had been 
reduced. Once this watershed date has been introduced into the analysis, the data results in the 
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daily averages for the period of escalation (August 3, 1964 – June 7, 1965) and the period after 
signaling was established (June 8, 1965 – December 31, 1965) of 1.858 and 1.324 respectively.  
According to these findings, the frequency of morality-based condemnation decreased 
during the period when the Chinese were reassured that the danger of a direct Sino-American 
confrontation had been reduced. This result does not contradict my assumption about the 
application of morality-based condemnation, namely that an increased frequency suggests that a 
decision will be made to go to war. Moreover, the pattern presented in this case implies that a 
decreased frequency of China’s use of morality-based condemnation may suggest a decision not 
to go to war.  
 
Conclusion 
The records of this case show that some of the concepts of the CRWT were invoked by the 
Chinese leaders to legitimize their decision for a possible Chinese intervention in the conflict in 
Vietnam. The identification of legitimacy seemed to help the Chinese leaders to define the 
preconditions that would trigger Chinese intervention in the Vietnam War. The concept of 
righteous war may have assisted the Chinese leaders to identify whether the decision for war was 
the right thing to do. This interpretation can be supported by Mao’s statements regarding the 
conditions triggering the Chinese intervention, especially in his conversation with Edgar Snow. 
In that conversation, Mao pointed out that China’s use of force outside its own territory should 
be regarded as a crime, and only a legitimate cause would remove the stigma of crime. However, 
it should be noted that the currently available evidence cannot further prove that the concept of 
righteous war had a more critical influence on the Chinese decision for possible intervention in 
the conflict. Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi did express ideas similar to those of the CRWT to justify 
and condition the scenario for Chinese intervention, but the relevant documents do not provide 
enough evidence to trace the logic behind their application of those concepts.  
The next question is why the identification of legitimacy did not result in a Chinese decision 
to go to war, which in this case means a substantial commitment to dispatch large numbers of 
Chinese troops into North Vietnam to fight against the U.S. This outcome may have resulted 
from the reality that the U.S. acts in the war had not met the Chinese conditions triggering the 
intervention. Indeed, from the viewpoint of historical study, to answer a “what if” question may 
not be a proper way to understand history. But in this case it would not hurt our understanding of 
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the application of the CRWT to ask how the Chinese would have responded if the U.S. had 
satisfied the conditions the Chinese had set for intervening in the conflict. Both Zhou’s and 
Chen’s statements may answer this question. The Chinese would have carried out a Korean War-
style intervention if either the U.S. had attacked the Chinese territory or their Vietnamese 
comrades had called for help in the face of a massive U.S. invasion of North Vietnam. This 
hypothetical scenario suggests that the Chinese would be likely to enter a war when conditions 
informed by the CRWT had been met.  
The results from the analysis of the People’s Daily also agree with my assumption about 
the application of the concept of righteous war, which is that the Chinese government may 
highlight righteous legitimacy when the decision for war is likely. My inference is supported by 
the result that the Chinese decreased the frequency of morality-based condemnation when they 
had been reassured that the U.S. had received the signal revealing China’s intentions. This 
outcome suggests that the morality-based condemnation used in the People’s Daily was more 
than a “moral cloak.” In other words, the frequency seems to reflect the receding of the 
precondition triggering the influence of the CRWT, namely, the Chinese perception that war was 
imminent. Hence, this result suggests that a lessened emphasis on the legitimacy gained by 
showcasing the moral inferiority of the opponent may occur when the necessity of a decision for 
war has receded. 
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Chapter 7 - The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969 
The Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969 not only marked the end of the Sino-Soviet alliance, 
which had existed in name only since both sides started their political and ideological dispute in 
1960, but also opened the window to the Chinese for the Sino-American rapprochement. The 
direct cause that triggered the outbreak of this conflict was the Sino-Soviet border dispute, in 
which the Chinese government claimed that the Soviets had encroached on China’s territory.495 
During the crisis, China’s leaders considered the danger of a Soviet invasion to be high. These 
facts suggest that the justification of self-defense should have influenced a Chinese decision for 
war. Nevertheless, the Chinese did not decide upon an offensive military operation on a 
considerable scale as in the Sino-Indian War. This case provides a good example for testing the 
limits of the influence of the CRWT. With China’s leaders facing the danger of a massive 
invasion by the U.S.S.R., pragmatism and righteousness pointed toward quite different courses 
of action – with the pragmatic prevailing over the righteous.  
 
Historical Background 
The modern shape of the Sino-Soviet border was mostly decided by the four treaties signed 
between the Qing Dynasty and Czarist Russia in the late 19th century, which were the Treaty of 
Aigun (1858), the Convention of Beijing (1860), the Tacheng Agreement (1864), and the Treaty 
of Ili (1881).496 Those “unequal” treaties not only resulted in a considerable loss of territory for 
China, but also gave rise to Chinese resentment that foreshadowed the outbreak of the Sino-
Soviet border conflict in 1969.  
After the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Soviet government issued a declaration 
repudiating the “unequal” treaties and relinquishing all claims to territories taken away from 
China by the czars and the Russian “bourgeoisie.”497 This declaration gave the Chinese an 
impression that the Soviet Union was willing to give up many territories Czarist Russia had 
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gained in Manchuria and other areas in Asia.498 But the Soviets had second thoughts when the 
subsequent negotiations with the Chinese were proceeding. In 1924, a new agreement between 
the Moscow and Beijing governments was finally concluded. The agreement was supposed to 
achieve a new delimitation of the Sino-Soviet border, but it was never carried out.499  
The subsequent development of Sino-Soviet relations in the early 20th century added further 
complexity to the border issue. In 1929, a conflict between the Republic of China and the Soviet 
Union occurred in Manchuria. Although the cause of that conflict was not the existing border 
issues, it ended with the Soviet seizure of actual control over Heixiazi Island at the confluence of 
the Ussuri and Amur rivers.500 In Xinjiang, the Soviet expansion of influence reached its height 
in the 1930s. This expansion was interrupted because of Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union 
in 1941, but it was revived after the end of World War II. The Soviets’ last-minute attempt ended 
up in vain on the eve of the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949, when the Chinese 
Nationalist commander in Xinjiang failed to respond to Stalin’s proposal that the Soviets would 
immediately extend diplomatic recognition to the new state and order the Chinese Communists 
to halt their advance into the region if the local Nationalist government declared its independence 
from China.501 The predomination of Soviet influence in Xinjiang was basically ended after the 
Chinese Communists won the Chinese Civil War in 1949.502  
The issue of Sino-Soviet border disputes was set aside after Mao Zedong proclaimed the 
“leaning to one side” policy allying China with the Soviet Union and the socialist camp to 
confront the Western powers.503 Ignoring the disputes was not the same as resolving them, 
especially when the actual line of control was considerably different from the official 
delimitation recognized by the two governments.504 The unresolved border issues reemerged in 
the late 1950s when the Sino-Soviet relationship began to deteriorate and the Soviets tilted 
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toward India in the Sino-Indian border disputes of 1959.505 In 1963, Beijing formally expressed 
to Moscow its concern about the problems caused by the “unequal treaties” and the questions 
that needed to be discussed on the issue of Sino-Soviet border.506  
The PRC and the Soviet Union started a series of negotiations in 1964507, but they did not 
succeed. One of the fundamental differences between the two sides was their standpoints on the 
issue of the “unequal treaties.” The Chinese insisted that the existing boundary delimitation was 
caused by the “unequal treaties,” with Chinese territory unfairly extorted by Czarist Russia and 
inherited by the Soviets. The Chinese view was that once this principle had been accepted and 
admitted by the Soviets, then Beijing would be open-minded and willing to accept any possible 
solution. In other words, the Chinese insistence on the issue of the “unequal treaties” was merely 
a way of saving face while conceding actual loss of territorial control. However, Moscow agreed 
to negotiate only those areas which were disputed, but was not willing to heed Beijing’s call for a 
renegotiation of all unequal treaties from the 19th century.508 The Soviet response led the Chinese 
to make a wrong estimation that Moscow not only refused to admit the very basic recognition 
that there had been “unequal treaties,” but was also unwilling to resolve the current disputes 
caused by the unclear delimitation.509 Mao’s talk with a delegation of the Japanese Socialist 
Party on July 10, 1964, in which he criticized the Soviet seizure of territories from other 
countries, further contributed to the deadlock in negotiations. Not only the Chinese but also the 
Soviets adopted a tougher attitude after they learned of those comments. 510  Due to the 
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entanglement each side stuck to its own version, and the negotiations of 1964 ended without 
result.511 
Although the initial negotiations were unsuccessful, the disputed border remained relatively 
calm until late 1968 when the number of clashes increased sharply, especially in the wake of the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August of that year, the Soviet enunciation of the 
“Brezhnev doctrine,” and the CCP Central Committee’s 12th Plenary Session.512 China’s leaders 
now regarded the Soviet Union, instead of the U.S., as the primary threat to China.513 After the 
Ussuri River became ice bound in the winter of 1968, Zhenbao Island became a hotspot where, 
according to Chinese reports, many soldiers were wounded by Soviet soldiers who carried out a 
series of actions attempting to expel the Chinese from the area.514 
China’s leaders didn’t consider a planned military action on the disputed border until 
February 1969. On January 25, the Heilongjiang Military District proposed to the Shenyang 
Military Region a plan with a total strength of three companies to carry out a counterstrike 
against the Soviet activities. The PLA General Staff Department and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs approved this plan on February 19.515 Finally, on March 2, Chinese troops engaged in 
their first military conflict against their former Communist brother on Zhenbao Island.  
The first Zhenbao Island clash occurred when Chinese units entered the island for patrol in 
the morning of March 2, 1969. The Soviet units discovered the Chinese and attempted to expel 
them from the island. The Chinese units responded with a flank attack executed by another 
Chinese patrol unit. Both sides exchanged fire under disordered conditions. After about thirty 
minutes, the conflict ended when the Soviet units made the first step to draw back from the 
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engagement. The same day, soon after the clash, the Chinese government delivered its 
diplomatic protest to the Soviets.516 
The second military clash on Zhenbao Island occurred on the morning of March 15. 
According to the Chinese sources, on the night of March 14 a Chinese infantry platoon and an 
engineering unit entered the island to plant anti-tank mines. The Soviet garrison discovered the 
Chinese activities next morning and dispatched six armored vehicles and more than 30 soldiers 
to expel the Chinese. The Chinese responded with a reinforcement of two additional patrol units. 
At 8:02 A.M., the Soviet soldiers launched their first response, but it was frustrated by the 
Chinese resistance after a one-hour engagement. The Soviet units again responded to the Chinese 
moves at 9:46 A.M., with the support of covering fire. That attack was also repulsed by the 
Chinese. The last engagement began at 1:35 P.M. when the Soviet units started with two hours of 
preparatory fire including the support of heavy-caliber artillery. At 3:13 P.M., the Soviet units 
dispatched ten tanks, 14 armored vehicles, and over 100 infantry soldiers to attack the Chinese 
positions. After two hours of fierce fighting, the Soviet units stopped and pulled back. 517 
Although there were two other skirmishes on March 17 and 21, the Sino-Soviet border on the 
Ussuri River returned to relative tranquility after the end of March. 
The tranquility was superficial, however; behind the border both Beijing and Moscow now 
had to consider the possibility of a major war. These military conflicts, even though the Chinese 
were well prepared and had fully anticipated their occurrence, led China’s leaders to reassess the 
likelihood of a major war with the Soviet Union. Mao expressed this sort of concern in a meeting 
on March 15, saying that the problem of Zhenbao Island was not a simple border issue, but a 
deeper issue revealing the Soviets’ ambition to entirely control China.518  At their 9th Party 
Congress between April 1 and 24, 1969, the Chinese Communists were expecting a possible 
major war, even a nuclear war, and believed that China could not ignore the risk and had to be 
well prepared.519 However, the prospect of a possible nuclear war or major war with the Soviets 
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did not deter Mao from showing his determination for a fight against the Soviets if necessary. 
Mao made such a presentation at the first Plenary Meeting of the 9th Central Committee on April 
28, 1969, declaring that China would cope with the Soviets regardless of whether it meant small 
fighting on the borders or a major war.520 Taking Mao’s remarks into account, China’s military 
actions on the Sino-Soviet borders in March could be a “diplomatic” signal showing Beijing’s 
determination to respond to any actions from Moscow, even though those Chinese leaders 
understood that the Soviets had full capability to launch a massive invasion of, as well as a 
nuclear war against, China. 
While most of China’s leaders were expecting and preparing for a possible war with the 
Soviet Union, an unexpected, but relatively severe, military incident occurred at Tielieketi in 
Xinjiang. The Soviet garrisons fired at a group of Chinese patrols entering that area. More than 
thirty Chinese soldiers were killed and more than ten were wounded.521 China’s leaders were 
uneasy about the possible consequences of the Tielieketi incident, which they thought was the 
prelude to Soviet preparations to launch a massive attack. On August 28, the CCP Central 
Committee, with Mao’s approval, issued an “Order of the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party” directing the military units and civilians on the border to be well prepared for 
Soviet military provocation and surprise attack.522 
With a Sino-Soviet war seemingly imminent, the death of Ho Chi Minh unexpectedly 
provided an opportunity for both sides to alleviate the tension. The Soviet Premier, Alexei 
Kosygin, headed a Soviet delegation to attend Ho Chi Minh’s funeral in Hanoi. During his visit, 
on September 9 Kosygin dispatched a member of the Soviet delegation to contact the Chinese 
delegation to inform them that Kosygin was willing to stop at Beijing to meet Chinese leaders on 
his way back to Moscow. 523  The Chinese delegation reported this to Beijing and received 
approval to Kosygin’s request. On September 11, Zhou Enlai and Kosygin met at the Beijing 
Airport for a three-and-a-half hour informal meeting.524 
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A rumor about a possible Soviet plan for attacking Chinese nuclear facilities was the first 
point Zhou raised during the meeting. The Chinese, Zhou said, would regard a Soviet attack on 
their nuclear facilities as a declaration of war. Kosygin denied that the Soviets had any such 
intention.525 Both sides quickly shifted the focus to the border disputes. Zhou proposed four 
temporary measures to resolve the developing crisis: that both sides should maintain the status 
quo of the borders, avoid any military conflict, withdraw their military forces from the disputed 
areas, and negotiate with each other when a clash occurred. Zhou also suggested that Beijing and 
Moscow should resolve the border disputes by a series of negotiations. The meeting ended after 
Kosygin expressed his support for Zhou’s suggestion.526 
The Soviet olive branch on September 11, however, did not immediately alter the Chinese 
estimation about the Soviets’ real intentions. At the Politburo meeting of September 16, most of 
the Politburo members still regarded the Soviet gesture of reconciliation as a smoke screen 
covering a real intention to launch a massive attack against China.527 Mao warned again on 
September 17 that China needed to be prepared for fighting a war, even a nuclear war. During 
the Politburo meetings of September 18 and 22, many members, especially Lin Biao, continued 
this sort of speculation and maintained that China should not completely cancel its war 
preparedness.528 Although the Chinese continued to worry about a possible Soviet attack, the 
second round of Sino-Soviet negotiations on the border issues took place as scheduled on 
October 20, 1969.  
 
Analysis of Leaders 
Mao Zedong 
Mao’s earliest comment on the issue of the Sino-Soviet border can be traced to July 10, 
1964, when he received a delegation from the Japanese Socialist Party. It was during the critical 
period of the first round of Sino-Soviet border negotiations; but, as mentioned earlier, Mao’s 
comments deepened the deadlock in the negotiations by expressing a confusing message: 
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The Soviet Union has occupied too much territory [of others]….Whenever they can put something into their 
pockets, they will. It is said that they even want to occupy Xinjiang and Heilongjiang…More than one 
hundred years ago they occupied the entire area east of Lake Baikal, including Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and 
the Kamchatka Peninsula. That account is difficult to square. We have yet to settle that account.529 
According to Yang Kuisong, a Chinese authority on the history of the Chinese Communist Party, 
this comment was typical Mao-style language which was crafted impromptu. 530  Mao’s 
impromptu language added an unexpected disturbance into the Sino-Soviet negotiations. The 
Chinese delegation saw the language as a signal of Mao’s approval for their adoption of an 
intransigent attitude. Inevitably the Soviet delegation became more and more immovable in 
refusing to acknowledge the issue of “unequal treaties” in response to the tough Chinese attitude 
and Mao’s undiplomatic language.531  
Mao quickly noticed this unintended consequence of his remarks and attempted to adjust his 
tone on September 10, 1964, when he received a group of guests from France. He explained that 
the previous comments were only a tactic, “taking the offensive through firing empty cannons.” 
He further explained that it was not his intention to alter the status quo on the borders; rather the 
Chairman’s purpose was to reach a reasonable settlement of the border issues and, taking the 
status quo as the basis, to sign a new border treaty with the Soviet Union.532 This explanation 
came too late to resolve the unintended deadlock, which reached the point of no return in late 
July, 1964. 
The Chairman’s remedy, from another viewpoint, indicates that Mao was not inflexible with 
regard to the Sino-Soviet border dispute. His explanation on September 10, 1964, indicates that 
Mao not only acquiesced in the status quo on the borders, but also was willing to resolve the 
potential contention by negotiation. It was similar to his attitude toward coping with Sino-Indian 
border disputes at their early stage, when Mao was willing to adopt a flexible, even 
compromising, attitude to resolve the impasse. 
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As indicated earlier, the Chinese had decided to carry out a counterattack against the Soviet 
actions at Zhenbao Island on January 25, 1969. Although it would not have been possible for the 
Chinese garrison to execute the plan of counterattack without Mao’s approval, the details of the 
discussion on the plan have not been released. The earliest record of a directive from Mao during 
the Sino-Soviet border conflict was taken down in a meeting of the Central Cultural Revolution 
Group on March 15, 1969. Mao called for a plan to increase the number of military units 
throughout China, with each county to establish at least a regiment (probably a militia regiment) 
in response to the possibility of war with the Soviet Union. Concerning the conduct of war, Mao 
emphasized his idea of people’s war as the most feasible strategy to cope with a Soviet attack. 
He mentioned that “[if] they attack, it will lead us to mobilize, and our strategy is gaining 
mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck.” In his plan, if the Soviets launched an 
attack, China would have to yield the entire area north of the Yellow River and start people’s war 
south of the river to expel the enemy from China step by step.533 According to this plan, the 
Chairman’s first priority was the conduct of strategy to resist the possible Soviet invasion. Moral 
issues were probably too obvious to require much attention. Although Mao emphasized his 
strategy of “gaining mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck,” he said nothing about 
the righteous legitimacy that China would gain from the possible Soviet invasion.  
Mao’s comment on the military actions in the Zhenbao Island incident shows the same 
absence of CRWT-based rhetoric. Mao made the comment on April 14 that: 
This fight was commanded by Sun Yuguo. [It shows that troops who] have no experience in fighting can still 
fight. China firstly didn’t dispatch any aircraft, secondly didn’t deploy any tanks and armored vehicles, and 
thirdly had no command cars, [but] fought a nine-hour battle and repulsed three charges the enemy launched. 
China does not want to [fight] without aircraft, tanks, and armored vehicles, but [can complete the mission] 
mainly by relying on courage. [We] need to break down blind faith, and this [military performance on] the 
Zhenbao Island breaks it down.534 
Although the content of this comment reveals little on how the Chinese consciously assessed the 
need to use force, more is explained by where it appeared. It came in a public speech, apparently 
carefully crafted, which was delivered at the 9th Party Congress. Mao’s choice to emphasize the 
value of human power in military performance rather than pointing out the Soviet provocation 
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and occupation of disputed territory indicates that how to defend China from a possible Soviet 
invasion, not how to punish the Soviet wrongdoings, was Mao’s first concern with regard to the 
Sino-Soviet conflict. Mao’s position reflects his pragmatic calculation that China’s active moves, 
such as punishing the Soviet behavior, would invite self-destruction through massive Soviet 
retaliation. 
On April 28, Mao made another public speech at the first Plenary Meeting of the 9th Central 
Committee, repeating his urgent call to be well prepared for a war with the Soviet Union. This 
speech was the first time Mao said anything about the righteous legitimacy that China would 
possess in the face of a massive Soviet invasion. He said: 
I have mentioned in the past that [we] need to prepare for war. No matter which year, we need to prepare for 
war…. ‘What if he [the enemy] doesn’t come?’ Whether he will come or not, we all must be prepared…The 
main preparation is to have a spiritual preparation. The spiritual preparation is to have the spirit prepared for 
war…. [Let] others come [into China] to attack, we will not go out and fight. We are not to go out to fight. I 
mean [we] shall not be provoked, even should the enemy request us to go out, we shall not do so. But if you 
[the enemy] come to fight, I have to cope with it. It depends on whether you [the enemy] want to fight on a 
small or large scale. [If they want a] small fight, [we] can do so on the borders. [If they want a] large fight, I 
advocate [that we shall] make room for the enemy…. If he [the enemy] cannot gain some advantage, in my 
opinion, he will not come in. [We] must let the entire world see that our fighting is reasonable and 
advantageous. If he comes in, in my opinion, we will have more advantage, [because] not only [will our 
standing be] justified, but [we will] also have advantages, [standing on a] good [position] to fight, which lets 
him be surrounded by the people….535 
Mao optimistically declared not only that a massive Soviet invasion would provide just cause to 
the Chinese but also that the just cause thus provided would also benefit the Chinese conduct of 
self-defense. Mao’s presentation, however, indicates that neither an attempt to retake the 
Chinese-claimed territory nor a punitive expedition to punish the Soviet provocation interested 
the Chairman when he defined China’s possible responses. In short, Mao was limiting China’s 
response to small number of options compared to the full range of what the CRWT would 
suggest. Mao made it clear that China would not cross the border to launch a massive attack, 
even though his speech was permeated by the apprehension that China was exposed to the 
enemy’s attack. Regarding the border disputes, Mao suggested that China could fight on a small 
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scale on the borders if its enemy desired, but the scale certainly would not compete with what 
had occurred in the Sino-Indian War.  
Starting from the first round of Sino-Soviet border negotiations in 1964, Mao had shown a 
flexible and pragmatic attitude in handling the border issues. He neither intended to retake the 
disputed territory occupied by the Soviets nor, whatever he actually believed, did he treat those 
occupations as immoral. On the contrary, Mao agreed to negotiations to solve the border disputes 
in March, 1969, after the Zhenbao Island Incident.536 Mao’s approval of negotiation didn’t mean 
an end to his alertness to the risk of a massive Soviet attack. Mao’s repeated advocacy of military 
preparedness demonstrates that the war scare and the speculation about Soviet intentions to 
entirely control China still dominated his assessment.  
Indeed, according to Mao’s presentation of righteous cause, China certainly had the right to 
take any measures to defend itself against the possible Soviet invasion. This legitimacy did not 
persuade Mao to undertake a large-scale punitive expedition to punish the perceived 
wrongdoings, or to defend China by seizing the initiative to attack the Soviets first; instead, Mao 
asserted that righteous legitimacy would put China in a better position to conduct a defense in 
depth successfully. This outcome must surely be a result of Mao’s understanding that China was 
confronting a much stronger opponent. For Mao, the Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969 was not 
merely about territorial disputes, but had to be considered in the broader context of the 
expanding Sino-Soviet split. In this circumstance, China had to be prepared for a major war 
against the Soviets, which might occur due to the increasing hostility between Beijing and 
Moscow. The Soviets’ superior capability for conducting military operations or delivering a 
nuclear strike meant that an initial Chinese offensive or massive counterattack could easily 
provoke retaliation that might severely threaten China’s survival. Mao’s plan to expand the 
number of Chinese militia units indicates his belief that full mobilization would be necessary to 
save China from defeat. Mao’s advocacy for conducting people’s war to fight against the Soviet 
invasion also suggests his awareness of China’s inferior military capabilities. 537  Hence, an 
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aggressive conduct of the defense might not be the proper option, because it would increase 
China’s risk of defeat. In other words, the reality of the balance of power, in which China was 
inferior to the Soviet Union, surely carried great weight in Mao’s decision-making during the 
Sino-Soviet border conflict in 1969. This finding indicates an important limit to the influence of 
the CRWT, namely that the consideration of righteous legitimacy may yield to pragmatic 
calculation when the Chinese leaders must decide between offensive action and self-defense 
while facing the danger of a superior opponent’s massive invasion or nuclear attack 
 
Zhou Enlai 
Zhou Enlai’s understanding of the Sino-Soviet border dispute, like Mao’s, can be traced to 
1964. On April 25, 1964, Zhou reported to the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress and the State Council of the PRC that 
Our principles to negotiate are: First, [all of] the Sino-Russian treaties signed after the Opium War are unequal, 
having been imposed on China by Czarist Russia; second, we still agree to use those treaties as the foundation 
for negotiation, and make some necessary adjustment at the same time; third, [we agree] to conclude a new 
treaty to replace the old treaties. But the Soviets disagreed [with our principles], [thus] there is no significant 
progress in negotiation.538 
On October 6, Zhou explained to the Premier of Romania, Ion Gherghe Maurer, the causes of 
deadlock in the Sino-Soviet negotiations by repeating the same argument, that the Soviet Union 
was unwilling to accept the Chinese three principles to conclude a new border treaty.539 Zhou’s 
opinion was clear: China was not only cooperative but also willing to adjust the borders through 
compromise, as long as the Soviets acknowledged that the old Sino-Russian treaties were 
“unequal.” Although Zhou regarded the Soviet refusal to acknowledge the “unequal treaties” as 
inadmissible and the major impediment to significant progress in negotiation, Zhou did not 
reveal any moral condemnation and still preserved room for a possible resolution. 
Zhou retained this relatively cooperative attitude after the Zhenbao Island incident. A day 
after the incident, several protests against Soviet military action erupted around the Soviet 
embassy in Beijing and the consulates in Tianjin and Shanghai. Zhou immediately instructed the 
authorities in those cities to establish a buffer zone between the protesters and the Soviet 
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embassy and consulates in order to prevent unexpected violence.540 This instruction shows that 
Zhou was attempting to avert incidents that might exacerbate Sino-Soviet tensions. On March 14, 
1969, a day before the second military clash occurred on Zhenbao Island, Zhou divulged his 
anticipation of the likelihood of a major Sino-Soviet conflict when he received a delegation from 
the American Progressive Labor Party. He said: 
Now it cannot be told [if a massive conflict will occur or not]. They (the Soviets) are to take this stuff [the 
military clash on the borders] to mobilize their people and examine the climate of opinion of the world. The 
Soviet Union has difficulty in attacking China.541  
Like Mao, Zhou never entirely dismissed his apprehension about a massive Soviet attack 
against China. Zhou conducted a two-handed policy in response to the Soviets’ reactions after 
the Zhenbao Island incident. On one hand, Zhou asked the military to strengthen its deployment 
of armed forces along the borders in order to prepare to “be rested and ready to face the attack of 
the fatigued enemy” and “gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck.”542 On the 
other hand, Zhou informed the Soviets that formal diplomatic communication would be the only 
channel recognized by the Chinese government, and the former channel of communication by 
telephone became inappropriate.543 Just as in Zhou’s earlier instructions, this two-handed policy 
apparently was designed for confining unexpected factors within certain limits. 
As time passed, Zhou seemed more and more to agree that the risk of a massive Soviet 
attack was declining. When a small-scale shelling occurred on the Sino-Soviet border on April 3, 
Zhou offered a suggestion to Mao and Lin Biao about how to respond to the Soviet shelling: 
[We] estimate that the attitude and demands the Soviet garrison adopted [on the border] were directed by the 
Soviet center…the enemy is to bluff and bluster, and to show their posture. We suggest that: 1. Our frontier 
posts should temporarily ignore the other side’s shelling; 2, [We shall] adjust the position of our artillery to 
aim at the enemy’s artillery positions along the bank and covered positions deploying the tanks and armored 
vehicles, and after several days of the enemy’s shelling, suddenly return fire in order to maximize their 
casualties and issue our protest at the same time. The timing should be scheduled before Vice-Chairman Lin’s 
report is announced….544 
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This suggestion demonstrates that in Zhou’s assessment the risk of a massive Soviet attack had 
significantly receded; otherwise a sudden counterattack would not be a feasible option because it 
would cause more uncertainty. Obviously, the estimation that the Soviets were bluffing led Zhou 
to propose a sudden counterattack.  
In fact, during the entire period of the 1969 Sino-Soviet crisis, Zhou was never a hardliner 
who saw the Sino-Soviet border dispute through the moral prism that the Chinese-claimed 
territories were sacred and inviolable. Even after the Tielieketi incident, when the risk of a major 
Sino-Soviet war seemed to have escalated again, Zhou retained his cooperative attitude in 
attempting to resolve the conflict. On September 7, before Kosygin arrived in Hanoi, Zhou had 
told the Romanian Maurer, also there to attend the funeral of Ho Chi Minh that “concerning the 
Sino-Soviet relations, our attitude is to agree to carry out [a series of] reasonable negotiations; 
before the problems have been settled, [we] should maintain the status quo on the border and 
avoid military conflict.”545 This indicates that Zhou had been considering negotiation with the 
Soviets to resolve the border disputes before the Soviet olive branch on September 9.  
Zhou and Kosygin’s meeting at the Beijing Airport also supports this inference regarding 
Zhou’s attitude. Moreover, the airport meeting was the first time that Zhou presented the 
legitimacy of China’s response to the possible Soviet military action since the outbreak of the 
Sino-Soviet border conflict. The risk of a Sino-Soviet war was the first issue raised in the 
meeting. Zhou stated: 
…on the issue of border disputes, China is passive; [if you] spread out the map [you] will know that all of the 
areas where conflicts are occurring are disputed areas. You always say that we want a war, [but] now we are 
so busy in our domestic affairs, why would [we] want a war? ... We have no troops stationed in foreign 
territory, and we also will not invade others, but you redeployed so many troops to the Far East546 … You say 
that we want to make nuclear war. In fact you are well informed about the level of our nuclear weapons [and 
you know that we will not do so]. You say that you will take preemptive measures to destroy our nuclear 
facilities. If you do so, we will declare that this is war, and that this is aggression. We will rise in resistance. 
We will fight to the end.547  
Zhou’s message made it clear that China wanted neither a major war nor a nuclear war, and that 
China would not initiate a war against the Soviet Union. China would certainly resist Soviet 
                                                 
545 Jin Chongji et al., Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949-1976, vol. 3: 319-320. 
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547 Quoted in Yang Kuisong, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969,” 38. 
156 
 
military actions to the end, especially if there were a preemptive strike targeting China’s nuclear 
facilities (which was of course also regarded by the Chinese as an act of aggression). Zhou was 
clearly confident that China would possess the righteous legitimacy to resist any Soviet military 
action piercing into China’s heartland. Like Mao, Zhou did not urge that this legitimacy should 
lead China to undertake an aggressive military counterstrike. 
With regard to resolution of the border disputes, Zhou concluded with two major principles 
and four temporary measures. For the major principles, he proposed: 
First, the debates on theory and doctrine between China and the Soviet Union should not have an impact on 
both countries’ relationship, and should not obstruct the normalization between the two; and second, the Sino-
Soviet border issue now is the central issue of the Sino-Soviet relationship, both sides can eventually find the 
solution through negotiation.548  
Then, he suggested the four temporary measures that both China and the Soviet Union should 
adopt: both sides should maintain the status quo of the borders, avoid any military conflict, 
withdraw their military forces from the disputed areas, and negotiate with each other when a 
clash occurred.549 Zhou’s suggestion was recognized by Kosygin and eventually came to be 
agreed upon by both sides as the first step toward resolving the border disputes. 
Yet the conversation with Kosygin did not fully remove Zhou’s concern about the risk of a 
Soviet invasion, even though Zhou presented a flexible and cooperative attitude during their 
meeting. On September 22, Zhou made a public speech aiming to raise military morale and 
speed up the progress of China’s preparedness for war. He advised the military that “now the 
international situation is tense, we have to be prepared for war, especially for preventing the 
enemy’s surprise attack, and need to be on the alert.” Zhou’s speech can be seen as a reflection 
of the tense atmosphere among the Chinese leaders, who still worried about a massive Soviet 
invasion. 550  
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the Chinese, there were no signals showing that the Soviets had started to withdraw their deployment, and the 
numbers of the Soviet forces still posed a menace to China which could not be ignored. On the Soviet deployment in 
the Russian Far East, see Lyle J. Goldstein, “Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters,” 
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Nevertheless, Zhou’s activities in late September and early October suggest that he was still 
hoping to achieve a peaceful resolution of the border issues with the Soviets. Zhou sent Kosygin 
a letter on September 19 requesting that the Soviets further confirm their acceptance of the four 
temporary measures. In this letter, Zhou mentioned that, “if [we] can receive your letter 
confirming [the previous measures accepted at the Beijing Airport meeting], then [it] can be the 
agreement between the Chinese and Soviet governments, which can come into effect 
immediately, and be put it into operation.” Zhou added: “I believe, if this agreement can be 
achieved, [it] will help to alleviate the situation on both sides of the border and the process of 
Sino-Soviet negotiation on the border issues.”551 On October 6, Zhou sent another letter telling 
Kosygin, “I believe [that] the alleviation of the Sino-Soviet border situation and the inauguration 
of Sino-Soviet border negotiations will provide a favorable condition to resolve the other 
problems in the relations between the two countries.”552  
Examination of the above records suggests that the consideration of just cause had 
negligible influence upon Zhou’s handling of the border conflict in 1969. Zhou would certainly 
have agreed that any Soviet military action penetrating into China’s heartland, especially a 
preemptive strike aimed at destroying China’s nuclear facilities, should be regarded as an act of 
aggression providing China the righteous justification of self-defense. Nevertheless, as with Mao, 
this awareness of righteous legitimacy exerted no visible influence on Zhou’s handling of the 
crisis, nor did it persuade him to advocate an aggressive conduct of the defense. This position 
may have been the result of Zhou’s assessment of the balance of power between China and the 
Soviet Union, in which China was clearly the inferior power. Also, the evidence agrees with the 
explanation that Zhou’s steady attitude favoring a peaceful resolution by flexible means brought 
him to agree with Mao’s plan for a defense in depth.  
 
Other Leaders 
To examine other leaders’ assessment of the Sino-Soviet border disputes, I select four PLA 
marshals — Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen — because they submitted 
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three reports assessing Sino-Soviet relations. 553  Their reports, requested by Mao, not only 
provided other high-ranking Chinese leaders with a key evaluation of Soviet intentions; they also 
took a significant step toward the Sino-American rapprochement.  
It is necessary to explain the implications of Lin Biao’s “Directive No. 1” before examining 
the four marshals’ reports. As mentioned earlier, Lin Biao had strongly expressed his concern 
about a massive Soviet attack throughout the Sino-Soviet border dispute in 1969. On October 17, 
Lin Biao issued the Vice-Chairman’s “Directive No. 1” which called for urgent preparation for 
war by the entire army and emergency evacuation of the important leaders.554 According to 
Chinese official records, Mao didn’t learn of Lin’s directive until the next day, and, dissatisfied, 
Mao immediately burned most of Lin’s report (in a form of a transcribed telephone message) 
after receiving it.555 As the official story about Mao’s reaction implies, other Chinese sources 
also point out that the actual intention of Lin’s directive was not what it appeared to be on the 
surface, a call for preparation against a Soviet surprise attack.556 But no matter what the real 
intention was, Directive No. 1 indicates that even those Chinese leaders who still worried about a 
Soviet invasion at the last minute had no intention of adopting an aggressive method to respond 
to the imminent danger they imagined. 
The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet border clashes significantly changed the Chinese 
perception of who was the most threatening enemy. After the 9th Party Congress, the four 
marshals were instructed by Mao to analyze the international situation and complete their task by 
                                                 
553 The reason why these four marshals were picked to assess the international situation and the Soviet intention 
remains unknown. Perhaps Liu Bocheng’s health problem caused him to be excluded from Mao’s consideration. He 
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sending three reports to Zhou and Mao.557 In their first report, “Looking at a ‘Zhenbao’ Tree 
from the Forest of World,” the four marshals made an initial assessment about the consequences 
of the Zhenbao Island incident, suggesting that it was not the right time for the Soviets to start a 
massive invasion of China because the Soviet Union was, according to their calculation, not yet 
ready.558  
A more detailed report was concluded on July 11, titled “Preliminary Assessment on the 
War Situation.” In this report, the four marshals repeated their assessment that the timing was not 
right for the Soviet Union and the United States to carry out massive invasions of China. 
Although both the Soviet Union and the United States were now regarded as the main enemies of 
China, the four marshals wrote: 
Soviet revisionists regard China as their main enemy. They are more threatening than American imperialists to 
our nation’s security. On the endless Sino-Soviet borders, Soviet revisionists unceasingly produce tensions, 
launch military invasion, and assemble masses of troops. They…attempt to establish a ring of anti-Chinese 
encirclement. These are the critical steps by which Soviet revisionists prepare the war of aggression against 
China. But if [they] really want to fight with China on a large scale, Soviet revisionists still has plenty of 
scruples and difficulties.559 
The four marshals estimated that three major concerns and difficulties prevented the Soviets 
from launching such an aggression against China. First, “because both China and the U.S. were 
the enemies of the Soviet Union, the Soviets would not dare to engage in a two-front battle.” In 
the marshals’ assessment, a Sino-Soviet war would weaken Soviet power in Eastern Europe, 
where the U.S. would seize the opportunity to take over. Second, if the Soviet Union decided to 
invade China on a massive scale, it would have to pursue a quick decision; but China would do 
everything to prevent such an outcome. The four marshals suggested that China should follow 
Mao’s guidance to engage in a protracted war if the Soviets invaded China. According to their 
estimation, a protracted war would bring three difficulties to the Soviet Union: it would 
significantly increase popular hostility against the Soviets within China, it would be exhausted 
maintaining the supply line to China from the industrial centers in the European part of the 
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Soviet Union, and its domestic problems, such as class contradictions and ethnic conflict, would 
be exacerbated.  
The third major point preventing the Soviets from launching an aggression against China 
was that the Soviet strategic center was in Europe. The four marshals indicated that 
…although its [the Soviet Union’s] preparation for anti-Chinese war is real, it mainly wants to maintain its 
political control through the military system, and to suppress domestic and Eastern European resistance; and 
[the reasons it] makes a show of readiness to fight [are] on the one hand, to vainly attempt to force us to 
negotiate by its strength, and on the other hand, to make the U.S. believe that it really wants to fight with 
China on a large scale, in order to gain peace on the western front and persuade the U.S. to allow it to organize 
a ring of anti-Chinese encirclement, thereby covering its expansion into Southeastern Asia and other 
areas…560 
The four marshals presented another report to Zhou on September 17 in response to the new 
developments after Kosygin’s visit to Beijing.561 In their opinion, “although the Soviet Union has 
the intention to launch an aggression against China and has already made a corresponding 
deployment,” it “could not make the political decision” because “a war against China is a critical 
matter of life and death, in which the Soviet revisionists are not certain [if they can avoid a sure 
defeat].”562 Kosygin’s visit to Beijing, from their viewpoint, was “a need based on counter-
revolutionary pragmatism, which attempted to change the brinksmanship toward our country, by 
showing the flag of peaceful negotiation, [and] to break away from domestic and foreign 
predicaments on this occasion,” and “to be the basis for Soviet revisionists’ policy [making] by 
inquiring about our intentions.” Thus, they thought that the Soviet Union would engage in 
negotiation and alleviate the tension with China in order to buy time to consolidate the domestic 
and Eastern European situations, as well as other positions in the Middle East and Asia.563 
The significance of the last report, however, was not its anticipation of the Soviet intention 
to alleviate the tension with China, but its cautious promotion of Sino-American rapprochement. 
Their last report presented the idea of Sino-American rapprochement, which had been gradually 
formulated by the four marshals during Kosygin’s visit to Beijing. Ye Jianying was inspired by 
one historical case during the Three Kingdoms period in which the Shu kingdom, administrated 
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by the legendary strategist Zhuge Liang, had successfully carried out the policy of allying itself 
with the kingdom of Wu to confront the kingdom of Wei, the strongest of the three.564 Chen Yi 
cited Stalin’s nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany on the eve of World War II to support the 
thought.565 The four marshals continued this train of idea in the last report, saying that China 
should seek to take advantage of the Sino-American-Soviet triangle. They suggested that, “[if] 
American imperialism requests to resume the ambassadorial meetings, we can also choose the 
opportune time to make a reply [for giving our approval]. Such a tactical action may have a 
strategic effect.”566 Thus, from their viewpoint, it was necessary to re-establish Sino-American 
relations for China to take advantage of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. 
As their reports show, the issue of morality received little consideration from the four 
marshals in their evaluation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Although they defined the possible 
Soviet invasion as an act of aggression, their strategy to cope with a possible Soviet attack was 
mainly based on pragmatic calculation. Moreover, their suggestion regarding Sino-American 
rapprochement shows a Machiavellian style of thinking underlying change in China’s grand 
strategy. For dealing with the possible Soviet invasion of China, the four marshals suggested 
adopting Mao’s plan for a guerilla-type defense in depth and a protracted war.  
 
Analysis of the People’s Daily 
In the case of the Sino-Soviet border conflict, there are a total of 232 days of reporting to 
observe. The period of observation begins with March 3, the day when the People’s Daily started 
to report the Zhenbao Island incident, and ends at October 20, when Beijing and Moscow 
returned to the negotiating table. In the data collected, the Soviet Union is always the clear object 
of Chinese condemnation. According to the data, words of moral condemnation appeared a total 
of 150 times during the period of observation, with a daily average of 0.644 instance of moral 
condemnation. Compared to the data presented in the previous cases, this daily average is the 
second lowest among the five cases.  
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September 9, 1969, is taken as the watershed date in this case. After the Zhenbao Island 
incident, the Sino-Soviet relationship had hovered on the brink of a major war, and the Chinese 
were preparing to resist an anticipated large-scale Soviet invasion. The extreme tension began to 
ease on September 9, when Kosygin’s willingness to meet the Chinese leaders was made known 
to the Chinese delegation in Hanoi. The Soviet olive branch led to the meeting between Zhou 
Enlai and Kosygin at Beijing Airport on September 11, which achieved an agreement to reopen 
negotiations on border issues. The introduction of this watershed results in the daily averages of 
0.749 and 0.171 for the periods of March 3 – September 9 and September 10 – October 20, 
respectively.  
My assumption about the application of morality-based condemnation is not refuted by the 
result of this analysis of the People’s Daily. The decreased frequency after September 9 suggests 
that the Chinese government’s use of morality-based condemnation reflected their assessment of 
the risk of a direct Sino-Soviet confrontation, especially the danger of a Soviet invasion. This 
sort of pattern, which can also be found in the cases of the Vietnam War and the Second Taiwan 
Strait Crisis, indicates that once such a risk has receded, the Chinese government may place less 
emphasis on the moral inferiority of its opponent.  
 
Conclusion 
In this case, we encounter the limitations of the CRWT as an explanatory factor. When 
China’s leaders faced a high danger of another state’s massive invasion or nuclear attack, their 
decision-making was dominated by pragmatic calculation. Although the Chinese leaders, 
especially Mao and Zhou, employed the idea of righteous legitimacy in their language stating the 
danger that China faced, considerations of just cause exerted negligible influence upon their 
conduct for self-defense. Mao’s statements indicate that China’s inferior capability carried the 
most weight in his decision-making when he decided upon the plan for a defense in depth. Mao’s 
train of thought was echoed by Zhou and the four marshals when they expressed their 
perspectives on China’s plan for self-defense. This implies that when China’s leaders have 
clearly perceived a scenario in which China is in danger of being invaded by a superior enemy, 
there is really no need for them to locate the just cause and legitimate the decision for self-
defense. Also, this scenario limited the decisions of China’s leaders to a narrow range of options 
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than the CRWT would suggest (e.g., employing an active counterstrike for self-defense), when 
the pragmatic calculation clearly shows that such an action would bring self-destruction to China. 
Evidence from the People’s Daily supports my assumption about the application of 
morality-based condemnation, namely that its frequency reflected the likelihood of China’s 
decision for war. The Chinese government evidently decreased the frequency of its morality-
based condemnations after September 9, 1969, when Zhou Enlai learned of the Soviet olive 
branch proffered in Hanoi. This result presents a pattern of Chinese use of language similar to 
that of 1964-1965; when the Chinese perceived war as not imminent, the frequency of morality-
based condemnation seemed to reflect that perception. This congruent result suggests that the 
language used in the People’s Daily was not simply a “moral cloak.” It shows that the Chinese 
government had less to say about the moral inferiority of its opponents when it perceived that 
war had become unlikely. 
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Chapter 8 - The Sino-Vietnamese War 
On February 17, 1979, approximately 330,000 PLA military personnel567 crossed the Sino-
Vietnamese border to engage in what the Chinese claimed was a “self-defense counterattack 
against Vietnam.” It was the second largest military operation the PRC had undertaken since 
1949. After about one month of fighting, the PRC unilaterally withdrew all of its forces from 
Vietnam, although border skirmishing, often involving artillery, continued into the early 1980s. 
This war, defined by the Chinese, was a “punitive” war to “teach” the Vietnamese “a lesson” 
through a military operation limited in scale and time.568 The reasons for the Chinese decision to 
go to war with the Vietnamese are still debatable. To punish Vietnam’s violent encroachment 
along the Sino-Vietnamese border was the official justification Beijing announced for going to 
war.569 The Chinese also emphasized that Hanoi’s misbehavior, which included mistreatment of 
overseas Chinese in Vietnam and the invasion of Cambodia, made Vietnam an aggressor 
deserving punishment.570 Some scholars argue that Beijing’s decision for war aimed to divert 
Vietnamese military pressure from Cambodia.571 Others have observed that Beijing’s intention to 
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respond to the Soviet strategy of encircling China through cooperation with Vietnam in 
Southeast Asia and Deng’s attempt to assert control over the military explain the decision for 
war.572 The Chinese decision to conduct the Sino-Vietnamese War was certainly not the result of 
a single cause. All of the above considerations add up to a more complete picture explaining 
Beijing’s reasons for carrying out the “punitive” war against the Vietnamese.  
For the purpose of my research, this chapter will focus on the official Chinese justification – 
to punish the Vietnamese for their violent acts – and the argument that China was attempting to 
divert the Vietnamese military from Cambodia, because these two are similar to the CRWT ideas 
of stopping violence, acting in self-defense, and helping a weaker state fighting against another 
state’s invasion. Moreover, the Chinese decision to carry out the military action on a large scale 
was not made without dissent.573 The discussions of China’s leaders on the options of use of 
force provide a significant clue to trace the influence of the CRWT upon their decision-making, 
as the case of the Korean War did. In this regard, the way China’s leaders applied the idea of 
righteous war not only to deciding to go to war but also to their way of ending it makes the Sino-
Vietnamese War a most likely case for examining the influence of the CRWT. But one caveat 
should be mentioned. Due to the lack of available Chinese documentation, there is really no way 
to trace the decision-making processes of individual leaders. Thus, the section analyzing the 
leaders will not focus on individuals but will look instead at the entire process of Chinese 
decision-making while synchronously tracing the activities of China’s leaders, propaganda, and 
the diplomatic system.  
 
Historical Background 
The deteriorating relationship between Beijing and Hanoi by 1975 and afterward is a good 
starting point for understanding the causes of the Sino-Vietnamese War. By 1975, Beijing and 
Hanoi were already on a collision course, mostly because of their discord stemming from the 
conduct of the Vietnam War and the ideological dispute over their relationship with the Soviet 
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Union.574 Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, which disclosed the opening moves of Sino-American 
rapprochement, also increased Hanoi’s hostility and anxiety toward Beijing.575 However, until 
the last stage of the Vietnam War the two capitals still maintained a superficially harmonious 
relationship.  
The first sign of discord was the negotiation on the delimitation of the offshore boundary, 
particularly in the Gulf of Tonkin, in August 1974. Hanoi asserted that the boundary line in the 
gulf had been delimited in 1887 by France and the Qing dynasty, with the result that Vietnam 
possessed two-thirds of the Gulf of Tonkin. Beijing disagreed. The Chinese argued that the Sino-
French Convention of 1887 on the Delimitation of the Frontier only provided an indication of the 
ownership of the offshore islands, not the delimitation of a “sea boundary line” in the gulf.576 To 
the Chinese, Hanoi’s insistence on this delimitation was groundless and the major cause for 
negotiation becoming futile.577  
The offshore boundary was not the only territorial dispute between Beijing and Hanoi. Their 
dispute over the ownership of the Paracel and Spratley Islands and over the demarcation of their 
land border also worsened their relationship. Of those quarrels, the dispute over the Sino-
Vietnamese border created more tension than the issue of the sea boundary.578 Beginning in 1975, 
Hanoi proposed several times that the border be adjusted in areas that Beijing considered to be 
Chinese territory as recognized by France and the Qing dynasty from 1895.579 Violent incidents 
on the border increased subsequently. In 1977, the first bloody incident erupted at the Youyiguan 
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[Friendship Pass], where 500 Vietnamese soldiers infiltrated the border and injured more than 50 
Chinese railway workers.580  
In addition to the increase in border incidents, the year 1977 witnessed another tension 
between Beijing and Hanoi – the issue of Cambodia. After the Vietnam War, the keystone of the 
foreign policy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) was to form “special relationships” 
with Laos and Cambodia, leading eventually to the establishment of an “Indochinese 
Federation.”581 This policy was obstructed by the new Pol Pot government in Phnom Penh, 
which wanted a treaty of nonaggression with the SRV rather than the Hanoi-proposed treaty of 
cooperation under which Cambodia would lose its independent and equal status with Vietnam.582 
Pol Pot’s refusal caused Hanoi to apply military pressure on the Khmer Rouge.583 Clashes along 
the Cambodian-Vietnamese border intensified from April 1977. On December 16, 1977, the 
SRV crossed the border and attacked Cambodia with a force of between 30,000 and 60,000 
troops.584 On January 12, 1978, the Chinese government made its position clear by urging an 
immediate ceasefire and complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.585 Beijing’s 
request deepened the Vietnamese hostility toward China. Finally, at the Fourth Plenum of the 
Fourth Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam in July 1978, the Vietnamese 
decided to identify China as the “direct enemy” of Vietnam, adopt an “offensive strategy” 
toward China, and regard it as a “national task” and “international obligation” to oppose 
China.586 As a result, the Sino-Vietnamese relationship sharply deteriorated in 1978.  
                                                 
580 The People’s Daily, May 14, 1979; and Guo Ming ed., Zhong Yue guanxiyanbian sishi nian, 136; Chen, China’s 
War with Vietnam, 49. 
581 William J. Duiker, China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict, 65. This policy was set at the Fourth Congress of 
the Vietnam Workers’ Party in December 1976. See Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 33. 
582 Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 34; William J. Duiker, China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict, 65. 
583 Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 34. 
584 Edward C. O’Dowd, Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War, 36 
585 Chen, China’s War with Vietnam, 35; and Guo Ming ed., Zhong Yue guanxiyanbian sishi nian, 161. 
586 U.N. General Assembly, 36th Session. Letter dated 13 July 1981 from the Permanent Representative of China to 
the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. Supp. 1981 (S/14589). 14 July 1981; Chang Pao-min, 
Kampuchea between China and Vietnam (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985), 67; and Guo Ming ed., 
Zhong Yue guanxiyanbian sishi nian, 161. 
168 
 
A new crisis emerged in 1978 with the flight of ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam to 
China in 1978 exacerbated Beijing’s resentment of Hanoi’s behavior. Between 1975 and 1978 
the unified Vietnamese government implemented a series of measures of socioeconomic 
transformation that severely struck the Chinese community in Vietnam, who were mostly 
businessmen and comprador bourgeoisie. The ethnic Chinese became the main targets for the 
burning sentiments of Vietnamese nationalists.587 From October 1977, Hanoi’s policy toward the 
ethnic Chinese entered into another stage, which involved expelling Chinese residents from 
northeast Vietnam and putting more pressure on the ethnic Chinese in southern Vietnam.588 In 
May 1978, there was an exodus of overseas Chinese from northern Vietnam to southern China. 
On June 6, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC released a statement urging the 
Vietnamese government to stop the mistreatment of the overseas Chinese and to engage in 
negotiation with China to settle the problem of the ethnic Chinese.589 Between June 13 and July 
24, the first round of negotiation was held in Hanoi, in which the Chinese government sought a 
flexible schedule to evacuate the Chinese but the Vietnamese wanted to limit the docking time. 
The negotiation ended without a substantial solution. The Chinese view was that the Vietnamese, 
who intentionally obstructed the progress of negotiation while continuing to expel the Chinese, 
were entirely responsible for the futile ending.590 On July 3, 1978, China announced the end of 
its assistance to Vietnam because Hanoi’s unfriendly policy of exacerbating anti-Chinese 
sentiment and expelling the Chinese destroyed the minimal conditions necessary for Chinese 
experts to work in Vietnam.591  
The second round of negotiation on the issue of the overseas Chinese started on August 8, 
1978, in Hanoi. This new round of negotiation neither resolved the problems of the overseas 
Chinese nor did anything to improve the colder and colder relationship between the two capitals. 
To Beijing, the Vietnamese not only rejected the “reasonable” proposals to settle the problems 
but also denied the reality of the harm that the Vietnamese government was doing to the overseas 
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Chinese. It was the Vietnamese, as the Chinese delegation argued, who closed the gate of 
negotiation, and the Chinese government thus had no choice but to suspend the negotiations on 
September 26, 1978.592  
While the negotiations on the issue of the overseas Chinese were encountering a deadlock, a 
renewed border dispute occurred in August 1978. As early as October 1977, China and Vietnam 
had started a round of negotiations on the delimitation of their border. The Chinese government 
argued that most of the boundary line on land had been delimited since 1895 and the disputed 
area should be delimited by negotiation after a coordinated investigation by both governments. 
But Hanoi continued to insist that the Vietnamese-claimed sea boundary line should be included 
and recognized in the discussion. The Chinese could not accept this. In August 1978, the 
Vietnamese used the excuse that they were “busy with other things” to unilaterally terminate the 
negotiation. 593  Meanwhile, a series of violent acts by the Vietnamese persecuting Chinese 
refugees near the border was reported by the Chinese government between August 25 and 26.594 
Clashes on the border also increased from late August 1978. According to Chen Chu, the 
permanent representative of China to the United Nations, the Vietnamese had encroached upon 
the Chinese border in 162 places, carried out armed provocations against China on more than 
700 occasions, and killed or wounded more than 300 Chinese border guards and civilians in the 
half year before the Sino-Vietnamese War.595 Between September and December 1978 Beijing 
sent one note per month to protest the Vietnamese encroachment upon Chinese territory. Those 
notes repeatedly warned that Hanoi needed to take full responsibility for the consequences of its 
provocation and encroachment on China.596  
While the situation on the border was becoming aggravated, the imminent Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia, which became obvious in November 1978, presented China with a strong 
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challenge.597 The issue of China’s response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia emerged as 
a main agenda item when Deng Xiaoping visited Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore in early 
November 1978.598 A Chinese military intervention in Cambodia became a possibility when 
Wang Dongxing, a member of the CCP Politburo, visited Phnom Penh in November 1978 and 
received a request for Chinese intervention to help Cambodia resist the imminent Vietnamese 
invasion. 599  Instead of sending military force into Cambodia, the Chinese decided to offer 
material aid and to support the Pol Pot regime to the end.600 Nevertheless, that decision did not 
fundamentally alter the track toward China’s use of force against Vietnam in 1979. In September 
1978, at a meeting of the General Staff of the PLA, the military leaders had noted that the 
Vietnamese were preparing for their invasion of Cambodia when the Chinese were discussing 
possible “punitive” measures against the Vietnamese. Some of the participants suggested that the 
“punitive” measure should be on a large scale, inflicting pain on the Vietnamese in order to 
stabilize the border and exert political influence upon the situation in Southeast Asia.601 Right 
after the SRV invaded in Cambodia in December 1978, the CMC ordered the Guangzhou and 
Kunming Military Regions to be ready for military action against Vietnam by January 10, 
1979.602  
The Chinese decision-making process entered into a critical stage after the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia. An initial decision for a punitive war against Vietnam was proposed by 
Deng Xiaoping at a CMC meeting on New Year’s Eve.603 This meeting basically decided the 
scale, targets, and timing of the military operation and appointed Xu Shiyou to command 
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operations from Guangxi in the east and Yang Dezhi to command operations from Yunnan in the 
west.604 The approval of the military plan, however, did not result in an immediate attack. On 
January 11, 1979, Deng appointed Yang Yong, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to 
investigate the situation on the border and in the frontier units.605 Yang presented his findings at 
a CMC meeting on January 22.606 His report convinced the participants to reaffirm that a military 
action against Vietnam would be needed.607 The next day, the CMC issued another schedule 
ordering the troops to be ready by February 15.608  
For the Chinese, to obtain Washington’s understanding of China’s intention was one of the 
key considerations for making the war workable. This consideration was partly a result of 
Beijing’s global strategy since the late Mao era, which held that China should pursue Mao’s 
strategy of a global “horizontal line” (一條線, yitiaoxian) to establish a line of defense against 
the Soviet Union stretching from Japan to Europe to the United States.609 Also, Beijing needed 
Washington’s support if it was to avoid being branded an aggressor by world opinion.610 Thus, 
when Deng Xiaoping talked with top American leaders during his trip to the United States in late 
January 1979, he not only explained the need to “punish” Vietnam but also emphasized that the 
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Chinese military action would be limited in scale and duration.611 Deng succeeded in obtaining 
U.S. understanding of China’s decision to go to war.612  
This assurance of the American attitude toward the Chinese military action set the Chinese 
leaders’ minds at ease to execute their war plan against the Vietnamese. On February 11, 1979, 
two days after Deng returned to Beijing, an enlarged CCP Politburo meeting was held, resulting 
in orders to the local commands in Guangxi and Yunnan to launch the attack against Vietnam on 
February 17. 613  On February 14, the CCP Central Committee issued an internal circular 
announcing and explaining the decision to go to war with Vietnam to the party organization of 
the provinces, military regions, and central government.614 Three days later, Chinese troops 
began to cross the border to “teach a lesson” to the Vietnamese. 
 
Analysis of Leaders 
In the Chinese official justification, China’s 1979 war with Vietnam was a punitive 
expedition prompted by the Vietnamese wrongdoings on the Sino-Vietnamese border. The 
wrongdoings the Chinese mentioned included the Vietnamese encroachments upon China’s 
territory and the bloodshed and mistreatment involved in the expulsion of the overseas 
Chinese.615 The Chinese also regarded their military action as a measure to restore order and 
peace in the southern region of China. Hence, this section begins with an examination of the 
influence of these Chinese official justifications upon the decision to go to war. 
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The first time the Chinese brought up the idea of resolving the problems on the border by 
force was probably at a meeting of the General Staff in September 1978. This was after the 
Vietnamese had unilaterally ended negotiations on the border issue and when the negotiations on 
the evacuation of the overseas Chinese had encountered a deadlock. The purpose of that meeting 
was to discuss the possible options for countermeasures against the Vietnamese provocations on 
the border. In the meeting, Zhang Caiqian, one of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, mentioned that 
“Vietnam oppresses cruelly a large number of overseas Chinese and expels them from Vietnam 
to China,” and “the Sino-Vietnamese border is unstable, where Vietnamese troops and 
Vietnamese police unceasingly provoke conflicts.” He then concluded that the participants 
needed to seek a countermeasure and report their suggestion to the central committee.616 All of 
the participants agreed that to punish and suppress the “arrogant” Vietnamese, a military action 
should be considered.617 With regard to the scale and objectives of the military action, the 
participants had two different opinions, even though the Combat Operation Command had 
already proposed a preliminary scheme for the punitive action. Some thought that the scale of 
punitive action should be small, with Trung Khanh618 as the limit of the Chinese advance. Others 
thought that the military action should be on a large scale in order to ensure that the Vietnamese 
would be hit painfully. This kind of military action, they argued, would ensure the economic 
development of the border area on the Chinese side and exert political influence upon the people 
of Southeast Asia.619 
This meeting indicates that the Vietnamese encroachment on the border and mistreatment of 
overseas Chinese that occurred in mid-August would appear to be the initial stimuli leading to 
the Chinese attack. Regardless of what kind of military plan they supported, the participants in 
the General Staff Meeting all seemed to agree that it was necessary to restore the stability on the 
border that had been broken by the Vietnamese. Although the participants did not use this sort of 
language, it would seem that China’s leaders believed that a stable and peaceful border was 
needed to guarantee China’s economic development. And this stable and peaceful border could 
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be achieved by punishing the Vietnamese for their violent behavior. Deng Xiaoping620 may be 
the key person who took this line, especially after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee of the CCP in December 1978, where he consolidated his political position as the 
paramount leader of the CCP and announced a shift of China’s national priorities to economic 
reform and an opening to the outside world.621 For example, in his message of February 16, 1979, 
informing President Carter of China’s final decision for war, Deng wrote: “We are forced to 
make the decision to undertake necessary self-defense operations against Vietnam.” To justify 
the decision, Deng mentioned that the military action “may play a certain role to check the 
ambitions of Vietnam and will benefit the peace and stability of this region.”622  
This justification also appeared in Deng’s comments on the causes of China’s attack on 
March 16, 1979, after the Sino-Vietnamese War. One of Deng’s reasons was to stabilize the 
border in order to sustain the economic reform. He said:  
We want to develop the Four Modernizations. [In doing so,] we need a more stable and steady environment. 
Would it be OK, if [we] let the Soviet revisionists and the Vietnamese threaten us from the north and south 
and disturb us? It is not OK that we are discomposed…we rather want to take advantage of this opportunity to 
test and weigh [the Vietnamese]. The Vietnamese talk so big that they regard themselves as “the third military 
power in the world”…and [they] also set us up as their number one enemy and unceasingly created 
disturbances on our border. If we had not taken action to strike back, its [Vietnam’s] arrogance would have 
been more and more swollen…. It [Vietnam] thought that we would be afraid of the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty. 
The Soviets succeeded in getting Afghanistan and Iran [into their sphere of influence], and are stepping up 
their pace in Vietnam and the East. [Those Soviet actions] have increased the threat to us; therefore, we need 
more stable and steady Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Soviet borders. To secure this condition [we need to] obtain 
the confidence that they would not dare to bully us at [their] will…. Thus, we would have the peace of mind to 
develop the Four Modernizations.623 
                                                 
620 Deng Xiaoping was CCP vice-chairman, vice-chairman of the CMC, deputy premier, and chief of the PLA 
General Staff in 1978. See Zhang, “Deng Xiaoping and China’s Decision to Go to War with Vietnam,” 9. 
621 Zhang, “Deng Xiaoping and China’s Decision to Go to War with Vietnam,” 10; and Ye Yonglie, Cong Hua 
Guofeng dao Deng Xiaoping: Zhonggongshiyijie sanzhong quanhui qianhou (From Hua Guofeng to Deng Xiaoping: 
Before and After the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Party Committee) (Hong Kong: Tiandi Books, 1998), 
522-528. 
622 Declassified Documents Reference System, http://infotrac.galegroup.com (document number: CK3100480164; 
accessed November 2, 2012). 
623 Deng, “Speech after the self-defense counterattack against Vietnam,” March 16, 1979. See 
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/d3959bea6294dd88d0d26b42.html 
175 
 
The Chinese military action, in Deng’s view, was designed to ensure a favorable and stable 
situation for securing the development of the Four Modernizations. Deng presented China’s 
national security and national interests as the major forces behind China’s decision to use force. 
But Deng’s judgmental language criticizing Vietnam as an arrogant actor implies that pragmatic 
calculation was not the only means he used to gauge the necessity of China’s attack on Vietnam.  
In fact, in describing the Vietnamese as misbehaving the Chinese were using language 
common in the CRWT as way to explain their launching of a counterattack that they described as 
self-defense. As they saw matters, the Chinese had unselfishly supported their Vietnamese 
comrades to fight against the U.S. in the Vietnam War. But the Vietnamese seemed not to 
appreciate what the Chinese had done for them. Moreover, the Vietnamese even intentionally 
mistreated and expelled the overseas Chinese in Vietnam and provoked conflicts resulting in 
many Chinese dead and wounded on the border. To the Chinese, those Vietnamese acts not only 
posed a threat to China’s security but also revealed the ungrateful nature of Vietnam.624  
The Chinese propaganda and diplomatic system also made a similar judgment when it 
delivered warning signals to the Vietnamese beginning in October 1978. In its protest of October 
26, 1978, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used the words “outrageous,” “savage,” and “vicious” 
to describe the Vietnamese provocations on the border and concluded that “the Vietnamese 
authorities need to take all of the responsibility for the consequences resulting from [their actions 
violating China’s sovereignty].”625 On November 10, a People’s Daily editorial commented that  
…after crazily opposing and expelling Chinese over the issue of the overseas Chinese, [the Vietnamese] 
further unceasingly provoke conflicts on the Sino-Vietnamese border and have nibbled up China’s 
territory…this savage attitude to defy the Chinese people has reached the stage of intolerability…we seriously 
warn the Vietnamese authorities: immediately retract the dirty hands you have stretched into China’s territory 
and stop the provocation and encroachment on the Sino-Vietnamese border! [You], the Vietnamese authorities, 
don’t treat China’s warning as a puff of wind passing the ear!626 
On December 25, 1978, the People’s Daily issued another editorial titled “There Is a Limit to 
China’s Forbearance,” which significantly increased the level of warning to the Vietnamese. It 
started with a comment: 
                                                 
624 Sanzhongquanhui yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian, vol. 1: 58-61; and Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing huiyi lu 
(Memoir of Liu Huaqing) (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2004), 394. 
625 The People’s Daily, October 27, 1978. 
626 The People’s Daily, November 10, 1978. 
176 
 
In recent days, the Vietnamese authorities’ provocations against China have become more and more 
unrestrained. Vietnamese armed forces have continually encroached upon Chinese territory, killing or 
wounding Chinese fishermen and residents of the border areas. Hanoi is intolerably unscrupulous in its 
bullying of China…. 
The editorial ended with a strong warning:  
There is a limit to the Chinese people’s forbearance and restraint. China has never bullied, and will never bully, 
any country; neither will it allow itself to be bullied by others. It will never attack unless it is attacked. But if it 
is attacked, it will certainly counterattack. China means what it says. We wish to warn the Vietnamese 
authorities that if they count on Moscow’s support to seek a foot after gaining an inch and continue to act in an 
unbridled fashion, they will decidedly meet with the punishment they deserve….627 
Strong condemnation of Vietnamese immorality also appeared in the private meeting where 
the Chinese leaders discussed the decision to use Chinese forces. On January 11, 1979, when 
Deng requested Yang Yong to investigate the situation on the border, he said:628  
Please go to the front to see what the exact situation is. If they [the Vietnamese] still continue creating troubles 
and behave inhumanly, then for those wicked people requiting kindness with enmity we don’t need to be 
polite. There is a limit to our forbearance. [If we] do not teach them a lesson, they will not behave, and we will 
also not feel at ease. 
This instruction not only is congruent with the general Chinese perspective toward the 
Vietnamese, but also reveals how Deng rated the moral standing of the Vietnamese. To Deng, 
the possible Chinese military action was aimed to punish and caution the Vietnamese, whose 
wicked and ungrateful behavior exceeded the limits of China’s forbearance.  
A clearer record indicating the influence of the CRWT is probably the instruction issued by 
the enlarged Politburo meeting of February 11, 1979. The instruction read: 
On February 17, the frontier forces of the Yunnan and Guangxi military regions will carry out a limited attack 
to strike at the aggressive arrogance of the Vietnamese troops and to defend the security of the border. China 
will not occupy an inch of Vietnam’s territory, but also will not allow others to occupy an inch of our 
territory – this is what is called punishment. Chinese always scrupulously abide by [the belief in] ending war 
with war (yizhanzhizhan, 以戰止戰), the position of active defense, the use of military prowess to ensure 
peace (zhigeweiwu, 止戈為武), and [the doctrine that] “We will never attack unless we are attacked; But if we 
are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.”629 
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Obviously, the Chinese adopted traditional wording to express their logic and justification for 
launching the attack, especially the idea of “the use of military prowess to ensure peace” 
(zhigeweiwu, 止戈為武). As we have already seen, this idea first appeared in King Zhuang of 
Chu’s comment on the purpose and meaning of military force, as recorded in the Zuo Zhuan. 
This indicates a direct linkage between the ideas of the CRWT and the Chinese leaders’ decision 
to go to war with Vietnam in 1979.  
Behind the official justification of self-defense, the Chinese seem to have regarded their 
military action as a measure to stabilize the border by punishing the Vietnamese for their 
misbehavior. The Chinese consistently revealed that one of the goals of their military action was 
to stop the troubles the Vietnamese made on the border in order to sustain favorable conditions 
for economic development. But this calculation of China’s interests was not the only 
consideration influencing the Chinese leaders’ decision. The Chinese also presented their 
judgment of the moral standing of the Vietnamese when they were justifying their decision to 
punish them. In this case, the Vietnamese encroachment on China’s territory and mistreatment of 
overseas Chinese in Vietnam led the Chinese to believe that the SRV was so ungrateful and 
wicked that it deserved to be punished. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia also had an effect 
on Chinese decision-making, which will now be examined.  
It is important to clarify the time when the Chinese started to “seriously” consider military 
operation as the “necessary” measure to handle the situation that China had encountered since 
mid-1978. This starting time will significantly affect my inference regarding the influence of the 
Vietnamese military action in Cambodia upon Chinese decision-making. My starting point is 
Deng Xiaoping’s speech of March 16, 1979. In this speech, Deng mentioned that deciding to 
attack Vietnam had not been an easy process; instead, the Central Committee and CMC had 
come to that conclusion only after almost two months’ consideration and deliberation.630 The 
duration of the almost two months’ consideration is the key to trace the starting time of the 
Chinese decision. 
According to President Carter’s recollection, based on his conversation with Deng Xiaoping, 
he concluded that the Chinese had already made up their mind to attack Vietnam before Deng’s 
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visit to the United States in late January 1979.631 More recently, the military historian Zhang 
Xiaoming has also argued that Deng’s trip to the U.S. was not an attempt to “test the water”; 
rather, Deng had already made up his mind before that time. The reason the Chinese did not 
attack in January was that they were not fully ready to execute the operation successfully.632 
According to these formulations, the Chinese had made their decision no later than January 28, 
1979, the date when Deng Xiaoping left for the U.S.  
The moves of Deng and the CMC in January 1979 also indirectly support this inference. 
Deng’s January 11 instruction to Yang Yong to investigate the situation on the border suggests 
that as of that moment he had not yet made the final decision. According to Yang’s recollection, 
his report of January 22 convinced the high-ranking leaders, including Deng, to reaffirm the 
necessity of China’s attack on Vietnam.633 The CMC immediately issued an instruction on the 
next day demanding that the combat forces be ready by February 15.634 The chronological order 
of Chinese moves in late January confirms the inferences of Carter and Zhang, although the 
Politburo did not issue the final order to carry out the attack until February 11. Hence, projecting 
two months back from late January of 1979, the result indicates that the time when the Chinese 
started to seriously consider the necessity of China’s attack on Vietnam should not be earlier 
than late November, 1978, or more specifically November 23, 1978. Chinese actions from late 
November through early December 1978 also support the importance of Vietnam’s attack on 
Cambodia as a relevant factor triggering China’s decision to go to war. At the meeting of the 
General Staff on November 23, the intelligence department of the PLA shared information 
regarding the imminent Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia with the participants, while the 
operations department proposed a revised and enlarged military plan. 635  Right after the 
Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, the CMC immediately held a meeting on December 7 to discuss 
a military operation against Vietnam, and on December 8 ordered the Yunnan and Guangxi 
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military regions to be ready for war by January 10, 1979.636 These records suggest the critical 
influence of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, signs of which became clearer and clear 
from late November of 1978, upon the Chinese decision-making. 
Although the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia affected China’s decision for war, it seems 
that the logic used by China’s leaders was not entirely the same as the justification of helping a 
small state resist a stronger state’s invasion. The attack was very likely designed for the purpose 
of punishment rather than as an action to divert or stop the Vietnamese attack on Cambodia. The 
evidence for this inference can be traced in the meeting of the General Staff in September 1978. 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of that meeting was to discuss a plan for military 
countermeasures in response to Vietnamese moves since the middle of 1978. Before the 
participants were asked to offer their suggestions, members of the intelligence department of the 
General Staff reported that the Vietnamese were highly likely to invade Cambodia. After 
learning this intelligence, some of the participants still suggested that the scale of China’s attack 
should be tightly constrained, with the advance of Chinese troops stopping in the area of Trung 
Khanh and the objective being to annihilate a Vietnamese militia regiment. However, the same 
intelligence seemed to move another group of participants to take a tougher line in designing 
China’s countermeasures. They suggested that China’s attack should be strong enough to inflict 
real pain on the Vietnamese. One of them, Zhou Deli, the chief of staff of the Guangxi Military 
Region, estimated that a military action on a small scale would not have the effect of diverting 
the Vietnamese troops from invading Cambodia because so small a Chinese attacking force 
significantly threaten the vital parts of Vietnam. He further argued that Chinese military action 
on a small scale would not satisfy the people of Cambodia and Southeast Asia politically.637 In 
other words, Zhou Deli’s intention was to help Cambodia’s fight against Vietnam’s attack 
through a massive Chinese invasion of the northern part of Vietnam. However, as will be seen, 
only parts of this suggestion were accepted by high-ranking Chinese leaders. 
China’s response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was one of the key issues when 
Deng Xiaoping visited Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore in November 1978. Especially during 
his trip to Singapore, Deng explained several times to Lee Kuan Yew how China would respond 
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to the possible Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. When he talked about the situation in 
Southeast Asia, Deng mentioned that “the real and urgent problem was a possible massive 
invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam.” And what China would do? Deng answered that “what 
China would do would depend on how far the Vietnamese went.” Deng further analyzed:  
If Vietnam succeeded in controlling the whole of Indochina, many Asian countries would be exposed. The 
Indochina federation would expand its influence and serve the global strategy of the Soviet Union to move 
southward into the Indian Ocean. Vietnam’s role was that of a Cuba of the East. The Soviets were drastically 
increasing their Pacific fleet. The world had witnessed great turbulence in the last two years as was evident 
from events in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, all pointing to a southward thrust by the South Union. 
China’s policy was to counter the strategic deployment of the Soviet Union, whether in Zaire or Somalia. 
Wherever the Soviet Union attacked, China would help to repel the attack. To have peace, ASEAN had to 
unite with China and repel the Soviet Union and its Cuba in Southeast Asia, Vietnam.638 
When Lee later asked again about China’s response to the possible Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia, Deng repeated his earlier formulation that what China did would depend on how far 
the Vietnamese went. But this time, Deng’s answer gave Lee an impression that “if the 
Vietnamese did not cross the Mekong River, it would not be so dangerous, but if they did, then 
China would do something.”639 
Indeed, these formulations indicate that Deng’s thinking was largely influenced by a 
pragmatic and realistic view of China’s strategic environment, which regarded the Vietnamese 
military action in Cambodia as a Soviet strategic move. But Deng’s later commitment to the 
Chinese response presented a slightly different perspective from that of realpolitik. At another 
meeting with Lee, Deng promised that “China’s approach would not be affected by the 
conclusion of the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty of friendship and cooperation.” Then, with a deadly 
serious look, Deng concluded that “China would punish the Vietnamese if they attacked 
Cambodia,” and “China would make them pay a heavy price for it, and the Soviet Union would 
discover that supporting Vietnam was too heavy a burden.” 640  Although the concern with 
countermeasures against the Soviet strategic moves was still influential, Deng’s solemn promise 
also gave prominence to the punitive character of China’s response to the possible Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia.  
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Nevertheless, it seems that Deng’s promise of a possible China’s military action had not 
become the consensus among China’s leaders as of early November 1978. The Pol Pot regime 
had asked the Chinese to dispatch forces to help the Cambodian fight against the Vietnamese 
when Wang Dongxing, a vice-chairman of the CCP, visited Phnom Penh between November 5 
and 8.641 The high-ranking Chinese leaders had a series of discussions on Pol Pot’s request for 
China’s armed support after Wang returned to Beijing. Su Zhenhua, the party political 
commissar of the PLA Navy and a CCP Politburo member, suggested that a naval detachment 
could be sent to Cambodia. Xu Shiyou, the commander of the Guangzhou Military Region, 
requested permission to attack Vietnam from Guangxi Province.642 Neither request was approved 
by the Party Center. The reasons the CCP did not approve an immediate use of force supporting 
the Cambodians, presented in Geng Biao’s speech in a CMC meeting on January 16, 1979,643 can 
be summarized as follows: First, as a socialist state, China’s national policy was not to dispatch 
armed forces, airplanes, and warships to other states, and to oppose the states that did so. The 
Chinese were concerned that once they dispatched armed forces to Cambodia, not only would 
that principle be violated but it might also cause anxiety about China’s intentions among the 
states in Southeast Asia. In this situation, China might lose its influence upon the Third World 
because the violation of principle would mark China itself as just the sort of hegemon that China 
had persistently opposed. Second, if China dispatched its armed forces into Cambodia before 
Vietnam did, the Chinese believed that they would lose their ground for criticizing the 
Vietnamese aggression in international arenas such as the United Nations. In their assessment, 
the Vietnamese were likely to make an unfounded countercharge branding China as the 
aggressor. Third, the complex circumstances of terrains, politics, and economics in Indochina 
would not allow a quick end to the conflict. Furthermore, China lacked the capability to engage 
in a war of attrition in that region. Fourth, China should not get bogged down in the mud, which 
was what the Soviet Union expected China to do in Indochina. In this situation, the Soviets and 
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Vietnamese would gain an upper hand in global opinion and obtain more strategic 
maneuverability against China.644 
The Chinese attitude toward the use of force in Vietnam, however, became more and more 
resolute from late November 1978 when the Vietnamese preparations for attacking Cambodia 
became evident. On November 23, the CMC held a meeting to discuss the situation in Indochina 
and China’s response. Chinese intelligence affirmed that the Vietnamese were about to launch an 
attack on Cambodia. Meanwhile, the General Staff proposed a revised military plan, which 
apparently was influenced by the participants urging a hard line policy toward Vietnam in the 
meeting of General Staff in September, to carry out a larger and longer military operation against 
Vietnam. This revised plan indicates that the preliminary scheme for the punitive expedition 
proposed by the Combat Operation Command in September, a small-scale use of force, was 
already insufficient to meet the new needs resulting from the latest developments in late 
November 1978. Obviously, the revised plan was designed to respond to the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia, although some Chinese generals were still uncertain of its efficacy. They 
estimated that the implementation of the revised plan might pin down some of the Vietnamese 
forces, but could not entirely stop them from carrying out the invasion of Cambodia.645  
It should be mentioned that the plan to support the Cambodians by attacking Vietnam was 
not without dissent. In Zhou Deli’s recollection, some leaders646 worried about the unfavorable 
consequences that the military action would bring. They thought that while China attacked the 
northern part of Vietnam to support Cambodia, the Soviets could attack the northern part of 
China in order to support Vietnam. In this case, China would be exposed to the predicament of a 
two-front war. Moreover, the United States, in their assessment, would enter the war only at an 
opportune time when it recognized that it could profit from intervention. Some of the dissenters 
argued that once China attacked Vietnam, China might suffer from an unfavorable climate of 
global opinion holding that China, a strong state, was bullying Vietnam, a small state. Moreover, 
the dissenters were also concerned that China, just recovered from the turmoil created by the 
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Gang of Four, should concentrate all capacities on economic construction rather than a war that it 
could not afford.647 
The voices favoring an attack on Vietnam emphasized that China, as a socialist state, had 
consistently supported states fighting in just wars and had earned a good reputation in Asia. Thus, 
they asked, “how could we be indifferent to the Vietnamese aggression abusing the sovereignty 
of another state,” and “how could we ignore the threat that the Vietnamese military power posed 
to the peace and tranquility of Southeast Asia?” They also added that the “evil talon” the 
Vietnamese used to seek hegemony had already reached China’s territory, severely damaging the 
normal life of the Chinese people and breaking the construction of the Four Modernizations. 
Hence, China should fight a war against Vietnam.648 
The shift in the Chinese attitude toward the scale and objectives of their punitive expedition 
against Vietnam by late November 1978 is critical for examining the influence of ideas of 
righteous war upon the Chinese decision. The preliminary scheme of September 1978 indicates 
that initially the Chinese preferred a small and very restrained punitive action to a large-scale 
military action as the solution to the border problems. When the Vietnamese plan to invade 
Cambodia became increasingly evident in November 1978, the Chinese came to favor a stronger 
attack on Vietnam. This new attitude generated the revised plan of November 23 according to 
which China would execute a large-scale military action against Vietnam. As mentioned earlier, 
this shift of the scheme of use of force suggests that the imminent Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia had convinced the Chinese that their original plan no longer satisfied the newly 
developing needs – China had to respond forcefully to the Vietnamese aggression. However, 
based on their assessment, the Chinese generals understood that unless Chinese troops could 
present a severe threat to the Vietnamese (e.g., threatening to attack Hanoi), the ability of 
China’s military action to stop the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was uncertain. In other 
words, unless the scale and ambition of China’s attack significantly threatened the survival of the 
SRV, the Chinese could hardly stop or divert the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia from being 
carried out. But as the dissents showed, if China did so, China’s military action might trigger a 
Soviet attack that would bring an unwanted two-front war. Apparently, the Chinese were aware 
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of this scenario while crafting the revised plan, in which the time, scale, and operational area of 
China’s attack were limited. Thus, the revised plan seemed to be a scheme for a punitive 
expedition without the certainty of stopping the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.  
Moreover, the revision of the plan and the debate among China’s leaders over the scale of 
the operation suggest an important role the ideas of righteous war might have played in decision-
making when the Chinese were considering two different courses of action both suggested by 
pragmatic calculation. The Soviet factor indeed played an important part in the deliberations of 
the Chinese as they planned their attack on Vietnam. As the dissenting views mentioned above 
show, the Chinese worried that the Soviet response to China’s attack on Vietnam would force 
China to engage in a two-front war.649 In this regard, a massive Chinese invasion of Vietnam 
would risk provoking the Soviet Union to launch a massive invasion of the northern part of 
China to support its Vietnamese ally. This kind of reasoning dictated that the best option for the 
Chinese was to carry out a small-scale military action. But this argument could not persuade 
those leaders who believed that China had the moral responsibility to support the Cambodians 
and to assure the states of Southeast Asia, such as Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia, that 
Vietnamese expansion would be checked.650 In their view, China should do more to respond to 
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in order to fulfill that moral responsibility. However, this 
does not mean that pragmatic calculation was entirely ignored in their assessment of China’s 
decision to use force; rather, considerations of morality seem to have carried more weight in 
determining China’s response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The revised plan of late 
November supports this inference about the influence of moral responsibility. On one hand, the 
revised plan would not be a prolonged invasion of Vietnam that might bog China down in the 
quagmire of an occupation of Vietnam and expose China to the danger of Soviet invasion. On 
the other hand, the scale of the revised operation was large enough to give the appearance of 
upholding China’s commitment to support the Cambodians and perhaps satisfy the need to check 
Vietnamese ambition. In other words, the revised plan suggested a military operation with a 
strongly punitive character, in which China kept its promise by slapping the Vietnamese in the 
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face with a strength that not only had the potential to humiliate and discipline them but also was 
carefully calibrated to prevent a massive Soviet invasion of China. 
A similar perspective was also revealed during Deng’s visit to the U.S. in late January of 
1979. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, before Deng’s visit the issue of Vietnam’s attack on 
Cambodia had been a major agenda item in the communications between Chinese and American 
officials. Chinese officials held that “the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was a Soviet-
sponsored aggression designed to strengthen Vietnam as a base for Soviet operations in 
Southeast Asia.” This move, as the Chinese leaders argued, represented “a strategic threat to 
China’s security, and a longer-range threat to the stability of Southeast Asia.”651 Messages from 
China’s leaders gave Brzezinski an impression that Beijing was determined to retaliate against 
the Vietnamese who had invaded and displaced the Pol Pot regime, a close ally of China.652 
At his first private meeting with President Carter, Deng informed him of China’s decision to 
use force by repeating the same argument about China’s countermeasure against the Soviet 
strategic deployment.653 Deng also added that China “considered the military action necessary to 
put a restraint on the wild ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them an appropriate limited 
lesson.”654 He further emphasized that the duration and scale of the “lesson” would be limited.655 
What Deng requested of the U.S. was to offer “moral support” in the international arena.656 After 
hearing Deng’s formulation, Carter expressed his concerns that the Vietnamese, who were 
increasingly isolated and subject to condemnation in the world community because of their 
aggression against Cambodia, would regain sympathy from some nations that would brand China 
as a culprit if Chinese forces moved toward Hanoi.657 Carter also pointed out that China’s 
potential military move would not be congruent with the agreement Beijing and Washington 
achieved in their new relationship to contribute toward greater peace and stability in Asia.658 
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Deng thanked Carter for his comments, but still insisted that “it was highly desirable for China 
that its arrogant neighbors know they could not disturb it and other countries in the area with 
impunity.”659  
The next morning, Carter and Deng met again in the Oval Office. Carter gave Deng a 
handwritten note summarizing his reasons for discouraging a Chinese invasion of Vietnam.660 
Deng expressed his appreciation for Carter’s comments, but reiterated that “China must still 
teach Vietnam a lesson”; otherwise, “the Soviets might use Vietnam the way they had used 
Cuba.” Deng also asserted that “China had the necessary strength to carry the operation through” 
and “it would be short, lasting only ten to twenty days.”661  
These formulations reflected a decision that mingled pragmatic calculation with 
considerations of morality. It was reasonable and feasible for the Chinese to win the 
understanding of the United States for China’s decision to attack Vietnam by emphasizing the 
threat that the Vietnamese military action in Cambodia, as an adjunct of Soviet strategic 
deployment, posed to the security of Southeast Asia and China. This pragmatic calculation 
would help the Americans make sense of China’s decision. But it is also worth noting that Deng 
adopted judgmental language to persuade the Americans and justify his decision at the same time. 
Defining the attack as a punitive expedition is another key point for observing the influence 
of righteous war thought. From November 1978 onward, the Chinese consistently presented their 
attack as a punitive expedition. Deng used essentially the same language with Carter in late 
January 1979 and Lee in early November 1978, stating that China’s intention was to “punish” the 
Vietnamese wrongdoings. This idea is different from the idea of helping a small state to fight 
against a stronger state’s invasion, but similar to the idea of punishing a disobedient. In his 
research on Sino-Vietnamese relations, Zhai Qiang pointed out that in addition to their grasp of 
realpolitik, China’s leaders had fully inherited China’s historical legacy, which includes a Sino-
centric view of the world that regards the small nations on China’s periphery, including Vietnam, 
as inferior and within the orbit of China’s influence.662 Zhang Xiaoming has also argued that this 
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kind of worldview influenced the Chinese to make the decision to attack Vietnam.663  The 
Chinese leaders have always argued that China’s attack was a punishment imposed upon 
Vietnam for its ingratitude and misbehavior. This formulation actually exposed the assumption 
that China’s superior status, regardless of whether it is based on virtue or power, gives it the right 
to correct the wrongdoings and disobedience of inferior states – especially those nearby. The 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia allowed the Chinese to manifest and amplify this sort of idea, 
especially in their condemnation of Vietnam’s immorality.  
Similar to their judgment of Vietnamese provocations on their border with China, China’s 
leaders also regarded the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as immoral and ungrateful behavior. 
Xu Shiyou was probably the most hawkish of the generals who had been urging an attack on 
Vietnam since early November 1978. After he learned of Vietnam’s preparation for invading 
Cambodia, Xu made a very straightforward judgment: 
How does such a little Vietnam dare to dominate Southeast Asia! It is too arrogant! There is no way to not 
teach it a lesson!664 
After the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia, Deng also delivered a strong condemnation of 
Vietnam’s immorality when he received Norodom Sihanouk, the former King and Prime 
Minister of Cambodia, on January 7, 1979. He said:  
Recently, the Vietnamese expansionists launched a new war of massive aggression against Cambodia. [They] 
wantonly bombed everywhere, brutally slaughtered peaceful residents, occupied a tract of land, and committed 
a monstrous crime…  The savage aggression and arrogant ambition of the Vietnamese authorities has been 
clearly exposed, [and it] caused the Asia-Pacific states and their people to be on alert. They understand that the 
bloodshed and insistence on combat of the Cambodian people was not only for defending their own national 
independence and sovereignty, but is also closely related to the security, peace, and stability of the Asia-
Pacific states … They…would never want to see the Soviets and Vietnam rampage and wantonly invade the 
region of Asia-Pacific.665 
      The condemnation of Vietnam’s immorality was also found in Chinese diplomatic and 
propaganda warnings beginning from mid-December 1978. Especially in January 1979, 
condemnation of the Vietnamese actions in Cambodia as immoral became a significant part of 
China’s warnings. On December 16, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement that: 
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The Chinese government and Chinese people resolutely support the just standpoint of the Cambodian 
government, and condemn the brutal behavior of the Vietnamese authorities who have invaded and subverted 
Democratic Kampuchea. This savage military invasion and subversion that the Vietnamese authorities have 
made against a sovereign state is the most serious and violent trampling on the doctrine of international 
relations, and a severe threat to the security and stability of the regions of Southeast Asia, Asia, and the Pacific. 
The Chinese government and Chinese people resolutely support the just combat of the Cambodian people 
defending their national independence and sovereignty.666  
On January 7, the People’s Daily released a commentary with the title “The Reckless Aggression 
Must Be Stopped,” which strongly condemned the immoral behavior of the Vietnamese in 
Cambodia. It mentioned:  
The Vietnamese authorities outrageously started a war of massive aggression against Cambodia… The 
Vietnamese authorities’ war of aggression against Cambodia is a dirty war without a declaration of war… This 
war of the strong bullying the weak that the Vietnamese authorities are carrying out is a war vainly attempting 
to conquer an independent nation which is weak, and [it is ] an unjust war [resulting from the Vietnamese 
authorities’] perfidy… This reckless behavior of the Vietnamese authorities tramples down every principle in 
international relations, completely exposing the extreme madness of the outward expansion of this emerging 
local-hegemonist… The Vietnamese authorities have become the malefactor violating the peace and stability 
of Asia and the World… To brotherly Cambodia which is suffering from such a brutal aggression, the Chinese 
people would never be indifferent. The Chinese people will continue to offer all kinds of help to the 
Cambodian people.667 
On January 8, the People’s Daily released another commentary on the Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia with almost the same formulation. In addition, the People’s Daily added what Deng 
had said in his talk with Sihanouk, that “the Vietnamese aggressor has committed a monstrous 
crime.”668 Chinese propaganda reiterated the same statement on January 10 when the Xinhua 
News Agency released a report titled “Guilty of Perfidy, Requiting Kindness with Enmity” to 
condemn the Vietnamese wrongdoings.669 Meanwhile, similar condemnation was appearing in 
China’s diplomatic offensive to gain support in the international arena. On January 15, 1979, 
when the Chinese government sent its letter condemning the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 
to the U.N. Security Council, it used strong language to describe the Vietnamese misbehavior: 
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…in late December last year, the Vietnamese aggressors…launched a frenzied and savage aggression on an 
unprecedented scale against Democratic Kampuchea in defiance of the strong opposition of the world's people 
and the stern condemnation of international opinion.670  
    These formulations indicate that the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia reinforced the 
Chinese belief that the SRV was ungrateful and vicious, especially when the Chinese leaders 
used “arrogant,” “savage,” and “monstrous” to describe the Vietnamese. These words imply that 
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia confirmed the Chinese assignment of an inferior moral 
status to the SRV, which may have helped convince them to make the decision to attack Vietnam. 
China’s propaganda activities in January also support this inference. The People’s Daily 
concentrated its condemnation more on the immorality of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 
than on their provocations on the border in January 1979, when the Chinese decision-making 
process entered the critical stage. It seems that the reaffirmation of the moral inferiority of 
Vietnam helped the Chinese to confirm their decision to attack it as the righteous thing to do.  
This review of Chinese thinking shows that both the Sino-Vietnamese border disputes and 
the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia affected the Chinese decision to attack Vietnam in 1979. 
The Sino-Vietnamese disputes, especially the Vietnamese encroachment on China’s territory, 
allowed the Chinese to justify self-defense by armed force. However, the justification of self-
defense did not convince the Chinese to carry out a large-scale attack at the initial stage. Until 
late November 1979 when the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was imminent China’s leaders 
had not favored a large-scale military operation. To the Chinese, the decision to go to war was 
for more than self-defense and the stopping of the Vietnamese violence; rather, it was a 
punishment imposed on Vietnam for its wrongdoings and disobedience.  
 
Analysis of the People’s Daily 
This section examines the morality-based condemnation of the Vietnamese in the People’s 
Daily before the outbreak of the Sino-Vietnamese War. The period examined starts from July 3, 
1978, when the Chinese government officially ceased all of its assistance to the SRV. This move 
was the most significant sign of the end of the close relationship between the PRC and SRV and 
an important turning point in China’s Vietnam policy. The examination ends at February 17, 
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1979, the outbreak of Sino-Vietnamese War. The total days of observation are 230. The items 
observed include reports and comments on the Vietnamese encroachments on China’s territory, 
the Vietnamese government’s mistreatment of the overseas Chinese, and the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia. The total number of morality-based condemnations is 385, which yields a 
daily average of 1.67. This rate occupies the second highest rank among the six cases included in 
this study.  
To examine variation in the use of morality-based condemnation, I set December 6, 1978, 
as the watershed date. As mentioned above, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia had an 
important impact on China’s decision to use force against the SRV. Hence it is proper to use the 
date of Vietnam’s attack on Cambodia as the critical moment for China’s leader to make the 
decision. This watershed divides the entire period into two stages: from July 3 to December 6, 
1978, and from December 7, 1978, to February 17, 1979. There are 175 days of observation in 
the first stage, and 73 days in the second stage. The People’s Daily used a total of 193 words of 
morality-based condemnation in the first stage, which results in a frequency of 1.229 as the daily 
average. A total of 192 words were used in the second stage, which yields a frequency of 2.63 as 
the daily average.  
Apparently, the Chinese doubled their morality-based condemnation after the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia. This result suggests that Chinese propaganda significantly lowered its 
evaluation of Vietnam’s moral standing after the SRV attacked Cambodia. This is congruent 
with my assumption that an increased frequency of morality-based condemnation should 
correspond with the outcome of a Chinese decision to go to war. This variation of the frequency 
implies that when the Chinese government places increased emphasis on the moral inferiority of 
its opponent, then China’s decision for war may be expected. 
 
Conclusion 
Evidence from this case does not damage my hypothesis about the influence of the CRWT; 
rather, it shows that the ideas of the CRWT had the potential to encourage China’s leaders to 
decide to go to war. The just causes that these Chinese leaders used to legitimize their decision 
resembled the justifications of self-defense, stopping violence, and punishing disobedient states 
that are part of the CRWT. The Chinese initially pondered a military action for self-defense in 
September 1978 when the series of Sino-Vietnamese negotiations deadlocked and the 
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Vietnamese encroachments on China’s territory showed no sign of ceasing. China’s leaders 
regarded their potential military action as a measure to restore order and stability on the Sino-
Vietnamese border. But the preliminary scheme of China’s military operation suggests that the 
justifications of self-defense and stopping violence did not lead the Chinese leaders to decide 
upon a large-scale punitive expedition.  
The Chinese significantly altered their attitude to favor a massive attack on Vietnam after 
the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in December 1978. This period witnessed the influence of the 
CRWT upon the process of the shift of the Chinese leaders’ mind-sets. The Vietnamese move 
not only convinced China’s leaders that China’s security had been significantly threatened, but 
also helped them to reaffirm that Vietnam deserved to be punished by China. Moreover, some 
Chinese leaders seemed to believe that China should do more to respond to the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia so as to fulfill the moral responsibility they shouldered. This perspective is 
slightly different from the idea of helping a small state to fight against a stronger state’s invasion, 
but is similar to the idea of punishing a disobedient state. This kind of thinking seems to have 
derived from the strategic relations among China, the Soviet Union, and the SRV in late 1978. 
As Chinese generals calculated in private, unless China carried out a massive attack even larger 
than what was actually done in 1979, China could not completely stop the Vietnamese armed 
forces from invading Cambodia. Such a massive invasion would expose China to the danger of a 
Soviet invasion of the northern part of China. This pragmatic calculation discouraged China’s 
leaders from undertaking a massive invasion of Vietnam. However, the Chinese also believed 
that unless the Vietnamese had been properly punished, China would lose its reputation and 
superior moral standing. This consideration of morality or keeping promises persuaded them to 
design a sophisticated plan for limited war which not only satisfied the need to support the 
Cambodians by humiliating the Vietnamese, but also avoided the danger of engaging in a two-
front war with the Soviet Union and the SRV. This train of thought was revealed in Deng’s 
conversations with the American leaders in late January, when he explained that China’s military 
action was to punish the “arrogant” Vietnamese who were bullying their neighbors.  
The examination of China’s condemnation of Vietnam’s immorality also supports the view 
that elements of righteous war thinking influenced Chinese decision-making. The Chinese 
consistently regarded the SRV as an ungrateful state that returned China’s kindness with enmity. 
Vietnamese encroachments on China’s territory and the SRV’s mistreatment of the overseas 
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Chinese convinced the Chinese that their judgment was correct. The Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia led the Chinese to reaffirm the inferior status of the Vietnamese, who were ungrateful 
and wicked. This judgment reinforced the Chinese leaders’ determination to launch a war against 
Vietnam. 
The analysis of the People’s Daily yields a result congruent with the analysis of leaders. 
The Chinese media doubled its morality-based condemnation of Vietnam after the Vietnamese 
invaded Cambodia. This variation suggests that the Chinese affirmed the inferior moral status of 
the SRV when decision-making was entering a critical period in January 1979. It also can be 
found in this case that China’s leaders emphasized the righteous cause for their decision after the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. This congruent result presents a pattern similar to those 
found in the cases of the Korean War and the Sino-Indian War, where we see both the expression 
of righteous cause during decision-making and an increased frequency after the critical moment 
for decision. This result supports my assumption that a Chinese decision for war is likely to 
occur when the Chinese reaffirm the righteous legitimacy of their cause by highlighting the 
moral inferiority of their opponent. 
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Chapter 9 - Conclusion 
This research has examined the role that the Chinese tradition of righteous war played in the 
process by which China’s leaders decided to go to war during the period from 1950 to 1979. In 
this study, I argue that the Chinese concept of righteous war was applied by Chinese leaders as a 
frame of reference to establish the legitimacy of a decision to go to war. This framework 
includes two major ideas: righteousness-based justification and competent authority. The 
justifications of stopping violence, punishing a disobedient state, helping a weaker state against a 
stronger state’s invasion, and self-defense are regularly defined as the righteous causes for going 
to war in the CRWT. The identification of competent authority is often relevant to the perception 
of moral standing, in which a war can be justified by facing an opponent morally inferior to 
oneself. When the decision for war has been justified within this frame of reference, the Chinese 
are prone to put that legitimized decision into action.  
Moreover, the Chinese concept of righteous war may play a more important role in the 
decision for war when Chinese leaders encounter an impasse in which two opposite courses of 
action are suggested by their calculations. The righteous legitimacy of one course of action may 
encourage Chinese leaders to enter a war even when the likely consequence may not appear to 
favor the Chinese. Also, the Chinese concept of righteous war can also enrich Johnson and 
Tierney’s theory about the shift of actor’s mind-sets in decision making because the CRWT may 
function as a catalyst for the shift. 
 
Findings 
The findings from the case studies and analyses of the People’s Daily in this project are 
supportive of the main line of interpretation of the study as a whole (see Table 9-1). Although it 
is hard to demonstrate that the CRWT had decisive influence, this research has found that 
Chinese assessment of just cause based on the CRWT may have exerted influence under certain 
circumstances, such as in the documentary evidence of Chinese decision making in the cases of 
the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnamese War. 
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Table 9-1 Results from the Cases 
 Debate on 
course of 
action 
Perceived war 
as imminent 
Visible 
influence of 
the CRWT 
Freq. of 
morality-based 
condemnation 
Decision for 
war 
1950 Yes Yes Yes Increased Yes 
1958 No No No Negligible No 
1962 Not Clear Yes Yes Increased Yes 
1964-1965 No No Partial Decreased No 
1969 No Partial No Decreased No 
1978-1979 Yes Yes Yes Increased Yes 
 
In the cases of the Korean War and the Sino-Vietnamese War, the concept of righteous war 
not only was applied by China’s leaders to establish the legitimacy of China’s decision for war, 
but it also encouraged the Chinese to make such a decision when another train of pragmatic 
thought urged an opposite course of action. In the case of the Korean War, Mao and Zhou 
highlighted the justification of saving North Korea from ruin to persuade their comrades that 
sending forces to fight in Korea was the right decision, even though some viewed intervention in 
support of North Korea as a poor strategy based on their calculation of China’s own interests. 
China’s leaders acted similarly in their decision making for the attack on Vietnam in 1979. The 
concept of righteous war encouraged China’s leaders to decide upon a large-scale punitive 
expedition when some of them had favored a very limited military action based on their concerns 
about the strategic relationship among China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union, in which China 
would face a two-front war if a Chinese attack on Vietnam provoked Soviet retaliation. 
The case of the Sino-Indian War provides moderate evidence supporting my argument 
about the CRWT. Mao made a moral assessment of the situation China faced during his 
decision-making. The concept of righteous war seemed to help him establish the legitimacy of 
military action against India and eventually to convince him to make the final decision for war. 
But the other leaders seem only to have used righteousness-based justification to legitimize the 
decision after it had been made. 
All these cases suggest that the Chinese concept of righteous war had the potential to alter 
Chinese leaders’ thinking in making decisions. In the case of the Korean War, Mao’s statements 
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offer more convincing evidence that the application of the CRWT and the shift of mind-set 
occurred simultaneously during the critical stage of his decision making. This pattern is also 
found in the case of the Sino-Indian War, where the process of legitimizing the decision and the 
shift in mind-set occurred simultaneously in Mao’s final decision making. In the case of the 
Sino-Vietnamese War, the establishment of righteous legitimacy drew China’s leaders closer to 
the final decision for the attack on Vietnam after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.  
The cases without the outcome of China’s decision to go to war help to clarify the 
circumstances in which the influence of the CRWT is unlikely to be felt. Those cases indicate 
that when the Chinese-identified just cause has not actually been met, China’s leaders would not 
initiate the implement of a decision for war.  The application of the CRWT can be found in the 
cases of the Vietnam War and the Sino-Soviet border conflict, as a frame of reference for 
legitimizing the possible Chinese decision to go to war. Especially in the case of the Vietnam 
War, Mao made a clear pronouncement on the morality of war to the effect that a Chinese use of 
force outside Chinese territory would be regarded as a crime, and it would not be a crime only if 
there were a legitimate cause.671 At the same time, these two cases point to the limits of the 
influence of the CRWT upon Chinese decision-making. In 1964 and 1965, the Chinese did not 
carry out a Korean War-style intervention in the Vietnam War because the Chinese-identified 
preconditions that would provide legitimate causes were never realized, due to the fact that the 
U.S. did not attack China or launch a massive invasion of North Vietnam. The underlying 
thinking of Chinese leaders’ moves in 1964 and 1965 was the same as in the Korean War, when 
the trigger for intervention was met, but that trigger was never reached in the Vietnam War.  
In the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, the Chinese assessment of Soviet invasion provided the 
just cause of self-defense to China’s leaders. However, the Soviet Union did not launch the 
invasion as the Chinese feared and the risk was eased by the communication between Chinese 
and Soviet leaders (especially Zhou and Kosygin). This indicates that the precondition for the 
Chinese to implement their decision for self-defense was not met in 1969. Moreover, the case of 
the Sino-Soviet conflict shows that the consideration of righteous war did not override pragmatic 
calculation when the Chinese were making the decision for self-defense against the danger of a 
                                                 
671 In this case, either China was attacked by the U.S. or North Vietnam was suffering from a massive U.S. invasion 
could render the legitimate causes. 
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superior opponent’s invasion. This suggests that the traditional Chinese concept of righteous war 
would exert no visible influence upon decision-making when the Chinese leaders were 
confronting a scenario in which China was in danger of being invaded by a superior enemy. 
The case of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis suggests another circumstance limiting the 
influence of the CRWT when China’s leaders intended to engage in a low-intensity conflict. In 
this case, the issue of morality seemed to be a negligible factor in the considerations that led the 
Chinese leaders to initiate the shelling in 1958. This indicates nothing more than that the Chinese 
concept of righteous war exerted no visible influence upon Chinese decision making when the 
Chinese attempted to conduct a strategic probing by means of low-intensity conflict. 
Another supportive finding results from the analysis of the People’s Daily, which examines 
the Chinese government’s use of morality-based condemnation in the six cases. The results 
indicate that the Chinese government consciously applied morality-based condemnation to its 
opponents. In the cases of the Korean War, the Sino-Indian War, and the Sino-Vietnamese War, 
the frequency of the morality-based condemnation evidently increased after Chinese decision 
making had entered a critical stage. Moreover, in all of those cases we find the preconditions for 
the influence of the CRWT on decision making as well as statements and remarks by the Chinese 
leaders showing traces of that influence. This congruence pattern suggests that the morality-
based condemnation used in the People’s Daily was not just for public consumption but reflected 
the actual thinking of the leadership. In the cases where a decision for war was not the outcome, 
the Chinese government either decreased or maintained the existing level of morality-based 
condemnation once the need for a decision to go to war had receded. Although those findings 
may reflect Chinese threat perception at the time, they also indicate that the Chinese government 
will further emphasize the legitimacy of a decision for war only when such a decision is likely. 
Moreover, the variation in the use of morality-based condemnation is helpful for distinguishing 
between the actual influence of the CRWT, where the frequency of condemnation should 
increase, and the superficial presentation of legitimacy, where the frequency should either 
decrease or remain at its existing level. 
 
Implications 
This study presents a theoretical implication for future studies exploring China’s behavior in 
using of force. Morality was not an irrelevant issue for the Chinese when they were considering 
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the decision for war. As the results show, the Chinese leaders would conduct moral assessment 
of their decision for war through a frame of reference based on the Chinese concept of righteous 
war. The Chinese concept of righteous war would likely convince the Chinese leaders to resort to 
force on a large scale, when the principles of morality demanded. This finding suggests that the 
assessment of righteous legitimacy can be regarded as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
triggering a Chinese decision to go to war. For this reason, it is best not to exclude Chinese 
thought about the justice of war from future studies exploring the pattern of China’s use of force.  
Two implications for policy can be drawn from this study. First, the Chinese expression of 
the concept of righteous war in a foreign crisis in which China is involved deserves the attention 
of any analyst or policy maker who attempts to forecast China’s pattern of use of force. As my 
analysis of the statements of China’s leaders between 1950 and 1979 has shown, their 
expressions of just cause not only reflected the bottom line of their decision to go to war, but also 
could be treated as signals forecasting China’s moves if the preconditions justifying action were 
met. Their language used in the People’s Daily to condemn the moral depravity of China’s 
opponents provides a useful supplement to observe Chinese decisions. In this regard, a Chinese 
decision for war is most likely to occur when the Chinese escalate their morality-based 
condemnation of their opponents. This can help the intelligence or analytical community to 
monitor China’s use of force more precisely by integrating the observation of Chinese moral 
condemnation. 
Second, breaking a deadlock by communication may be a good method to avoid a Chinese 
decision to go to war. This research indirectly confirms that the Chinese prefer to adopt non-
violent methods over the resort to force to resolve foreign crises. This does not mean that policy 
makers should concede whatever China wants in order to avoid direct confrontation, but 
awareness of this Chinese propensity may useful for policy makers seeking to buy time through 
diplomatic maneuver or gain advantages in negotiations. 
 
Direction of Future Research 
The results of this study provide three directions for further academic research. First, as 
implied by the case of the Sino-Soviet border conflict presented here, there is a need to 
investigate how the ideas of the CRWT functioned in different types of war. This investigation 
will further enhance our understanding of Chinese concepts of righteous war. Second, in addition 
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to jus ad bellum which has been discussed in this dissertation, the concepts of jus in bello and jus 
post bellum, to borrow the Western terms, are worth further examination for a more complete 
understanding of the influence of the CRWT upon China’s decisions for conducting warfare. As 
the cases of the Sino-Indian War and the Sino-Vietnamese War show, the Chinese unilaterally 
withdrew their forces to end the conflict. Those acts suggest that the Chinese concept of 
righteous war may exert influence not only on China’s decision for war but also on its decision 
to end a war. Third, it is worthwhile to explore the function of the CRWT in other periods of 
Chinese history. The period being tested in this research tells only a partial story of the CRWT. 
To further understand the CRWT, there is a need to investigate other periods when the CRWT 
may have had more influence on the Chinese government, such as the Ming, Northern and 
Southern Song, Tang, and Han dynasties. 
 
 
199 
 
 
Bibliography  
Online Sources: 
 
Correlates of War Project (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/) 
 
Declassified Documents Reference System (http://infotrac.galegroup.com) 
 
Deng, Xiaoping. “Speech after the Self-defense Counterattack against Vietnam.” March 16, 1979. 
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/d3959bea6294dd88d0d26b42.html 
 
Eisenhower, Dwight D. “Radio and Television Report to the American People Regarding the 
Situation in the Formosa Straits.” John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American 
Presidency Project. September 11, 1958. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11231 
 
Johnson, Lyndon Baines. “Report on the Gulf of Tonkin Incident (August 4, 1964).” Miller 
Center of Public Affairs at University of Virginia. April 25, 2012. 
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3998. 
 
United Nations, Archives and Records Management Section (http://archives.un.org/ARMS/) 
 
 
Newspapers and News Magazine: 
 
Beijing Review 
 
The People’s Daily 
 
The Central Daily News 
 
New York Times 
 
 
Chinese Classics (including translations): 
 
Anonymous. Guanzi. Taipei, Taiwan: Taiwan Zhonghua Book Company, 1981. 
 
Anonymous. The Analects of Confucius. trans. Arthur Waley. New York: Random House, 1938. 
 
Anonymous. The Doctrine of the Mean. trans. James Legge. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 1960. 
 
Anonymous. The Rites of Zhou. Taipei, Taiwan: Taiwan Zhonghua Book Company, 1981. 
 
200 
 
Dai De 戴德. Dadai Liji (大戴禮記 Ritual book by Dai Senior). Beijing, China: Zhonghua Book 
Company, 1985. 
 
Duyvendak , J. J. L. ed. and trans. The Book of Lord Shang: A Classic of the Chinese School of 
Law. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1928. 
 
Fan, Ye 范曄. The Book of the Later Han. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1982. 
 
Henricks, Robert G. ed. and trans. Lao-Tzu Te-Tao Ching: A new translation based on the 
recently discovered Ma-Wang-Tui text. New York: Ballatine Books, 1989. 
 
Johnston, Ian trans. and ann. The Mozi: A Complete Translation. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010. 
 
Knoblock, John and Jeffrey Riegel eds. and trans. The Annals of Lü Buwei: A complete 
translation and study. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000. 
 
Liu, An 劉安. Huainanzi. Taipei, Taiwan: Kwangwen Book Company, 1972. 
 
Major, John S. et al. The Huainanzi: a Guide to the Theory and Practice of Government in Early 
Han China. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 
 
Mencius. The Works of Mencius. trans James Legge. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 
1960. 
 
Sawyer, Ralph D. ed. and trans. The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, Inc., 1993. 
 
Xunzi. Xunzi. trans. John Knoblock. Hunan, China: Hunan People’s Publishing House, 1999. 
 
Yu, Xian-hao, Zhou Fu-chang and Yao Man-bo ann. Zuo Zhuan 左傳. Taipei: San Min Book Co., 
2002. 
 
 
English Primary Sources: 
 
Government Documents: 
 
Donald Hopson, “Report to Foreign Office, No. 720, Priority/Confidential, 31 May 1965.” 
Foreign Office Files for China 371/180990, London. 
 
The Eighty-Fourth Congress of the United States. “Joint Resolution: Authoring the President to 
employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the 
Pescadores and related positions and territories of that area.” United States Statutes at Large. vol. 
69 (1955): 7 
 
201 
 
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume XIX, 
China. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1995). 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19 
 
Memoirs: 
 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-
1981. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1983. 
 
Carter, Jimmy. Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President. New York: Bantam Books, 1982. 
 
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Waging Peace, 1956-1961. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965. 
 
Johnson, Lyndon B. The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971. 
 
Lee, Kuan Yew. From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965-2000. New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2000. 
 
 
Chinese Primary Sources: 
 
Official Records: 
 
Geng, Biao 耿飆. “Secret Report.” Studies on Chinese Communism. 166 (October, 1980): 141-
162. 
 
Jiangguo yilai MaoZedong wengao (建國以來毛澤東文稿 Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the 
Founding of the People’s Republic of China). 13 vols. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1987-97. 
 
Jiangguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao (建國以來周恩來文稿 Zhou Enlai’s Manuscripts since the 
Founding of the People’s Republic of China). 3 vols. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 2008. 
 
Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (建國以來重要文獻選編 Selected Works of the 
Important Documents since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China).  20 vols. Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian, 1992-1998. 
 
Jin, Chongji 金沖及 et al. Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949-1976 (周恩來年譜, 1949-1976 A 
Chronological Records of Zhou Enlai, 1949-1976). 3 vols. Beijing, Zhongyang wenxian, 1998. 
 
Liu, Shufa 劉樹發 ed. Chen Yi nianpu (陳毅年譜 A Chronological Record of Chen Yi). Beijing: 
Renmin, 1995. 
 
Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan (毛澤東外交文選 Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong). 
Beijing: Shijie zhishi, 1994. 
 
202 
 
Mao Zedong wenji (毛澤東文集 A Collection of Mao Zedong’s Works). 8 vols. Beijing: Renmin, 
1993-1997. 
 
Mao Zedong xuanji (毛澤東選集 Selected Works of Mao Zedong). 5 vols. Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1991. 
 
Sanzhongquanhui yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (三中全會以來重要文獻選編 Selected 
Works of the Important Documents since the Third Plenum). Beijing: Central Literature 
Publishing House, 2011. 
 
The Institute of Contemporary China Studies. The Annals of the People’s Republic of China 
(1950). Beijing, China: Contemporary China Publishing House, 2006. 
 
The PRC Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic History Research Office. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong 
dashiji, 1949-1975 (周恩來外交活動大事記 A Chronology of Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic 
Activities, 1949-1975). Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1993. 
 
Wu, Dianyao 吳殿堯 et al., Zhu De nainpu, 1886-1976 (朱德年譜, 1886-1976 A Chronological 
Records of Zhu De). 3 vols. Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2006. 
 
Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Rishi, 1978 (中華人民共和國年史: 1978 Daily History of the 
People’s Republic of China, Vol. the Year of 1978). Sichuan: Sichuan People Press, 2003. 
 
Zhong yin bianjiang ziwei fanji zuozhanshi (中印邊境自衛反擊作戰史 A Combat History of the 
Sino-India Border Self-defense War). Beijing: Junshi kexue chubanshe, 1994. 
http://info.cndsi.com/html/20051126/1754143209.html. 
 
Zhongguo gongchandang lishijishi (中國共產黨歷史紀實 The Historical Records of the 
Chinese Communist Party). 10 books, 30 vols. Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003. 
 
Zhou Enlai junshi wenxuan (周恩來軍事文選 Selected Military Papers of Zhou Enlai). 4 vols. 
Beijing: Renmin, 1997.  
 
Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (周恩來外交文選 Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai). 
Beijing, China: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990. 
 
Official Released Biographies: 
 
Chen Yi zhuan (陳毅傳 A Biography of Chen Yi). Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing 
House, 1995. 
 
Feng, Xianzhi 逢先知 and Jin Chongji 金沖及 ed.. Mao Zedong zhuan, 1949-1976 (毛澤東傳, 
1949-1976 A Biography of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976). Beijing, China: Zhongyang Wenxian 
Chubanshe, 2003. 
 
203 
 
He Long zhuan (賀龍傳 A Biography of He Long). Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing 
House, 2007. 
 
Huang, Yao 黃瑤 and Zhang Mingzhe 張明哲 ed. Lou Ruiqing zhuan (羅瑞卿傳 A Biography 
of Lou Ruiqing). Beijing: Contemporary China Publishing House, 1994. 
 
Jiang Feng 姜鋒 et al., Yang Yong jiangjun zhuan (楊勇將軍傳 Biography of General Yang 
Yong). Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1991. 
 
Jin, Chongji ed., Zhu De zhuan (朱德傳 A Biography of Zhu De). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 
1993. 
 
Jin, Chongji 金沖及 ed. Zhou Enlai zhuan, 1949-1976 (周恩來傳, 1949-1976 A biography of 
Zhou Enlai, 1949-1976). Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1998. 
 
Jin Ye 金治, Hu Juchen 胡居成 and Hu Zhaocai 胡兆才, Baizhan jiangxing Xu Shiyou (許世友
將軍傳 Biography of General Xu Shiyou). Beijing: PLA Art Press, 1999. 
 
Liu Bocheng zhuan (劉伯承傳 A Biography of Liu Bocheng). Beijing: Contemporary China 
Publishing House, 2007. 
 
 
Memoirs: 
 
Lei, Yingfu 雷英夫. Zai zuigaotongshuaibu dang canmou: Lei Yingfu jiang ju hui yi lu (在最高
統帥部當參謀: 雷英夫將軍回憶錄 General Lei Yingfu’s Memoir). Nanchang, China: 
Baihuazhou wenyi chubanshe, 1997. 
 
Liu Huaqing 劉華清, Liu Huaqing huiyi lu (劉華清回憶錄 Memoir of Liu Huaqing). Beijing: 
Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2004. 
 
Peng, Dehuai 彭德懷. Peng Dehuai zishu (彭德懷自述 Peng Dehuai’s Memoir). Beijing: 
Jiefangjun wenyi chubanshe, 2002. 
 
Yang, Dezhi 楊得志. Yang Dezhi huiyilu (楊得志回憶錄 Yang Dezhi Memoir). Beijing: 
Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1993. 
 
Wang, Yan 王焰 ed. Peng Dehuai nianpu (彭德懷年譜 A Chronological Record of Peng 
Dehuai). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1998. 
 
Zheng, Wenhan 鄭文翰. Mishu riji li de Peng laozong (秘書日記裡的彭老總 Marshal Peng as 
Recorded in His Secretary’s Diary). Beijing: Junshi kexue, 1998. 
 
204 
 
Zhou Deli 周德禮, Yige gaojicanmouzhang de zishu (一個高級參謀的自述 Personal 
Recollection of a High-ranking Chief of Staff). Nanjing: Nanjing chubanshe, 1992. 
 
Tong, Xiaopeng 童小鵬. Fengyu sishinian (風雨四十年 Forty Years of Storms). Beijing: 
Zhongyang wenxian, 1996. 
 
Wang Nianyi 王年一. Dadongluan de niandai (大動亂的年代 The Era of Maelstrom). Henan: 
Henan renmin chubanshe, 1988. 
 
Wang, Bingnan 王炳南. Zhongmei huitan jiunian huigu (中美會談九年回顧 Nine Years of 
Sino-American Talks in Retrospect). Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1985. 
 
Wu, Lengxi 吳冷西. Yi Mao zhuxi (憶毛主席 Recalling Chairman Mao). Beijing: Xinhua, 1994. 
 
Xiong, Xianghui 熊向暉. Wode qingbao yu waijiao shengya (我的情報與外交生涯 My Career 
in Intelligence and Diplomacy). Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2006. 
 
Ye, Fei 葉飛. Ye Fei huiyilu (葉飛回憶錄 Ye Fei’s Memoir). Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 
1988. 
 
 
Secondary Sources: 
 
An, Tai Sung. The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute. Philadelphia, PA: The Westminster Press, 
1973. 
 
Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002. 
 
Butler, Michael J. “U.S. Military Intervention in Crisis, 1945-1994: An Empirical Inquiry of Just 
War Theory.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution. 47, No.2 (2003): 226-248. 
 
Chang, Pao-min. Kampuchea between China and Vietnam. Singapore: Singapore University 
Press, 1985. 
 
Chen, Jian. “The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China’s Changing Relations with India and the 
Soviet Union.” Journal of Cold War. 8, No. 3 (Summer 2006): 54-101. 
 
________. China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. 
 
________. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2001. 
 
Chen, King C. China’s War with Vietnam, 1979: Issue, Decision, and Implications. California: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1987. 
205 
 
 
Chen, Lai 陳來. Gudai Sixiang Wenhua de Shijie: Chunqiu Shiqi de Zongjiao Lunli yu Shehui 
Sixiang (古代思想文化的世界 – 春秋時代的宗教、倫理與社會思想 The World of Ancient 
Thought and Culture: Thoughts of Religion, Morality, and Society in the Spring and Autumn 
Period ). Beijing: Sdx Joint Publishing Company, 2002. 
 
Chen, Steve. “Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behavior: Assessment from a Perspective of 
Conflict Management.” World Politics. 30, No. 3 (April, 1978): 391-410. 
 
Ch’ien, Mu. Guo Shi Dagang (國史大綱 The Outlines of National History). Taipei: The 
Commerce Press, 2005. 
 
Christensen, Thomas. “Threats, Assurance, and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lesson of Mao’s 
Korean War Telegrams.” International Security. 17 (Summer 1992): 122-154. 
 
Collier, David. “Understanding Process Tracing.” PS: Political Science and Politics. 44, No. 4 
(2011): 823-830. 
 
De Bary, WM. Theodore and Irene Bloom. Sources of Chinese Tradition: From Earliest Times 
to 1600. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 
 
Duiker, William J. China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict. Berkeley, California: Institute of 
East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986. 
 
Eckstein, Harry. Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change. 
California: University of California Press, 1992. 
 
Evera, Stephen Van. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1997. 
 
Fairbank, John King. “Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience.” in Chinese Ways in 
Warfare. ed. Frank A. Kierman and John King Fairbank. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1974: 1-26. 
 
Feng, Huiyun. Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, 
Leadership and War. Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2007. 
 
Fisher, David Fisher Morality and War: Can War be Just in the Twenty-first Century. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011. 
 
Gaddis, John Lewis. Now We Know: Rethinking Cold War History. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1997. 
 
Garver, John W. “China’s Decision for War with India in 1962.” in New Directions in the Study 
of Chinese Foreign Policy. eds. Robert S. Ross and Alastair Iain Johnston. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2006: 86-130. 
206 
 
 
___________. Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 2001. 
 
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2005. 
 
Godehardt, Nadine. “The Chinese Meaning of Just War and its Impact on the Foreign Policy of 
the People’s Republic of China.” GIGA Working Paper No. 88 (September, 2008). 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287161. 
 
Goncharov, Sergei N., John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai. Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the 
Korean War. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993. 
 
Guo Ming 郭明 ed. Zhong Yue guanxiyanbian sishi nian (中越關係演變四十年 A 40-Year 
Development of the Sino-Vietnamese Relationship). Guangxi: Guangxi People Press, 1992. 
 
Guthrie, Charles and Michael Quinlan. Just War - The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern 
Warfare. New York: Walker & Company, 2007. 
 
He, Ming 何明 and Lo Feng 羅鋒, Zhongsuguanxi zhongda shijian shushi (中蘇關係重大事件
述實 Record of Critical Events in the Sino-Soviet Relationship). Beijing: Renmin, 2007. 
 
Heinlein, Joseph. “The Ground Forces,” in The Military and Political Power in China in the 
1970s. ed. William W. Whitson. New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1972: 153-169. 
 
Helperin, Morton H. The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis: A Documentary History. Santa Monica, 
Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1966. 
 
Hensel, Howard M. ed. The Prism of Just War: Asian and Western Perspectives on the 
Legitimate Use of Military Force. Surrey and Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010. 
 
Herring, George C. LBJ and Vietnam War: A Different Kind of War. Texas: The University of 
Texas Press, 1994. 
 
Hershberg, James G. and Chen Jian. “Reading and Warning the Likely Enemy: China’s Signals 
to the United States about the Vietnam in 1965.” The International History Review. 27, no.1 
(Mar. 2005): 47-84. 
 
Heuser, Beatrice. The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
 
Hood, Steven J. Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War. Armonk, NY: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1992. 
 
207 
 
Hunt, Michael H. “Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950 – June 1951.” Political Science 
Quarterly. 107 (Fall 1992): 453-478. 
 
_____________. A Vietnam War Reader: A Documentary History from American and 
Vietnamese Perspectives. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2010. 
 
Jencks, Harlan W. “China’s ‘Punitive’ War on Vietnam: A Military Assessment.” Asian Survey. 
19, No. 8 (1979): 801-815. 
 
Jia, Rouyu 賈若瑜 chief ed. Mao Zedong junshi sixiang (毛澤東軍事思想 Mao Zedong’s 
Military Thought). Shandong: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1993. 
 
Johnson, Dominic D. P. and Dominic Tierney. “The Rubicon Theory of War: How the Path to 
Conflict Reaches the Point of No Return.” International Security. 36, No. 1 (Summer 2011): 7-
40. 
 
Johnston, Alastair Iain. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese 
History. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
 
Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1819-
1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns.” Conflict Management and Peace 
Science. 15, no. 2 (1996): 163-213. 
 
Kang, Ching-Piao 康經彪. “Just War Thought of the Pre-Qin Period.” WHAMPOA - An 
Interdisciplinary Journal. no. 51(2006) : 125-142. 
 
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
Lei, Yingfu 雷英夫. “Kangmei yuanchao zhanzheng jige zhongda juece de huiyi (xu yi)” (抗美
援朝戰爭幾個重大決策的回憶- 續一 Recall of several major decisions in the war to resist U.S. 
aggression and aid Korea, the first continuance). Dang de wenxian (黨的文獻 Party Literature). 
no. 1(1993): 24-30. 
 
Lewis, Mark E. “The Just War in Early China.” in The Ethics of War in Asian Civilizations: A 
Comparative Perspective. ed. Torkel Brekke. London and New York: Routledge, 2006: 185-200 
 
Levy, Jack S. “Cases Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference.” Conflict Management 
and Peace Science. 25, No 1 (2008): 1-18. 
 
Levy, Jack S.and William R. Thompson. Causes of War. West Sussex, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd., 2010. 
 
Li, Xiaobing, Allan R. Millet, and Bin Yu trans. and eds. Mao’s Generals Remember Korea. 
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2001. 
208 
 
 
Li, Chun-ling 李春玲. “Warsaw Talks and Sino-American Handling of the Taiwan Strait Crisis 
of 1958.” Shixue yuekan (史學月刊 Journal of Historical Science). vol.7 (2005): 97-114. 
 
Li, Danhui 李丹慧. “1969 nian zhongsu bianjie chongtu: yuanqi he jieguo” (1969 年中蘇邊界衝
突: 緣起和結果 The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict in 1969: its causes and consequences). 
Dangdai zhongguoshi yanjiu (當代中國史研究 Research on Contemporary Chinese History). no. 
3 (1996): 39-50. 
 
_______________. “Political Fighters and Adversaries: Sino-Soviet Border Relations in the 
1960s - the second research on Sino-Soviet border relation.” Shehui Kexue (社會科學 Social 
Science). no. 2 (2007): 146-167. 
 
_______________. “Zhongsu guanxi yu zhongguo de yuanyue kangmei” (中蘇關係與中國的援
越抗美 The Sino-Soviet Relationship and China’s Policy of Aiding Vietnam and Resisting 
America). Dangdai zhongguoshi yanjiu (當代中國史研究 Research on Contemporary Chinese 
History). no.3 (1998): 111-125. 
 
Li, Feng. Landscape and Power in Early China: The Crisis and Fall of the Western Zhou, 1045-
771 BC. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 
Li, Ke 李克 and Hao Shengzheng 赫生章, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun (文化
大革命中的人民解放軍 The People’s Liberation Army during the Cultural Revolution). Beijing: 
Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, 1989. 
 
Li, Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson translated and annotated, “Mao Zedong’s 
Handling of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958: Chinese Recollections and Documents,” Cold War 
International History Project Bulletin. nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995): 207-225. 
 
Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2008. 
 
McNeal, Robin. Conquer and Govern: Early Chinese Military Texts from the Yizhou Shu. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2012. 
 
Maxwell, Neville. “Sino-Indian Border Reconsidered.” Economic and Political Weekly. 34, No. 
15 (1999): 905-918 
 
_____________. India’s China War. New York: Pantheon Books, 1970. 
 
Millett, Allan Reed. The War for Korea, 1950-1951: they came from the north. Lawrence, 
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2010. 
 
Niu, Jun 牛軍. “The Decision-making of the Jinmen Bombardment Revisited.” Guoji Zhengzhi 
Yanjiu (國際政治研究 International Politics Quarterly). vol. 3(2009): 161-184. 
209 
 
 
O’Dowd, Edward C. Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist 
War. New York: Routledge, 2007. 
 
Orend, Brian. The Morality of War. Toronto, Canada: Broadview Press, 2006. 
 
Ostermann, Christian F. “New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71.” Cold War 
International History Project Bulletin. nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995): 186-206 
 
Pollack, Jonathan D. Into the Vortex: China, the Sino-Soviet Alliance, and the Korean War. 
Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1990. 
 
Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: 
Wiley-Interscience, 1970. 
 
Ross, Robert S. The Indochina Tangle: China’s Vietnam Policy, 1975-1979. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1988. 
 
Ryden SJ, Edmund. Just War and Pacifism: Chinese and Christian Perspective in Dialogue. 
Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute, 2001. 
 
Scobell, Andrew. China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Shen, Zhi-hua 沈志華. Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu chaoxianzhanzheng (毛澤東、史達林與朝鮮戰
爭 Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War). Guangdong, China: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 
2003. 
 
Shi, Bo 師博 ed. 1962, Zhong Yin dazhan jishi (1962, 中印大戰紀實 Record of Events in the 
Sino-Indian Major War, 1962). Beijing: Dadi chubanshe, 1993. 
 
Stroble, James A. “Justification of War in Ancient China.” Asian Philosophy. 8, no. 3 (1998): 
165-190. 
 
Turner, Karen. “War, Punishment, and The Law of Nature in Early Chinese Concepts of The 
State.” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 53,no. 2 (1993): 285-324 
 
Waley, Arthur. Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1982. 
 
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New 
York: Basic Books, 2006. 
 
Wang, Jianwen. Feng Tian Cheng Yun: Gudai Zhongguo de Guojia Gainian ji qi Zhengdangxing 
Jichu (奉天承運: 古代中國的國家概念及其正當性基礎 Heaven-Sent Conveyances: the 
210 
 
Concept and the Foundation of Validity of “State” in Ancient China). Taipei: Dong Da Tu Shu 
Publishing Company, 1995. 
 
Wang, Yan 王彥. Paoji Jinmen (砲擊金門 The Bombardment of Jinmen). Jiangsu, China: 
Jiangsu wenyi chubanshe, 1992. 
 
Wang, Zhongchun. “The Soviet Factor in Sino-American Normalization, 1969-1979.” in 
Normalization of U.S.-China Relations: An International History eds. William C. Kirby, Robert 
S. Ross, and Gong Li. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005: 158-164. 
 
Wang, Yuan-Kang. Harmony and War: Confucian culture and Chinese Power Politics. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011. 
 
Westad, Odd Arne, Chen Jian, Stein Tønneson, Nguyen Vu Tung and James G. Hershberg, eds., 
77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977, 
CWIHP Working Paper No. 22, (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 1998). 
 
Whiting, Allen S. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina. Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 2001. 
 
Wooley, John T. “Using Media-Based Data in Studies of Politics.” American Journal of Political 
Science. 44, No. 1 (Jan., 2000): 156-173. 
 
Xu, Yan 徐焰. Jinmen Zhizhan (金門之戰 The Jinmen Battle). Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo 
dianshi, 1992. 
 
___________. Zhong Yin bianjie zhi zhan lishi zhenxiang (中印邊界之戰歷史真相 True history 
of the Sino- Indian border war). Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd., 1993. 
 
___________. Liushinian guoshi jiyao: Junshi juan (六十年國史紀要 – 軍事卷 The Summary 
of National Affairs for Sixty Years: Volume Military Affairs). Hunan: Hunan Renmin 
Chubanshe, 2009. 
 
Xue Mouhong 薛謀洪 and Pei Jianzhang 裴堅章. Dangdai zhongguo waijiao (當代中國外交 
The Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy). Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1988. 
 
Yang, Kuison 楊奎松. “Mao Zedong yu yinduzhina zhanzheng” (毛澤東與印度支那戰爭 Mao 
Zedong and the Indochina Wars). in Zhongguo yu yinduzhina zhanzheng (中國與印度支那戰爭 
China and the Indochina Wars), ed. Li Danhui 李丹慧. Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 2000. 
 
_________________. “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-
American Rapprochement.” Cold War History. 1, no.1 (August 2000): 21-52. 
 
211 
 
Ye, Yonglie 葉永烈. Cong Hua Guofeng dao Deng Xiaoping: Zhonggongshiyijie sanzhong 
quanhui qianhou (從華國鋒到鄧小平: 中共十一屆三中全會前後 From Hua Guofeng to Deng 
Xiaoping: Before and After the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Party Committee). Hong 
Kong: Tiandi Books, 1998. 
 
Zhai, Qiang. “Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965: New Chinese Evidence.” CWIHP 
Bulletin Issue 6-7 (Winter 1995-1996): 232-242. 
 
_________. China & the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975. Chapel Hill and London: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2000. 
 
Zhang, Shu Guang. Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953. 
Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1995. 
 
Zhang Xiaoming. “Deng Xiaoping and China's Decision to go to War with Vietnam.” Journal of 
Cold War Studies. 12, No. 3 (2010): 3-29. 
 
Zhou Deli 周德禮, Xu Shiyou de zuihou yizhan (許世友的最後一戰 The Last Battle of Xu 
Shiyou). Nanjing: Jiangsu People Press, 1990. 
 
 
212 
 
 
Appendix A - The Levels of Hostility in the MID Dataset 
Source: Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer. “Militarized Interstate 
Disputes, 1819-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns.” Conflict Management 
and Peace Science. 15, No. 2: 163-213. 
Definitions of Threats of Force in MID Dataset 
Action Definition 
Threat to use force threat by one state to use its regular armed forces 
to fire upon the armed forces or violate the 
territory of another state 
Threat to blockade threat by one state to use its ships, airplanes or 
troops to seal off the territory of another state, so 
as to prevent either entry or exit 
Threat to occupy territory threat by one state to use military force to occupy 
the whole or part of another state's territory 
Threat to declare war threat by one state to issue an official declaration 
of war against another state 
Threat to use nuclear weapons threat by one state to use all or part of its nuclear 
arsenal against the territory or forces of another 
state. 
Definitions of Displays of force 
Action Definition 
Alert reported increase in the military readiness of a 
state's regular armed forces 
Mobilization activation by a state of all or part of its 
previously inactive forces. 
Show of troops public demonstration by a state of its land based 
military forces, not involving combat operations 
(e.g., maneuvers) 
Show of ships public demonstration by a state of its naval 
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military forces, including a purposeful display of 
naval forces outside the territorial waters of a 
targeted state 
Show of planes public demonstration by a state of its airborne 
capabilities (e.g., repeated air space violations). 
Fortify border explicit attempt to publicly demonstrate control 
over a border area through the construction or 
reinforcement of military outposts to defend or 
claim territory. 
Nuclear alert increase in military readiness of a state's nuclear 
forces. 
Border Violation crossing of a recognized land, sea or air 
boundary for a period of less than twenty-four 
hours by official forces of one state, without any 
force being used on the territory (or population) 
of the targeted state or any significant public 
demonstration of military force capability. 
Definitions of Uses of force 
Action Definition 
Blockade crossing of a recognized land, sea or air boundary 
for a period of less than twenty-four hours by 
official forces of one state, without any force 
being used on the territory (or population) of the 
targeted state or any significant public 
demonstration of military force capability. 
Occupation of territory use of military force by one state to occupy the 
whole or part of another state's territory for a 
period of more than twenty-four hours. The 
immediate occupation after a war by the 
victorious side's army is not coded as an incident 
unless provisions of the treaty are violated by the 
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occupying forces or further militarized incidents 
are undertaken by the state being occupied. 
Seizure capture of material or personnel of official forces 
from another state, or the detention of private 
citizens operating within contested territory. 
Seizures must last at least twenty-four hours to 
be included. 
Clash outbreak of military hostilities between regular 
armed forces of two or more system members, in 
which the initiator may or may not be clearly 
identified. 
Raid use of regular armed forces of a state to fire upon 
the armed forces, population, or territory of 
another state. Within this incident type, the 
initiator can be clearly identified and its action is 
not sanctioned by the target. 
Declaration of war official statement by one state that it is in a state 
of war with another state 
Use of CBR weapons use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons 
from the arsenal of one state employed against 
the territory or forces of another resulting in less 
than 1,000 total battle deaths per dispute 
 
